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Abstract 
The growing lack of confidence in public companies arises from the recent accounting 
scandals and corporate collapses, which have been attributed to the consequences of 
separation of ownership and control in modern firms. Agency theory predicts a conflict of 
interest between managers and shareholders that leads to agency costs and weak 
performance. This study used agency, stakeholders’, and stewardship theories as the 
theoretical framework and multiple regression analysis to examine the relationship 
between corporate governance mechanisms and organizational performance in 
nonfinancial firms listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange. The results of the study could 
help clarify understanding of corporate governance to managers, investors, and regulators 
who seek to understand how corporate governance impact firms’ performance. In this 
study, corporate governance mechanisms included board independence, audit committee 
independence, board size, number of board meetings, and executive compensation. The 
data were collected from the firms’ published accounts on their websites and on the 
archives of the Nigerian Stock Exchange for a period starting from January 1, 2011 to 
December 31, 2015. The measures of financial performance in the study were return on 
assets, return on capital employed, and Tobin’s Q. The study found a positive but not 
statistically significant relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and 
financial performance. This study has implications for positive social change by showing 
managers and other stakeholders of firms how a good corporate governance system 
assures investor confidence, employee loyalty and commitment, the reduction in conflict 
of interest and agency costs, and a strong financial performance. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study  
Introduction 
The need for effective corporate governance mechanisms in joint-stock 
companies arises from the separation of ownership from control. The owners of 
the company, the shareholders, employ managers as their agents to manage the 
business and take strategic and operational decisions in the interest of the firm and 
shareholders. Because the agents and owners are separate individuals and groups, 
the relationship between them often bring conflicts of interest. Whereas the 
managers are employed to maximize returns to shareholders and also look after 
the interests of all other stakeholders, they often pursue self-interest to the 
detriment of the financial interest of their principals (Haji, 2014; Smith, 2003). By 
using insider knowledge, managers of corporations could hide and use price-
sensitive information to benefit themselves (Appuhami & Bhuyan, 2015; Liu, 
Valenti, & Chen, 2016). 
Although the principal-agent problems in corporations have existed since 
the time of the industrial revolution, the attention of the business and political 
leaders around the world was drawn afresh to the insidious nature of this 
challenge facing business enterprises when the former energy giant, Enron, Inc., 
collapsed. Enron’s bankruptcy destroyed shareholders’ value and put many 
employees out of jobs (Liu, Miletkov, Wei, & Yang, 2015). Other high-profile 
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financial scandals and corporate collapses followed that of Enron with Waste 
Management, Parmalat, Lehman Brothers, and Global Crossing being a few of 
those that made headlines (Burnsed, 2009CITE). Researchers have suggested that 
the common thread that runs through the financial scandals and corporate 
dysfunctional behavior has its roots in weak corporate governance systems 
(Conyon & He, 2016; Ueng, 2016). The problem is also a result of incompetence, 
poor organizational culture, and leadership styles that are excessively focused on 
the short-term profit, excessive risk-taking, and the pursuit of self-interest by 
managers (Zona, 2016). O’Connor and Byrne (2015) and Rashid (2015) traced the 
problems in corporations to poor corporate governance systems and weak and 
ineffective enforcement of corporate governance standards by the board of 
directors 
To ensure company directors are more transparent, adhere strictly to 
corporate governance standards, and are more accountable to shareholders, the 
U.S. government enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act of 2002, following the 
collapse of Enron, Inc (Malthotra, Poteau, & Fritz, 2013). The objective of SOX 
is to protect present and potential investors and creditors of corporations by 
regulating the content, accuracy, and reliability of corporate disclosures in the 
financial statements (Dah, 2016). One of the most profound changes brought by 
the SOX is the establishment of the Public Companies Accounting Oversight 
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Board (PCAOB). The PCAOB has the mandate to (a) register all public 
accounting firms that audit public companies; (b) establish auditing, quality 
control, ethical, and independence attestation standards required of external 
auditors; (c) periodically assess the degree to which audit firms comply with the 
rules of the PCAOB and professional standards; and (d) establish procedures for 
investigating and disciplining registered firms and persons associated with them 
(SOX, 2002).  
The SOX (2002) also requires public companies to ensure independent 
directors are in a majority on the boards of directors and to have audit committees 
composed entirely of independent directors. These provisions should ensure that 
governance mechanisms have the potential to reduce agency problems and enable 
the firms to function effectively (Baran & Forst, 2015). In line with the SOX, 
many countries have developed corporate governance codes and standards that 
aim to reduce agency costs, minimize corporate risk, improve firm performance, 
and reduce the incidences of corporate collapses (Bhagat & Bolton, 2013).  
While laws like SOX and corporate governance codes developed by major 
stock exchanges may reduce managers’ excesses, I will argue in this study that 
these mechanisms are necessary but not sufficient to eliminate agency problems 
in corporations. Regulators, the board of directors, and all stakeholders must be 
vigilant and continuously monitor the performance of their companies. Managers’ 
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greed, self-dealing, and incompetence in managing other peoples’ money are not 
new. According to James (2011), financial frauds have been occurring since 193 
A.D. An example was the purported sale of the Roman Empire by the guard of the 
Emperor to an unsuspecting purchaser (James, 2013). James also documented 
many other financial hoaxes, like the Mississippi Scheme in 1719, when the 
Scottish financier, John Law, sold shares in a company that promised tremendous 
gains in gold and silver in what was, and remains, a swampy backwater. Then 
there was the original Ponzi scheme of 1920 by Charles Ponzi, in which investors 
lost money by engaging in purchases and sales of postal coupons while relying on 
Ponzi’s exaggerated and unfounded claims of profit from the transaction (James, 
201). 
It would appear that investors did not learn any lessons from the original 
Ponzi scheme of 1920, or from any of the financial scandals before that case. In 
1986, Barry Minkow swindled investors by selling shares in ZZZZ Best for a 
stock valuation of $200 million in a company worth only a fraction of that sum 
(James, 2011). Then in 2008, a bigger, modern-day Ponzi scheme took place in 
the United States: Bernard Madoff was accused and convicted by the federal 
authorities of running a Ponzi scheme and was also charged with money 
laundering (James, 2013). For his crimes, Madoff was sentenced to 150 years in 
prison (Burnsed, 2009).  
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As Burnsed (2009) also reported, many other corporate frauds and 
irregularities have been discovered after the passage of the SOX. Samuel Israel III 
led the Bayou group, a Stamford (CT)-based hedge fund that took $450 million 
from investors and diverted the money to private uses (James, 2013). The courts 
have also convicted many top management employees of insider trading and for 
hiding information on the losses they were making. Jerome Kerviel was a futures 
trader in Societe Generale Bank who incurred $8 billion loss without any express 
permission from his bosses (James, 2011). The case of Ivan Boesky and Michael 
Milken in 1986 is similar to that of Kerviel; the two traders were convicted and 
jailed for insider trading (James, 2011). 
Tom Petters, who ran the Petters Group Worldwide in Minnesota, was 
indicted in 2008 for money laundering, conspiracy, and wire and mail fraud 
(James, 2011). Petters’ scheme ran from 1995 to 2008 and involved false reports 
to investors that their money was being put to good use to buy and resell 
wholesale consumer goods (James, 2011). Investors of Petters Group Worldwide 
lost $1 billion (James, 2011). The incidences cited above indicate that the solution 
to financial scandals, especially the problem caused by the separation of 
ownership from control, require several tools and corporate systems to prevent, 
detect, and punish perpetrators of corporate crime. The individual leadership 
styles of the managers involved in the cases, the corporate governance 
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mechanisms in place, and the particular organizational culture existing in the 
corporations at the time, mostly predicted these outcomes. 
In this study, I examined the impact of corporate governance mechanisms 
on the performance of nonfinancial firms listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange. 
In the study, I covered all nonfinancial firms and excluded banks and other 
finance companies, such as hedge funds and unit trusts. The exclusion of firms in 
the financial industry wasimportant because these companies are highly regulated 
by the Central Bank of Nigeria and other government agencies. Firms in the 
financial industry follow the rules of the regulators, which are different from the 
rules and accounting procedures of nonfinancial corporations. In this study, I 
focused on 116 nonfinancial firms listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange, and the 
data spanned 5 years from 2011 to 2015. Although several researchers have found 
a positive and significant association between organizational performance and 
corporate governance mechanisms, the results of the degree of impact of board 
characteristics and other corporate governance mechanisms on organizational 
performance have been mixed (Al-Saidi & Al-Shammari, 2015; Rashid, 2015). 
My objective in this study was to contribute to the present body of research by 
examining how firm size and age moderate the relationship between corporate 
governance and company performance generally, and particularly in Nigeria. 
7 
 
 
Background of the Problem 
The industrial revolution, which began in England and then spread to the 
whole of Europe and North America, took place between the 18th and 19th 
centuries (Montagna, 1981). The revolution transformed a mainly agrarian, rural, 
and feudal society in Europe and America into cosmopolitan, industrial, and 
urban communities (Montagna, 1981). The owners of capital, the capitalists, 
replaced landowners and feudal lords as the primary source of wealth creation in 
the economy (Lewis, 1992). The proprietors of the new businesses employed the 
majority of the population to work in factories, mines, railroads, communications, 
and shipping industries, rather than farms (Lewis, 1992). The companies and 
businesses required enormous capital to finance them, which one inventor or 
entrepreneur may not have been able to supply. Without money to fund the new 
ventures, the industrial revolution would not have achieved the spectacular 
progress that has transformed peoples’ life, conditions of living, and made 
available goods and services that are now ubiquitous all over the world.  
The real revolution came when the English government introduced the 
concept of limited liability as a way to finance the new ventures. Individuals 
could invest in a company or venture without being involved in the day-to-day 
management of the business, and the only liability they have, should the business 
fail, is the obligation to pay any unpaid allotment on their shares (Smith, 2003). 
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For investing in the venture, the firms pay the investors dividends, and they are 
assured of capital growth if the venture succeeds (Smith, 2003). Although 
businesspeople could exploit the concept of limited liability to their advantage, 
such as the cases of the South Sea Company and the Mississippi Company that 
collapsed in 1720, the idea revolutionized corporate finance and gave both 
investors and business people the means to achieve their financial objectives 
(James, 2013). 
Sadly, one of the unintended consequences of limited liability of a joint-
stock company is the conflict of interest that arises between shareholders, who 
own the business, and managers, who are the agents that manage the enterprise. 
The conflict of interest is present in large firms due to the separation of ownership 
from control. The managers, who are expected to represent the interests of the 
shareholders, often engage in the pursuit of self-interest that hurt the owners. The 
managers can do this because they are in control of the firm’s assets and 
resources, and they possess insider knowledge that the shareholders do not have. 
They often use the information to benefit themselves financially, or conceal 
value-destroying information from the shareholders to retain their employment 
and status, or to deliberately manipulate the firms’ state of affairs to deceive the 
stockholders (Larcker & Tayan, 2013). The latter acts are the classic principal-
agent problems that result in agency costs, the cost being borne entirely by the 
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equity owners, and by extension, all the other stakeholders such as bondholders, 
creditors, employees, the government, and the general public (Larcker & Tayan, 
2013).  
All things being equal, the shareholders should be better off if they 
formulate the corporate strategy, take all the critical decisions in the firm, and run 
the company on a daily basis (Smith, 2003). But in practice, especially for the 
large, publicly traded multinational corporations, it is neither possible, 
practicable, nor convenient for stockholders to run their own firms. As Larcker 
and Tayan (2013) stated, a business owner or a group of shareholders may add 
some control systems to deal with the principal-agent problems and reduce the 
agency costs that result from the conflict of interest between the managers and 
owners. Since the mid-1970s, this system of controls has come to be known as 
corporate governance (Larcker & Tayan, 2013). The controls might include 
inventory and risk management systems, internal auditing, independent external 
auditing, and the board of directors as a monitoring system (Lenard, Yu, & York, 
2014). The board is the organ of the business and the representative of the 
shareholders in the company whose duties are to monitor the executive directors, 
offer counsel and advice to the managers of the firm, and determine the broad 
vision and strategies to guide the company to achieve its objectives (Adewuyi & 
Olowookere, 2013). 
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The term “corporate governance” formally entered the Federal Register, 
the official journal of the U.S. federal government, in 1976 (Cheffins, 2015). 
Before 1976, the America’s Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) had 
begun to enforce corporate governance codes and bring erring managers to 
account (Cheffins, 2015). In 1974, the SEC sued three nonexecutive directors of 
Penn Central for misrepresentation of the firm’s financial condition and for 
inadequate oversight and failure to uncover various misconduct of the company’s 
top management (Cheffins, 2015).  
In 1991 in the United Kingdom, the Financial Reporting Council, the 
London Stock Exchange, and the U.K. accountancy profession set up the Cadbury 
Committee, following numerous financial scandals and corporate failures 
(Cybinski & Windsor, 2013). The Committee was charged, among other things, 
to: (a) review the structure and the responsibilities of the board and recommend 
the code of best practice, (a) consider the role of auditors and make 
recommendations to the accountancy profession, and (c) highlight the rights and 
responsibilities of the shareholders (Badi, 2013). Many researchers and corporate 
executives see the recommendations of the committee as a landmark in corporate 
governance and company management. 
Some of the most important recommendations of the Cadbury Committee 
are: (a) all quoted companies should comply with code of best practice in 
11 
 
 
corporate governance, and stock exchanges should get annual financial statements 
of listed companies with a statement of compliance with the standard; (b) the 
position of the chairman should be separated from that of the Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO), and if combined, there should be present in the company a 
powerful and independent nonexecutive director to serve as a counterweight to 
the power and influence of the CEO/board chair; (c) nonexecutive directors 
should be independent and of high caliber, with appropriate qualifications and 
industry experience to advice and monitor other directors without any conflict of 
interest; and (d) all the members of the nomination, audit, and remuneration 
subcommittees of the board should be composed of nonexecutive directors (The 
Cadbury Report, 1991). These recommendations have serious implications for 
company management. The recommendations have also been adopted by many 
company regulators across the world. 
The Cadbury Committee also recommended the following: (a) the 
directors’ total emoluments, the chairman’s emoluments, and the remuneration of 
the highest paid director should be disclosed in the financial statements; (b) the 
audit report should state that the directors are responsible for the financial 
statements; (c) the financial statements should disclose the audit fees and other 
charges from nonaudit services rendered by the eternal auditors; (d) audit partners 
should be rotated at regular intervals; and (e) institutional investors should take 
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active part in company management (The Cadbury Report, 1991). By being 
active, investors could prevent abuses by the directors. Rotating audit partners 
periodically would ensure accountability and consistency in audit opinion. 
The Cadbury Committee’s report on the financial aspects of corporate 
governance has been publicly endorsed in the United Kingdom and incorporated 
in the listing rules of many stock exchanges around the world (Sun, Lan, & Ma, 
2014). The recommendations are also the basis of several research and journal 
articles on corporate governance (Cybinski & Windsor, 2013). But corporate 
governance even predated the groundbreaking work on the subject by Berle and 
Means (1932). Legal scholars and economists have written about the problem that 
arises when ownership is separated from control. The problem and costs of 
agency existed at the time of the East Indian Company, the Hudson Bay 
Company, the Levant Company, and many of the companies chartered by the 
British government in the 16th and 17th centuries (Cheffins, 2015).  
Concerns about managerial accountability, information asymmetry, equity 
in the distribution of a company’s wealth, shareholders’ rights, board structure, 
and many other matters concerning the internal governance of a large firm can be 
traced to the time of industrial revolution. Nevertheless, despite the recognition of 
the problems caused by the separation of ownership from control, management 
experts have not found a definitive solution to the problem, nor have they found a 
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better alternative to the corporate form of limited liability through joint-stock 
ownership. Years of research, legislation, and implementation of codes of 
corporate governance have not prevented serious corporate misdemeanor and 
financial recklessness (Muller-Kahle, 2015). 
According to The Economist, the last known American corporate disaster 
was that of Lehman Brothers in 2008, which caused severe financial problems 
around the world and also led to the passage of Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act of 2010(The Economist, 2016). But that was before 
the case of Valeant, a Canadian drug company listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange, which has all the ills that plagued Lehman: A huge debt burden, poor 
corporate governance practices, a weak board, managers with an entitlement 
mentality, bad acquisitions, bad corporate information management and a culture 
of evasiveness, and severe accounting problems (The Economist, 2016). The 
Economist estimated that the loss to shareholders will be up to $75 billion, and the 
company may default on its $31 billion debt (The Economist, 2016. The lessons 
from the company’s problems are that boards matter in corporate management, 
the influence of institutional investors may have been overrated, and the 
importance of monitoring professional managers is ever present in any 
corporation. 
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The emission scandals in Volkswagen (VW), a German carmaker, is 
another case that indicates agency problems are deep-rooted in firms and that 
there is a need to monitor and supervise the top management of companies by an 
active and independent board. According to Hans-Dieter Potsch, VW’s 
Chairperson of the Supervisory Board, the decision to cheat on emission standards 
was made over 10 years before U.S. regulators detected the fraud (Ewing, 2015). 
That decision has dented VW’s image as a reliable carmaker and has resulted in 
the recall of 11 million vehicles (Ewing, 2015). According to the chairperson, 
some top managers in the company made the decision that VW should be the 
dominant carmaker in the world, but they set out to achieve this objective by 
cheating on emission standards (Ewing, 2015). There was a tolerance for breaking 
rules in VW, a culture of poor communication among employees, and a prevailing 
climate of fear (Ewing, 2015). 
VW’s scandal and the reasons adduced for them show the complexity of 
corporate governance and how challenging it is to achieve effective internal 
management in many corporations. As Larcker and Tayan (2013) stated, the 
board of directors needs to experiment with several tools and focus on the best 
that achieve the desired objectives. In aligning the interests of shareholders and 
managers, directors could use incentive-based motivations, such as remuneration 
that include performance bonuses, or lay more emphasis on a corporate culture of 
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fairness, ethical behavior, and doing the right things at all times. Another 
emphasis could be on leadership styles that encourage openness, transparency, 
moral uprightness, and truthfulness. What works sometimes depends on firm-
specific contexts. Nevertheless, the board must actively monitor and supervise 
managers. Board structure, the independence of the audit committees, regular 
attendance at meetings, the power and effectiveness of other committees, and 
independent and competent external directors are the key ingredients in corporate 
governance practices (Annuar & Rashid, 2015). 
In this study, I examined board characteristics and the role of audit 
committees and executive compensation on corporate performance. But as I 
argued above, fraud and financial scandals still take place despite implementation 
of corporate governance codes and even after the passage of SOX. I examined the 
association between five corporate governance characteristics and organizational 
performance. The characteristics of the board and other corporate governance 
mechanisms that were  hypothesized to impact corporate performance in this 
study are board independence, audit committee independence, executive 
compensation, number of board meetings, and the size of the board. The 
performance metrics were return on assets (ROA), return on capital employed 
(ROCE), and Tobin’s Q. There were two mediators, and these were  the age and 
size of the firm. 
16 
 
 
Statement of the Problem 
Company stakeholders are concerned about firm governance due to recent 
financial distress in many large corporations (Lin, Hutchinson, & Percy, 2015). 
Researchers have argued that the high rate of collapses in firms is an outcome of 
weak corporate governance practices (Palmrose, 2013). Management scholars 
continue to examine the association between corporate governance and long-term 
financial performance (Conyon & He, 2016). The general problem was that there 
is no agreement among researchers on the extent of the relationship between 
corporate governance and organizational performance (O’Connor & Byrne, 
2015). The consequence of the inconsistency in the research findings is that 
corporate managers do not know, and may not be able to implement, best 
practices in corporate governance (El-Faitouri, 2014). The specific problem was 
that in Nigeria, company leaders have insufficient knowledge of how corporate 
governance practices affect organizational performance and the benefits of 
improving corporate governance systems. 
Purpose 
The purpose of this quantitative correlational study was to examine the 
statistical relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and firm 
performance in 116 nonfinancial companies listed on the Nigeria Stock Exchange. 
The independent variables were corporate governance mechanisms, defined as (a) 
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independence of the board, (b) independence of the audit committee, (c) executive 
compensation, (d) number of board meetings, and (e) board size. The dependent 
variable was firm performance, defined as the ROA, ROCE, and Tobin’s Q. There 
were  two mediators. The first  was the size of the corporation and the second was  
the age of the firm. The size of the firm was measured by the natural logarithm of 
total assets and age  was the number of years since incorporation. I tested the 
relationships between these variables with the quantitative paradigm approach, 
using multiple regression analysis methods to analyze the data. 
Significance of the Study 
This study has the potential to make a positive social change in company 
management by clarifying the importance of corporate governance practices in 
corporations’ organizational performance. The insights gained from this study 
may provide investors, financial analysts, and regulators with early warning 
signals of potential problems in an organization and aid stakeholders in assessing 
corporate performance. The results of this study could also help corporate 
managers to use organizational resources more effectively by understanding the 
important variables that affect their firms’ long-term financial performance. 
Regulators in Nigeria may also benefit from the findings of this study by 
recognizing important corporate governance mechanisms that promote 
organizational effectiveness and the country’s economic growth. 
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Significance to Theory 
The results of this inquiry can provide insights into the factors that are decisive in 
predicting organizational performance from a combination of corporate governance 
mechanisms that affect a firm’s efficiency and the effectiveness of resource utilization. 
Many research studies have been conducted with a view to finding the correlation 
between corporate governance components and firm performance. The results of this 
study will contribute to the body of research by examining whether the size and age of 
the firm mediates the relationship between each of the corporate governance mechanisms 
and firm performance.  
Significance to Practice  
The insights gained from this study may provide investors, financial analysts, and 
regulators with early warning signals of potential problems in an organization and also 
help stakeholders in their assessment of corporate performance. The study could also help 
corporate managers to use organizational resources more effectively by devoting more 
resources to the most important factors that are critical to financial performance. Business 
organizations are important engines of growth in many communities, and their continued 
growth is essential for the growth of the national economy. Companies are important 
forces for social change and improvement in their performance will ensure better 
employment prospects and increase in the welfare and wellbeing of individuals and the 
whole society. 
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The results of this study may also be of benefit to present and potential 
investors and top managers of firms in Nigeria by showing the impact of board 
characteristics on the performance of their companies. The findings may help 
these stakeholders to restructure their board and audit committees to become a 
more focused and efficient monitoring tool. By applying the study’s 
recommendations, the board of directors of listed companies in Nigeria may 
institute better strategies to monitor the top management of their firms and 
thereby lower the company’s agency costs, reduce investment risk, and enhance 
corporate value. 
Significance to Social Change 
With improved corporate governance structure, the board, on behalf of 
shareholders, should be able to monitor the business in a way that makes it more 
efficient and effective. A more proactive strategy of monitoring top executives by 
the board of directors would ensure that members of the board have adequate 
information to counsel managers and prevent risky, self-destructive behavior. Top 
managers will be reluctant to engage in transactions that could put the company at 
the risk when they know members of the board will ask questions. In Nigeria, 
rules are rarely obeyed and company failure and lackluster performance common. 
This happens because of the prevalence of crony capitalism and an informal way 
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of running business organizations where family connections sometimes trump 
meritocracy. 
By showing the long-term benefits of a strong corporate governance 
structure on the firm’s financial performance, the findings of the study may 
persuade both the board and top management to focus on merit and competency 
in recruiting top managers and on factors that align shareholders’ interests with 
those of the agents. Also, by highlighting the positive outcomes of obeying rules 
and regulations, the board of directors and managers may be persuaded of the 
importance of effective corporate governance practices, the implementation of 
which would send a positive message to the market and improve firm value. 
Implementation of good corporate governance systems may also reduce staff 
turnover and lower the cost of funds, thereby improving organizational 
performance. Improvement in firm performance increases employment 
opportunities, returns to investors, and increased tax revenue for the government. 
Background 
In the following list are the selected articles relating to corporate 
governance and its impact on corporate performance:  
Haβ, Johan, and Schweizer (2016) found that firms with effective 
corporate governance performed better than firms with weak corporate 
governance. Peng, Mutlu, Sauerwald, and Wang (2015) stated that a firm’s good 
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performance in an earlier accounting period draws competent, independent 
directors into the firm. The presence of independent directors on the board of 
directors is one of the mechanisms of good corporate governance practices that 
could improve organizational effectiveness. 
O’Connor and Byrne (2015) stated that what matters in corporate 
governance is not universal, and it is inappropriate to prescribe the same rules for 
all companies regardless of organizational culture and institutional setting in each 
country. They also found differences in corporate value resulted from differences 
in resource and governance functions. 
Wu and Li (2014) found that in China, increases in board independence 
reduce the incidences of connected transactions and fraud, insider trading, and 
misuse of corporate assets by executives. The researchers also noted that 
uncertainties in a firm act as impediments to the effectiveness of board 
independence. 
Shin, Sung, Choi, and Kim (2014) studied the impact of top management 
ethical contribution to firm-level ethical and procedural justice and firm 
performance, using the type of industry and size of the firm as mediating 
variables. This study also used the size and age of the firm as mediating variables. 
Ioana and Mariana (2014) examined the relationship between corporate 
governance and firm performance, using multiple regression analysis to analyze 
22 
 
 
the data. The research found no significant relationship between the independence 
of the members of the audit committee and firm performance. 
Mishra and Mohanty (2014) and Erkens and Matos (2012) investigated the 
impact of corporate governance on company performance and defined firm 
performance as ROA and ROCE. Mishra and Mohanty found that the better the 
corporate governance practices in firms in India, the better the firms’ 
performance. Mishra and Mohantyalso found legal compliance has no effect on 
ROA but broad effectiveness and a proactive disclosure improves corporate 
performance. 
Wahba (2015) found that where the CEO is also the chair of the board, 
increasing the number and proportion of nonexecutive directors to the total 
number of directors has a significant negative impact on firms’ financial 
performance. 
Muller-Kahle (2015) found that although ownership ought to provide an 
incentive to shareholders to monitor their investments in the firm, in practice this 
may not be so because large shareholders may not have the same objectives as the 
company. Muller-Kahle also found that firm performance is negatively and 
significantly influenced by CEO-dominant owners. Dominant owners with 
conflict of interest negatively affect firm performance than those who had no 
business ties with the firm before purchasing their investment. 
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Jermias and Gani (2014) found a negative and significant association 
between the number of board and audit committee meetings and firm performance 
in the listed companies in Standards and Poors ( S&P ) 500 databases between 
1997 and 2004. 
O’Connor and Byrne (2015) stated that what matters in corporate 
governance is not universal, and it is wrong to prescribe the same rules for all 
companies to follow regardless of history, size, and organizational culture and 
institutional setting in each country. 
Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical framework of this study was based on three theories of 
corporate governance: (a) agency theory, (b) stakeholder theory, and (c) 
stewardship theory. Agency problems arise due to the separation of ownership 
from control in large corporations. The separation leads to imperfect alignment 
between the interests of the principal, who are the shareholders, and the managers, 
who are the agents that manage the business on a daily basis (Fama, 1980). As 
Smith (2003) observed, managers should not be expected to devote as much 
attention and dedication to the objectives of the firm as shareholders. A conflict of 
interests between the shareholders and managers leads to suboptimal performance 
of the firm (Xie & Fukumoto, 2013). 
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Some of the self-interested attitudes of managers that are manifestations of 
the conflict of interest include compensation that is not commensurate with 
performance and the practice of taking excessive risks because of short-term gains 
at the expense of future growth (Sila, Gonzalez, & Hagendioff, 2016). Other self-
interest actions of managers are a pay-for-performance compensation that 
motivates managers to focus on the short-term and the use of the firms’ resources 
to fend off takeover battles that may be in the interest of the shareholders (Hiebl, 
2015). It is reasonable to expect that better pay and commensurate compensation 
to top executives may lead to better alignment of the interests of the shareholders 
and managers, but this may not be so in many corporations. Baulkaran (2014) 
stated that adequate compensation to executives leads to a much closer alignment 
between the interest of the shareholders and the top management. The company 
must also find a way to compensate top management for the value they have 
added to the company through devices such as share ownership, profit sharing, 
and stock options. 
According to the agency theory, the aim of corporate governance 
mechanisms is to ensure that managers are monitored and controlled by the board 
(Ueng, 2016). To be effective, the board would establish those corporate 
governance mechanisms that align the interests of shareholders and managers. 
Other theories beside the agency theory are part of the theoretical underpinnings 
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of corporate governance. By merging both the stewardship and stakeholder 
theories with the agency theory, it is possible for a researcher to have a complete 
theoretical justification for corporate governance as a basis for evaluating 
organizational performance (Almadi, 2015; Isidro & Sobral, 2015; Poutziouris, 
Savva, & Hadjielias, 2014). 
The agency model is based on a narrow view of contractual relationships, 
whose underlying philosophy is internally driven (Francis, Hassan, & Wu, 2013; 
Kraftt, Ou, Quatraro, & Ravix, 2013). The stakeholder theory’s worldview is a 
much broader and based on an externally-focused model as it considers the 
interests of shareholders, employees, clients, suppliers, strategic partners, and 
other groups that have connections with the firm (Rashid & Islam, 2013). Some 
researchers have stated that the notion of considering the interests of all 
stakeholders might have been extended to an impracticable extent, and it is 
important for corporate managers and practitioners to know where to draw the 
line (Arenas & Rodrigo, 2016). Managers must have an idea of the persons or 
groups who will be affected by their decisions 
One argument of stakeholder theory is that a firm draws resources from 
the environment and ought to be responsible for the preservation of it for the 
present, incoming, and future generations. But the question is whether future 
generations can be considered as stakeholders (Arenas & Rodrigo, 2016). 
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Whether or not future generations are so considered, the question of fairness and 
equity in the use of resources is a fundamental one. It is difficult to determine the 
identity of future generations and what is a fair allocation to them out of a firm’s 
resources. The solution offered by Arenas and Rodrigo (2016) was to consider 
future generations as the direct descendants of the present stakeholders, out of 
whom the firm will get future employees, customers, and managers. 
Research has shown the benefits to businesses of having a broader view of 
participants in the corporate entity. Mande and Rahman (2013) found a positive 
and significant association between a good relationship with stakeholders and 
firm performance. To gain the benefits that come with looking after the interests 
of all stakeholders in a company, managers need to keep them informed about the 
affairs of the company by giving timely and accurate information (Sendjaya, 
Pekerti, Hartel, Hirst, & Butarbutar, 2016). All employees and, most importantly, 
managers must at all times think how their actions and decisions affect every 
stakeholder in the organization (Sendjaya et al., 2016). If the board and 
management consider the interests of all stakeholders in the firm in their policies, 
the conflict of interest between the shareholders and managers is likely to reduce. 
The third theory of corporate governance that forms the theoretical 
framework for this study is the stewardship theory. The stewardship theory 
emphasizes that the manager is committed to the long-term goals of the 
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organization instead of the steward’s self-interests (El-Faitouri, 2014). There are 
thus little mechanisms that need to be put in place to ensure corporate objectives 
are achieved (Hiebl, 2013). The savings in agency costs when managers imbibe 
the philosophy of a steward instead of that of an agent should improve 
organizational performance. Perhaps the best test of the differences between the 
attitudes of agents and stewards is the actions of managers during takeover battles 
(Mishra & Mohanty, 2014). Agents tend to frustrate merger talks using strategies 
like poison pills and issuing of new shares (Mishra & Mohanty). The new shares 
may be issued to the managers’ favored bidder at considerably lower price than 
what the hostile bidders are offering (Mishra & Mohanty). Stewards will not only 
present truthful information to the decision-makers but work also in the overall 
interests of the organization (Dah, 2016). 
Many researchers have concluded that the stewardship theory is yet to be 
accepted as a basis for analyzing organizational dynamics. There are various 
benefits for using the theory to methodically examine organizations: 
The adoption of the theory is likely to ensure a mutually beneficial 
relationship between managers and shareholders, based on trust and cooperation 
(Dah). 
As stewards are motivated by a higher order of needs, such as self-esteem 
and self-actualization, they are likely to work for the long-term interests, survival, 
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and sustainable performance of the organization. The benefits of the stewardship 
model will also accrue to all stakeholders (Mishra & Mohanty). 
By emphasizing a different model of the economic person who is 
motivated only by self-interest, imbibing the stewardship theory ensures a 
corporate atmosphere where decision-making is simplified and easier than in a 
pure agency relationship. Information asymmetry and moral hazard that make 
decision-making difficult are not present when the central philosophy of 
management is to serve as stewards of the organization (Pouziouris, Savva, & 
Hedjielias, 2014). 
In this study, I developed a theoretical framework that predicts the 
relationships between corporate governance mechanisms and organizational 
performance in nonfinancial companies in Nigeria. The framework  was  based on 
the relationship between board independence, audit committee independence, 
executive compensation, number of board meetings, and board size and 
organizational performance, using size and age of the firm as mediators. 
Organizational performance was measured using three variables: ROA, ROCE, 
and Tobin’s Q. The age of the firm was the number of years since incorporation 
and size was the natural logarithm of total assets. The theoretical framework is 
shown in Figure 1. 
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The proposed theoretical framework is shown in figure 1. 
Independent 
Variables                      Mediators    Dependent  
       Variables     
  
  
   
  
  
   
 
 
Figure1.The proposed theoretical framework for testing the relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms and organizational performance in Nigerian companies 
Research Questions 
Researchers frequently ask questions to understand and interpret observed 
phenomenon (Babbie, 2013). To examine the relationship between corporate 
governance and organizational performance, the research questions (RQs) that 
guided this study were  as follows: 
RQ1: Is there a statistically significant association between corporate 
governance and financial performance of publicly quoted companies in Nigeria? 
Board Independence 
Audit Committee 
Independence  
Executive Compensation  
Number of Board 
Meetings 
Board Size 
Return on Assets 
(ROA) 
Return on Capital 
Employed 
(ROCE) 
Tobin’s Q 
Firm Age 
Firm Size 
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RQ2: Is there a statistically significant association between board 
independence and financial performance of publicly quoted companies in 
Nigeria? 
RQ3: Is there a statistically significant association between audit 
committee  and financial performance of publicly quoted companies in Nigeria? 
RQ4: Is there a statistically significant association between executive 
compensation and financial performance of publicly quoted companies in 
Nigeria? 
RQ5: Is there a statistically significant association between the number of 
board meetings and financial performance of publicly quoted companies in 
Nigeria? 
RQ6: Is there a statistically significant association between board size and 
financial performance of publicly quoted companies in Nigeria? 
RQ7: Does the size of the firm mediate the relationship between corporate 
governance and financial performance of publicly quoted companies in Nigeria? 
RQ8: Does the age of the firm mediate the relationship between corporate 
governance and financial performance of publicly quoted companies in Nigeria? 
Research Hypotheses 
According to Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (2008), hypothesis 
testing consists of two statistical hypotheses. The first is the research hypothesis, 
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usually designated by H1. The second is the null hypothesis, which is symbolized 
by H0. H1 is what the researcher wants to know. H0 is, by implication, the 
antithesis of H1 (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008). In this study, I tested 
the following hypotheses by the stated theories and literature on the relationship 
between corporate governance mechanisms and organizational financial 
performance: 
H01: There is no statistically significant relationship between corporate 
governance and organizational financial performance in listed companies in 
Nigeria. 
H1: There is a statistically significant relationship between corporate 
governance and organizational financial performance in listed companies in 
Nigeria. 
H02: There is no statistically significant relationship between board 
independence and organizational financial performance in listed companies in 
Nigeria. 
H2: There is a statistically significant relationship between board 
independence and organizational financial performance in listed companies in 
Nigeria. 
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H03: There is no statistically significant relationship between audit 
committee independence and organizational financial performance in listed 
companies in Nigeria. 
H3: There is a statistically significant relationship between audit 
committee independence and organizational financial performance in listed 
companies in Nigeria. 
H04: There is no statistically significant relationship between executive 
compensation and organizational financial performance in listed companies in 
Nigeria. 
H4: There is a statistically significant relationship between executive 
compensation and organizational financial performance in listed companies in 
Nigeria. 
H05: There is no statistically significant relationship between the number 
of board meetings and organizational financial performance in listed companies in 
Nigeria. 
H5: There is a statistically significant relationship between the number of 
board meetings and organizational financial performance in listed companies in 
Nigeria. 
H06: There is no statistically significant relationship between board size 
and organizational financial performance in listed companies in Nigeria. 
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H6: There is a statistically significant relationship between board size and 
organizational financial performance in listed companies in Nigeria. 
H07: Firm size does not significantly mediate the relationship between 
corporate governance and organizational financial performance in listed 
companies in Nigeria. 
H7: Firm size significantly mediates the relationship between corporate 
governance and organizational financial performance in listed companies in 
Nigeria. 
H08: Firm age does not significantly mediate the relationship between 
corporate governance and organizational financial performance in listed 
companies in Nigeria. 
H8: Firm age significantly mediates the relationship between corporate 
governance and organizational financial performance in listed companies in 
Nigeria.  
Nature of the Study 
This study was a quantitative correlational study. There are three types of 
research design in any scientific inquiry: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed 
methods. If the aim of the research is to explore and understand the corporate 
governance phenomenon, the qualitative method of inquiry is suitable, as it does 
not aim at finding a statistical relationship between corporate governance and 
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organizational performance. The main drawback of the qualitative method is that 
the research findings cannot easily be replicated or generalized to other 
organizations, groups, or people (Frankfort-Nachnamias & Nachnamias, 2008). 
This study was  not a qualitative inquiry. 
In a quantitative research design, the researcher tests theories and 
hypotheses that have been formulated from the literature and research questions 
(Leedy & Ormrod, 2010). Quantitative research methods include experimental, 
quasi-experimental, correlational, and survey research methods. In experiments, 
researchers manipulate the subjects and observe the effect on them (Babbie, 
2013). The advantage of experimental design is the researcher’s ability to isolate 
the effect of other variables, and find a cause-and-effect relationship between 
them (Babbie, 2013). Experimental research is also fairly easily replicable and 
generalizable. The experimental design suffers from the fact that the research is 
conducted under artificial conditions, which may not reflect what happens in a 
natural environment and the society at large. An experimental design was  not 
suitable for the present topic as none of the variables can be manipulated, and the 
research cannot be conducted in an artificial laboratory. 
A quasi-experimental design, like the experimental design, was  also not 
suitable for this study because quasi-experimental designs are used when the 
researcher cannot achieve true randomness, but can still manipulate some 
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variables (Leedy & Ormrod, 2010). In a quasi-experimental design, the researcher 
cannot control all extraneous variables and it is impossible to rule out other 
explanations for the findings. Quasi-experimental designs do not suffer from 
artificiality common to laboratory-controlled, pure experimental research design. 
In this dissertation study, I used a type of quantitative research design 
method defined as a correlational study. In correlational studies, the researcher 
endeavors to find whether there is, and the strength of, a relationship between two 
or more variables (Leedy & Ormrod, 2010). According to Leedy and Ormrod 
(2010), correlational studies examine the degree to which changes in the 
characteristics of one variable is related to changes in the characteristics of one or 
more variables. The researcher cannot conclude that a cause-and-effect 
association is present between the variables just because they are statistically 
correlated.  
A correlational study most suitable for the current inquiry, as my aim was 
to test the statistical relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and 
organizational performance in the listed companies in Nigeria. I chose 
correlational studies for the present inquiry after I had  considered all other 
methods under the broad heading of descriptive quantitative research (Leedy & 
Omrod, 2010). A correlational research design is suitable for inquiries into the 
determinants of the performance of companies, which was the intent of this study. 
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This correlational design was used to examine  whether there was  a relationship 
between the chosen corporate governance components and organizational 
performance metrics in listed companies in Nigeria, and the strength of the 
relationship. 
Possible Types and Sources of Data 
In this study, I used data extracted from the published financial statements 
of the 116 nonfinancial companies quoted on the Nigerian Stock Exchange from 
2011 to 2015 financial years. The published accounts and reports are available 
from the companies’ websites and at the archive of the Nigerian Stock Exchange. 
The filings of the annual financial reports with the Nigerian Stock Exchange are 
mandatory because they are one of the listing requirements for all companies 
listed on the exchange. The financial statements contain information on the 
companies’ income statement, financial position, principal activities, risk 
management system, operational procedures, and explanatory notes to the 
accounts. The information in the balance sheet and income statement of the report 
was used in computing ROA, ROCE, and Tobin’s Q, the dependent variables in 
the study. 
The financial statements also contained information on corporate 
governance mechanisms, which are the independent variables in this study; these 
are (a) board independence, (b) audit committee independence, (c) executive 
37 
 
 
compensation, (d) the number of board meetings, and (e) the board size. Also, the 
size of the firm was obtained from the balance sheet, which is the natural 
logarithm of total assets, and the age of the corporation, which is the time since 
incorporation, was reported in the corporate information section of the financial 
statements. The information obtained from the annual reports was organized into 
ratios, indexes, and scores. I extracted  the information using content analysis 
method. According to Bonna (2012), content analysis method includes theoretical 
definitions, and statistical and objective analysis. 
Analytical Strategies 
The data analysis in this study was conducted using the Statistical Package 
for Social Sciences (SPSS) software to run several multiple regression analysis 
for each of the dependent variables against the predictor variables. Descriptive 
and inferential statistics was employed in the study. I used three alternative 
measures of performance; which are ROA, ROCE, and Tobin's Q. While both 
ROA and ROCE are accounting ratios and measure a firm's historical 
performance, Tobin's Q is a market-based measure and is an indication of the 
company's future performance. The emerging markets, from where I conducted 
this study, suffer from pricing inefficiencies and high volatility in the pricing of 
stocks. Emerging markets, such as Nigeria, also suffer from hyperinflation, 
inadequate information management systems, and financial illiteracy among 
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investors. It is important to use alternative performance measures, which in this 
study are the accounting ratios of ROA and ROCE. 
 I used several alternative model specifications to examine the effect of 
corporate governance mechanisms on the performance of companies. The first 
model specification tested the overall impact of corporate governance on firm 
performance. The other models tested the association between each component of 
corporate governance and firm performance. Two other model specifications 
tested whether firm age and company size mediate the relationship between 
corporate governance and firm performance. The first of the model specifications 
that tested the first hypothesis, H1, is as follows: 
OrgPerf = α0 + β1BodInd + β2AuditCommInd + β3BodSize + β4BodMtgs 
+  β5ExecComp + β6FirmAge + β7FirmSize + ε   (1)   
 Where OrgPerf is firm performance measured ROA, ROCE, and Tobin’s 
Q. BodInd is board independence, defined as the proportion of directors that are 
independent and whether the positions of the CEO and the chairperson of the 
board are combined in one person. Where the two positions are combined in one 
executive, there is the presence of CEO duality. I measured board independence 
on a 5-point Likert scale, where 1 equals the presence of CEO duality and less 
than 50% of board members are independent, 2 is presence of CEO duality, and 
exactly 50% of board members are independent, 3 is the presence of CEO duality 
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and more than 50% of board members are independent, 4 is absence of CEO 
duality and less than or exactly 50% of board members are independent, and 5 
equals the absence of CEO duality and more than 50% of the board members are 
independent. A high score indicates more independence while a low score means 
less independence of the board of directors. 
AuditCommInd is the independence of the audit committee, defined as the 
proportion of independent directors on the committee and their freedom to 
communicate directly with the chief internal auditor of the firm without express 
permission of the CEO. Audit committee independence was measured on a 5-
point Likert scale, where a score of 1 equals independent members of the 
committee is less than 50% and without the freedom to communicate directly with 
the chief internal auditor, a score of 2 equals independent members of the 
committee is exactly 50% of the total members without the freedom to 
communicate directly with the chief internal auditor, 3 indicates independent 
members are greater than or equal to 50% but the committee lacks the freedom to 
communicate directly with the chief internal auditor, 4 equals more than 50% of 
the members are independent without the freedom to communicate directly with 
the chief internal auditor, and 5 equals more than 50% of the members are 
independent with the full freedom to communicate directly with the chief internal 
auditor. 
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BodSize is the total number of directors on the board, including the 
chairman, the executive and nonexecutive directors, and the CEO. Following a 
review of the literature, I adopted the view that larger boards enhance better firm 
performance, although some studies indicated otherwise ( Lenard, Yu, & York, 
Leung, Richardson, & Jaggi, 2014; Sun, Lan, & Ma, 2014). A 20-member board 
was scored 20, a 19-member board was scored 19, and an 18-member board was 
scored 18, and so on. None of the quoted companies in Nigeria, according to the 
filings of the companies with Nigerian Stock Exchange, had more than 20 
members on the board of directors. A high score indicates a strong corporate 
governance system while a low score indicates a weak corporate governance 
practice.  
BodMtgs is the number of board meetings, measured by the actual number 
of board meetings that took place in a year where a quorum was formed. A firm 
that holds one board meeting in a year was scored 1, two board meetings was 
scored 2, three board meetings was scored 3, four board meetings was scored 4, 
and so on. The frequency of board meetings are important since the directors 
deliberate on and take major strategic decisions at the meeting, including 
decisions on investment, sale of a major unit, mergers and acquisitions, 
appointment of directors, approval of strategic plans, and consideration of audit 
and other committees’ reports. In Nigeria, the SEC code of corporate governance 
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states that a minimum of four meetings in a year is mandatory, i.e. one in a 
quarter. The frequency of the meetings may indicate the level of involvement of 
the directors in the business or it may signal a problem in the organization (Alves, 
Cuoto, & Franscisco, 2016; Jernias & Gani, 2014).  
ExecComp is the executive compensation; measured by the total payments 
to the executive in terms of salary, wages, benefits, and other perquisites, plus the 
value of non-monetary benefits enjoyed by them. The Companies and Allied 
Matters Act of 1990 in Nigeria makes it mandatory that the financial statements 
of corporations disclose money wages and other benefits accruable to directors 
and executives. FirmAge is the age of the corporation, measured by the number of 
years since incorporation; FirmSize is the size of the firm, measured by the 
natural logarithm of total assets; α0 is the intercept of the model; β1 to β7 are the 
beta coefficients of the regression; and ε is an error term. 
The other models that tested Hypotheses 2 to 9 are as follows: 
ROA = α1 + β8BodInd + β9AuditCommInd + β10BodSize + β11BodMtgs + 
Β12Execomp +  β13FirmAge + β14FirmSize + ε    (2)  
ROA = α1 + β8BoardInd + ε       (3) 
 ROA = α1 + β9AuditCommInd + ε     (4) 
 ROA = α1 + β10BodSize + ε      (5)  
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ROA = α1 + β11BdMtgs + ε      (6) 
  ROA = α1 + β12Execomp + ε           (7) 
 ROA = α1 + β13FirmAge + ε       (8) 
 ROA = α1 + β14FirmSize + ε       (9) 
 ROCE = α2 + β15BoardInd + β16AuditCommInd + β17BodSize +     
  β18BodMtgs + Β19Execomp + β20FirmAge + β21FirmSize + ε (10)  
ROCE = α2 + β15BodInd + ε         (11) 
  
ROCE = α2 + β16AuditCommInd + ε       (12)  
ROCE = α2 + β17BodSize + ε      (13)  
ROCE = α2 + β18BdMtgs + ε      (14)  
ROCE = α2 + β19Execomp + ε     (15)  
ROCE = α2 + β20FirmAge + ε      (16) 
 ROCE = α2 + β21FirmSize + ε      (17) 
 Tobin’s Q = α3 + β22BodInd + β23AuditCommInd + β24BodSize +            
β25BodMgts + β26Execomp + β27FirmSize + β28FirmAge + ε   (18)  
Tobin’s Q = α3 + β22BodInd + ε      (19)  
Tobin’s Q = α3 + β23AuditCommInd + ε    (20)  
Tobin’s Q = α3 + β24BoardSize + ε     (21) 
Tobin’s Q = α3 + β25BdMtgs + ε      (22)  
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Tobin’s Q = α3 + β26Execomp + ε      (23)  
Tobin’s Q = α3 + β27 FirmAge + ε      (24)  
Tobin’s Q = α3 + β28FirmSize + ε      (25)  
FirmAge = α4 + β29BodInd + β30AuditCommInd + β31BodSize +    
β32BodMtgs + Β33Execomp + Β34FirmAge + β35FirmSize + ε (26)  
FirmSize = α5 + β36BoardInd + β37μAuditCommInd + β39BodSize + 
β40BdMgts + β41Execomp + β42FirmSize + ε    (27) 
     
Where, ROA is the return on assets; α0 to α5 are the intercepts of the model; ROCE is the 
return on capital employed; and Tobin’s Q is the ratio of market value to the 
replacement cost of assets. 
Other Information 
The data collection and analysis for the dissertation study was undertaken in Nigeria, and 
covered all the 116 nonfinancial companies listed on the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange from 2011 to 2015 financial years. The criteria for selecting the firms 
were: (a) the sampled companies must have been listed for at least three years 
prior to 2011, (b) the firms must have at least four directors, (c) the corporation 
must report earnings before interest, taxation, amortization, and depreciation 
(EBITD) for the entire 5 years, (d)  the market capitalization of each firm must be 
a minimum of $1 million, (e) the companies must have audited financial 
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statements filed with the Nigerian Stock Exchange for all the five years this study 
covered, and (f)  the firm’s financial statements must be published regularly as 
dictated by the rules of the Exchange. The selected firms also had history of 
compliance with corporate governance codes. 
Financial and corporate governance data were obtained from the published financial 
statements of the companies from the archive of the Nigerian Stock Exchange and 
the companies’ websites. The entire data collection process did not involve 
contact with any members of the society, as the study relied exclusively on 
collection of secondary data. Nevertheless, I was very careful with the data 
collected and the subsequent analysis and storage to prevent unauthorized usage. 
The data will be stored on my laptop as well as on mobile hard disks and thumb 
drives; all the storage devices will be password-protected. After the university 
approves the study, the mobile hard disks and thumb drives will be securely 
locked when not in use. Access to the data on the laptop will be restricted by the 
password and by the fact that the personal computer is not shared with anyone. I 
will keep the data for 5 years before destroying it. There will be no reference to 
the firms in my analysis and report of the findings. I will handle personally the 
downloading and extraction of data from the audited accounts and the 
computation of scores, ratios, and indexes. 
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Assumptions 
The following assumptions underlined this dissertation study: The theoretical 
framework provided by agency, stakeholders, and stewardship theories are appropriate to 
examine corporate governance in publicly quoted firms in Nigeria. There is a logical 
relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance, and it is 
possible to develop hypotheses that can be tested statistically to examine the association 
between them 
A study of corporate governance is an examination of a firm’s internal governance 
structure and has implications for firm performance, returns to investors, the 
welfare of the employees, the performance of the stock market, and the health of 
financial system as a whole. 
This study is based on all the 116 nonfinancial companies listed on the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange. All the listed financial institutions will be excluded from this study 
because they are under the regulation of the Central Bank of Nigeria and have 
different account and disclosure requirements dictated by the bank and other 
regulatory agencies. It is assumed that all the 116 non-financial companies 
prepared their financial statements under the International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) and before the country implemented the IFRS, the Nigerian 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). 
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Four foreign auditing firms, Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler (KPMG), Price 
Waterhouse, Deloitte, and Ernst & Young audit the great preponderance of quoted 
companies in Nigeria. Where a Nigerian audit firm audits a listed company’s 
financial statements, it is mostly in a joint audit with the big four listed above. It is 
assumed that the external auditors, regardless of the auditor and the auditing firm, 
audited the financial statements by following international auditing standards and 
guidelines. 
Scope and Delimitations 
Scope 
In this study, I focused on the impact of corporate governance on the financial 
performance of sampled nonfinancial companies listed on the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange. The independent variables selected for the study were five components 
of corporate governance mechanisms. These were: (a) the independence of the 
board of directors, (b) the independence of the audit committee, (c) executive 
compensation, (d) the number of board meetings in a year, and (e) the size of the 
board. Financial performance, the outcome variable, was measured by three 
metrics: (a) ROA, (b) ROCE, and (c) Tobin’s Q. One hundred and seventy-one 
companies were quoted on the Nigerian Stock Exchange at the end of December 
2015, 116 of them were nonfinancial firms. Those in the financial services 
industry are subject to a different accounting and procedural regulations, different 
47 
 
 
and distinct from those of other companies that are not licensed to take deposits 
from members of the public. This study was focused exclusively on the 116 
nonfinancial firms who are not subject to the regulation from the central bank and 
other financial regulators. 
The data for board characteristics and financial performance was obtained from the 
published financial statements filed with the Nigerian Stock Exchange. Other 
financial and non-financial information were obtained from the company’s 
website. I made use of the companies’ historical financial data in their published 
financial statements from 2011 to 2015. Research based on secondary data is 
common and widely used in social and other scientific inquiry, especially research 
on corporate governance and firm performance (e.g., Francis, Hassan, & Wu, 
2013; Mehrotra, 2016; Muttakin, Monem, & Khan, 2015). 
In this study, I used multiple regression analysis to test the association between corporate 
governance mechanisms and firm performance. Before analyzing the effects of 
the predictor variables on the outcome variables, I ran Pearson product-moment 
correlation coefficient to examine the relationships among all the variables 
(Mehrotra, 2016). The Pearson correlational analysis shows the size of the effect, 
whether small, medium, or large but without distinguishing between dependent 
and independent variables. Several regression analyses using ordinary least 
squares method was run to test the association and the strength of the relationship 
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between the independent and dependent variables. Multiple regression analysis 
indicates the relationship between the dependent and the independent variables 
and the percentage of the variation in the dependent variable that is explained by 
the variations in the independent variables. 
Delimitations 
This study examined the association between board characteristics and other corporate 
governance mechanisms and firm performance. The corporate governance 
mechanisms were board independence, audit committee independence, executive 
compensation, number of board meetings, and board size. There are many other 
board features and corporate governance mechanisms that were not examined in 
this study. Many researchers have identified the number and structure of the 
compensation committee, the number of meetings of the audit committee, director 
share ownership, and board diversity as equally important (Bonna, 2012, 
Kaczmarek, Kimino, & Pye, 2014; Mehrotra, 2016; Mishra & Mohanty, 2014; 
Perryman, Fernando, & Tripathy, 2016; Pugliese, Minichili, & Zattoni, 2014). 
The impact of these and other variables like them on firm performance was not 
examined in this study. This study examined the association between board 
characteristics and other corporate governance mechanisms and firm 
performance. The corporate governance mechanisms were board independence, 
audit committee independence, executive compensation, number of board 
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meetings, and board size. There are many other board features and corporate 
governance mechanisms that were not examined in this study. Many researchers 
have identified the number and structure of the compensation committee, the 
number of meetings of the audit committee, director share ownership, and board 
diversity as equally important (Bonna, 2012, Kaczmarek et al. , 2014; Mehrotra, 
2016; Mishra & Mohanty, 2014; Perryman et al., 2016; Pugliese, et al.,2014). The 
impact of these and other variables like them on firm performance was not 
examined in this study. 
To measure company performance, I used ROA, ROCE, and Tobin’s Q. Other 
performance metrics have been used in the literature. For example, Zango, 
Kamardin, and Ishak (2016) examined the impact of corporate board committees, 
board accounting and financial expertise, and board gender on financial risk 
disclosure. Hong, Li, and Minor (2016) used compensation paid to executive to 
measure the degree of a firm’s social performance. Similarly, Liu, Valenti, and 
Chen (2016) used information transparency to examine the impact of corporate 
governance on the performance of listed Taiwanese firms, using family ownership 
as the moderating variable.  
Limitations 
A major potential source of limitation in this study was the use of secondary data to 
obtain financial and corporate governance information. The accuracy of the 
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information from secondary sources could be a potential source of bias. The use 
of secondary data relied on the firms’ published financial statements. Given that 
accounting scandals have been reported in many firms in recent times, some of 
the information on the financial statements may have been manipulated. Also, 
financial statements are prepared based on some underlying principles, 
conventions, concepts, and accounting policies. Lack of uniformity in the 
application of these accounting rules in many firms made comparison difficult. 
Also, specifically, Nigerian firms converted to IFRS in 2012, and many are still 
trying to perfect the system. Some of these issues may cause errors. The lack of 
information was also a problem. Some firms were excluded from the study 
because they did not have the required information for analysis. Secondly, if 
information were available, I would have made necessary adjustments to some 
accounting estimates and balances in the financial statements that could have been 
more accurately stated, such as the figures for inventory, current assets, long-term 
debt, and income and loss items. 
To mitigate this bias, I gathered data from multiple sites: The companies’ websites, the 
website of the Nigerian Stock Exchange, professional accountants’ websites, and 
the website of the mass media. Data were collected at different points in time on 
the same phenomenon. The strategy of time and space data triangulation allows 
the researcher to discover what is common among the various data sources 
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(Kimchi, Polivka, & Stevenson, 1991). The approach of using several data 
sources and measurement in different periods would reduce the potential source 
of bias referred to above. Eliminating a source of bias enhances a researcher’s 
ability to interpret results more accurately.  
As at the end of the fourth quarter of 2015, 171 equities were quoted on the main board 
of the Nigerian Stock Exchange, with 55 firms in the financial services industries. 
The rest were 116 non-financial firms that represented this study’s population. 
The nonfinancial firms listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange are into 
manufacturing; hotels and tourism; energy, equipment, and services; petroleum 
products distribution; apparel retailers; courier, freight, and deliveries; road 
transportation; and services. 
Some of the nonfinancial companies were not selected for the following reasons: (a) 
Their quotation history at the stock exchange was less than three years before 
2011, (b) they had less than four directors, (c) their total market capitalization was 
less than $1 million throughout the years of analysis, (d) there were no audited 
financial statements covering all the 5 years of analysis that complied with, or (e) 
the firms did not comply with the listing rules of the stock exchange to file 
financial and other statements with the exchange. The exclusion some of these 
firms from the study may introduce bias as the study will consider corporations 
that are active in the market, have a solid history of trading, and have financial 
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statement that meet global best practices. The companies selected may be the ones 
that already have strong corporate governance structures and tradition, thus 
biasing the findings. Some of the assumptions may also not be accurate, which 
may cause errors and difficulties in the interpretation of results. The use of well-
tested scales, recognized statistical models, and a highly regarded software 
package in the study address some of these potential sources of bias. 
This study was designed as a quantitative, correlational inquiry to examine the impact of 
corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance. The fact that not all the 
companies listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange were included in this research 
was a source of bias. Another related potential bias concerned the exclusion of 
some corporate governance components and measures of firm performance. The 
exclusion of some of these variables and companies not included in the sample 
may affect the extent to which the result of the study can be generalized, even in 
the same industrial sector. I have selected what I believe were the relevant 
variables for the study of corporate governance in Nigeria, and I have chosen 
measures of firm performance that are not only widely used, but that are popular 
with investors, analysts, regulators, and managers as predictors of organizational 
financial performance. Future researchers in Nigeria on the same subject may 
extend this work by making other assumptions and including more companies and 
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selecting financial performance metrics and corporate governance mechanisms 
that are peculiar to nonfinancial firms. 
Definition of Terms 
Audit: An independent examination, on a test basis, of the accounting records of a firm by 
an appointed external auditor (El-Faitouri, 2014). 
Audit committee: A committee of the board composed mainly of independent directors 
that monitor the reports of external auditors and ensure the management follows 
auditors’ recommendations (Dalwai, Basiruddin, & Rasid, 2015) 
Board independence: The percentage of nonexecutive directors that are members of the 
board of directors (Adewuyi & Olowookere, 2013; Leung et al., 2014). A board 
that is composed mostly of executive directors is not perceived as an independent 
board. 
Board leadership structure: It is the division of the leadership of the board of directors 
between the chairperson and the CEO. If an individual combines both positions, 
the board structure is perceived not to be independent and to exhibit CEO-duality 
(Kouki & Guizani, 2015). The determinants of board size and independence: 
Evidence from China. 
Board meetings: It is the formal gathering together of board members where the business 
of the company is considered after a quorum has been established by an appointed 
company secretary and the deliberations and decisions of the meeting recorded in 
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a minutes of meetings book under the care of the secretary to the board. The board 
is the organ of the firm and board meetings are the place where board power is 
exercised (Alves, Couto, & Francisco, 2016; Jermias & Gani, 2014). 
Board size: This is the number of people that are on the board of directors of a company, 
including the chair, CEO, and the executive and nonexecutive directors (Lenard et 
al., 2014; Sun et al., 2014). 
Committees: Members of the board that are charged to carry out specific duties on behalf 
of the board and report their stewardship to the whole body of the members. 
There are many committees the board can form, both standing and ad hoc 
committees. Some of the important ones affecting corporate governance are 
compensation, audit, employment and general purposes committees (El-Faitouri, 
2014). 
Democratic leadership: It is a leadership style based on open communication, 
transparency, fairness, and justice in the place of work (Lojpur, Ateksic, 
Vlahovic, Bach, & Pekovic, 2015). 
Executive compensation: The total remuneration paid to the CEO and top management 
staff, including basic salaries, allowances, performance bonuses, and stock 
options (Basory, Gleason, & Kannan, 2014) 
Firm size: The natural logarithm of the total assets (Darmadi, 2013) 
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Foreign ownership: The percentage of total equity owned by individuals and firms that 
are not nationals of the country where the business is incorporated or domiciled. 
Where the shareholder is a corporate organization, if its state of incorporation is 
different from that of the company in which shares are held, it is a foreign 
company (Liu, Miletkov, Wei, & Young, 2015) 
Gender diversity. It refers to the percentage of females to the total number of persons on 
the board of directors (Isidro & Sobral, 2015; Quttainah, 2015). 
Institutional ownership. The percentage of shares held by institutions to the total shares in 
a firm. Examples of institutional shareholders are pension and superannuation 
funds, hedge funds, and insurance and banking companies. 
Market value: It is the current share price multiplied by the total number of shares in 
issue at any particular time (Alipour, 2013). 
Market value added: It is the excess of market value of capital (debt and equity) over the 
book value of capital (i.e., the current market value of the firm’s debt and equity 
less the economic book value). Economic book value is the net worth less share 
capital plus reserves and debt capital (Kouki & Guizani, 2015).  
Research and development intensity: Research and development intensity is the firm’s 
Research and Development (R&D) investment scaled over its total assets (Zona, 
2016). 
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Return on assets (ROA): It is the earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and 
amortization (EBITDA) scaled by the total assets of the firm (Kara, Erdur, & 
Karabiyi, 2015).  
Return on capital employed (ROCE): The ratio of total EBITDA  and total capital 
employed in the firm. The total capital includes equity and long-term debt (Sahu 
& Manna, 2013). 
Return on sales (ROS): It is EBITDA divided by the  company’s gross earnings or sales 
(Kara, Erdur, & Karabiyik, 2015). 
Significant shareholder ownership: If a single individual, a group of related individuals, 
or an institution holds 5% or more of the share capital of a firm, the shareholder is 
said to be a substantial shareholder (Chahine & Zeidan, 2015). 
Stakeholders: All the individuals and institutions that are affected by the action of a firm, 
including employees, directors, shareholders, investors, bondholders, creditors, 
suppliers, the tax authority, and the general public (Dalwai, Basiruddin, & Rasid, 
2015). 
Strategic leadership: Refers to leadership mainly concerned with leading organizations 
rather than leading in the organization. Strategic leaders take on overall 
responsibilities for the financial health of their organization, regardless of their 
department or strategic business units (Carter & Greer, 2013). 
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Tobin’s Q: It is the ratio of the market value of equity plus the total value of long-term 
debt to the book value of total assets (Bhagat & Bolton, 2013; Kaczmarek, 
Kimino, & Pye, 2014; Silthipongpanich & Polsiri, 2015). 
Transformational leadership: A type of leadership style that facilitates organizational 
engagement, trust, and shared responsibilities among members of a firm (Barrick, 
Thurgood, Smith, & Courtright, 2015; Mishra, Grunewald, & Kulkarni, 2014). 
Transparency: Implies openness, accountability, a lack of hidden agendas, and full 
disclosure of dealings, practices, and transactions. It also connotes a corporate 
atmosphere where free and open exchanges are encouraged among members of 
the organization, and where rules and regulations and the reasons behind them are 
clear, fair, and accurately and thoroughly communicated to all stakeholders (Gu & 
Hackback, 2013). 
Summary 
In the first chapter of this dissertation study, I highlighted the problems in major public 
corporations using the agency, stakeholder, and stewardship theories as the 
theoretical framework to examine the issues. I traced the continued challenges in 
large firms to agency problem, which causes a conflict of interest between the 
managers and shareholders due to separation of ownership from control (Fama, 
1980). In publicly listed companies, the problem is mostly acute because of the 
wide dispersion of stakeholders; sometimes the membership of these firms crosses 
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international boundaries. The company’s affairs are left in the hands of directors 
and top executives, who may be incompetent or greedy or intent on pursuing their 
self-interest. The agency problem has given rise to two other related issues, one is 
information asymmetry, and the other is moral hazard. The directors have more 
information than the shareholders and can use the information to deceive the 
shareholders or benefit themselves or both. A moral hazard then arises whereby 
the shareholders have to employ other tools, such as monitoring and close 
supervision of executives, to minimize their potential loss. 
The government tried to address these problems by passing laws, such as the SOX of 
2002. The SOX  requires companies to have an independent board of directors; 
independent audit committee; competent, independent, and capable members of 
the board; a compensation committee; and accurate and full disclosure of the 
companies’ financial affairs. The Act also set up PCAOB, a body charged with 
the monitoring and supervision of external auditors. The legislation became 
necessary following the collapse of Enron, a large energy trader, and Arthur 
Andersen, one of the big four accountancy firms at the time, and arguably, the 
most aggressive. The stock exchanges, the Organization of Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) the American Business Round Table, and 
the professional firms also responded to the crisis by setting up corporate 
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governance codes, to which all listed companies and other large public companies 
are to comply. 
The SOX, PCAOB, and the various systems of corporate governance did not prevent the 
financial meltdown of 2007–2008, which took down Lehman Brothers and almost 
sunk AIG, but for government intervention and bailout. As McDonald and 
Paulson (2016) stated, AIG suffered from poor risk management and a weak 
board in its securities lending and credit swap businesses. The financial crisis led 
the government in the U.S. to enact another law, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010. The Act aims at strengthening the 
financial stability of the US by improving firms’ accountability and transparency, 
end the “too big to fail” assumption, protect the taxpayer from the costs of 
bailouts, and insulate the general public from abusive banking and financial 
services. The Act also established Financial Stability Oversight Council in 
Section 111, and in Sections 201 to 217, the Orderly Liquidation Authority. The 
aims and objectives of these Acts are similar to what the corporate governance 
codes are trying to achieve in large, publicly listed companies: Instituting 
transparency and adequate disclosure of the affairs of listed corporations.  
Despite the legislations and the codes of corporate governance, fraudulent financial 
restatements and executive misuse of power are still rampant. The $1.9 billion 
accounting scandal in Toshiba was reported to have been as a result of severe 
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pressure on a weak management to show profit. For the financial recklessness in 
Toshiba, the regulators imposed a fine of $60 million on the company (Adaddy, 
2015). Although the fine is a loss to shareholders, the financial cost is far greater 
than this, and the damage to Toshiba’s corporate reputation is inestimable. Tesco, 
a British supermarket chain, also overstated its profits by $365 million to deceive 
analysts and shareholders (Miller, 2015). While the expectations of the market 
may be a problem for the managers, it is difficult to dispute that these corporate 
scandals may also be a result of an organizational culture that values appearances 
rather than substances, weak and ineffective managers, and compensation and 
promotion schemes that reward short-term profitability over long-term financial 
stability. 
I argued in this dissertation study that legislation and corporate governance codes were 
not sufficient to reduce and minimize accounting scandals and fraud in large 
companies. While rules and regulations are necessary, practitioners, the 
government, and all stakeholders must also look at the type of organizational 
culture and leadership styles that prevail in organizations. The laws and codes of 
professional practice are prescribed uniformly and are expected to apply equally 
to all organizations. The firms’ leadership styles and the particular organizational 
culture, the economic environment prevailing in the sector, the rate of 
technological changes, the macroeconomic indications in the country of 
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operation, and the degree of market sophistication and investor knowledge affect 
leadership styles and organizational culture. Organizational culture and leadership 
styles have effect on how corporate governance evolves and is implemented in 
firms, and these have a great impact firm performance. These and other indices 
will affect how the rules and regulations are applied as well, and the outcomes in 
different or similar organizations will differ. As a matter of fact, a uniform rule is 
inadequate to govern all firms. Although corporate culture and leadership styles 
cannot be legislated, it is within the power of shareholders and regulators to select 
and approve directors and managers with leadership styles and culture that 
promote firm cohesion and positive organizational climate. 
I proposed a theoretical model in this study to examine the association between corporate 
governance mechanisms and organizational performance. I use three theories of 
corporate governance as the theoretical lens to examine the conflict of interests 
that arises between owners of capital and managers that are entrusted with the 
management of the corporation. As Yarram and Dollery (2014) argued, the 
conflict of interest between the principal and agent is the primary source of 
problems in large firms. 
To examine the association between firm performance and corporate governance, I used 
ROA, ROCE, and Tobin’s Q as proxies for firm performance, the outcome 
variable. I also chose board independence, independence of the audit committee, 
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executive compensation, number of board meetings, and the size of the board as 
predictor variables. Two mediating variables were hypothesized to impact the 
relationship between corporate governance and firm performance. The two 
mediators in the study are firm size and age. The size of the company confers 
advantages and disadvantages on the firm. A large size means the organization 
has resources to devote to research and development, attract the most experienced 
staff to the organization, and buy inputs to the processes at cheaper prices because 
of the negotiating power that comes with size. Large firms, on the other hand, 
may become bureaucratic over time and slow to respond to opportunities and 
threats. Age is a proxy for experience. With age, firms may be able to manage 
risks better and prevent costly mistakes. Age may also impede the firm from 
being the first to the market; the managers may base their action on experience 
and may be surprised by a much smaller, and better organized, newcomer. 
The four other chapters in this dissertation study were  organized as 
follows: In cchapter 2, I reviewed the current state of research in corporate 
governance theories and examine their impact on corporate performance. I 
documented  and discussed the theories and the findings, including the scope for 
further research. In cchapter 3, I reviewed  the research methods that I used to 
examine the association between corporate governance mechanisms and firm 
performance. In cchapter 4, I  presented the result of my research into the impact 
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of corporate governance on organizational financial performance in nonfinancial 
companies listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange. Finally in cchapter 5, I 
presented the summary of the dissertation study, conclusions, and 
recommendations. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction 
 In this chapter, I review the literature on corporate governance and firm performance. I 
organized the chapter into three sections. In the first section, I reviewed the 
literature on corporate governance with particular reference to the agency, 
stakeholder, and stewardship theories. In the review in this section I compared 
and contrast the main theories of corporate governance, which are agency, 
stakeholder, and stewardship theories. I examine the strengths, weaknesses, and 
the significant assumptions underlying the theories. In the second section, I  focus 
on the conflict of interest between the shareholders and managers, the response of 
the stakeholders to the problem, and the findings of research studies. The third 
and final section consisted  of a literature review on a firm’s performance, with 
emphasis on ROA, ROCE, , and Tobin’s Q, which were the dependent variables 
in the study. 
Theories of Corporate Governance 
There were three main theories of corporate governance that I considered in this study. 
These were the agency theory, the stakeholder theory, and the stewardship theory. 
These theories provided the foundation and theoretical underpinnings for the 
study and showed an understanding and appreciation of corporate governance as a 
crucial tool in organizational management. The theories also illustrated why 
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corporate behavior is as it is and how a long-term improvement in the efficiency 
and effectiveness of firms can be sustained. 
 
Agency Theory 
The agency theory assumes a conflict of interest between managers and shareholders of 
large corporations as a result of the separation of ownership from control (Wallis 
& Klein, 2015). The managers are sometimes motivated to pursue self-interest, 
which may conflict with the profit maximization objective of the owners (Smith, 
2003; Wallis & Klein, 2015). As rightly stated by Smith (2003), the owners could 
not expect managers to devote their attention faithfully to the shareholders’ 
interests as much as their own. A conflict of interests arises as a result of 
opportunistic behavior of the managers. But according to Miletkov, Moskalev, 
and Wintoki (2015), the cause of agency problems in organizations is the 
mangers’ excessive focus on short-term profit. Managers are appraised on the 
extent to which they improve firm value and profitability in a calendar year 
(Rashid & Islam, 2013). The appraisal and scrutiny of shareholders and financial 
analysts force managers to focus on the short-term, and when short-term profit is 
overemphasized, there is unlikely to be an ethical work climate and a positive 
attitude of stewardship by the managers and directors (Hassan & Naser, 2013). 
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Hiebl (2013), in a qualitative study of 14 large and privately held manufacturing firms in 
Austria, found short-term management appointments increase agency problems. 
The researcher also found that agency-like behavior increases agency problems 
that are not present in firms managed by owners-managers, who exhibit steward-
like behavior. Some researchers see the basic assumption of agency theory as the 
main cause of the conflict of interest in corporations. But the assumption that 
managers are fraudulent and lack the integrity to pursue owners’ objectives when 
exercising managerial power may not be applicable in all cases. The assumption 
of the agency theory may have become a self-fulfilling prophecy: The managers 
are assumed to be selfish and self-interested, and in practice they behave 
according to type. This assumption has been the major reasons why experts call 
for close monitoring of employees, especially the top management by the board of 
directors (Kaczmarek, Kimino, & Pye, 2014). 
Some of the self-interested attitudes of managers include compensation that is not 
commensurate with performance, taking excessive risks that may put the future of 
the firms in ruins as a result of pay for performance compensation, and using the 
firms’ resources to fend off takeovers that may be in the interest of the 
shareholders (Hiebl, 2015). Quttainah (2015) found antitakeover provisions 
negatively and significantly associated with firm performance. Quttainah  also 
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found antitakeover provisions acted against firms’ survival and recovery during 
the 2007–2008 financial crisis. 
Hiebl (2013) found the presence of owner-manager in management lowers the perceived 
control by top management and in turn ensures mutual trust and respect between 
the managers and shareholders, reducing agency problems. But both the corporate 
governance and agency theory scholarship have developed on the basis that 
managers need close monitoring by an independent board of directors and an 
independent audit and compensation committees to reduce agency costs (Hiebl). 
The agency costs are borne entirely by the shareholders (Baulkaran, 2014; Kay & 
Vojtech, 2016; Rashid & Islam, 2013). Not all research findings support the 
agency theory. Kay and Vojtech (2016) found that, although the SOX laid much 
emphasis on director independence to reduce agency problems, the rule fails to 
reduce CEO misbehavior, such as excessive compensation and manipulation of 
rules of incentive-based remuneration. Baulkaran (2014) on the other hand, found 
that independent chairperson on the board of directors and majority voting rights 
provisions were negatively associated with firm value. He also found  say-on-pay, 
a policy that allows shareholders to vote on employees’ emoluments, was 
negatively and significantly associated with stock returns. 
Rashid and Islam (2013) and Jermias and Gani (2014) found that a bigger board size and 
CEO duality were positively associated with firm performance, but the findings 
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are inconclusive. Rashid and Islam carried out their research on all listed 
companies on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange and concluded that the 
explanatory power of the variables was low due to many imperfections in the 
market. Although the SOX laid much emphasis on the strength of an independent 
board and independent committees to reduce agency problems in firms, research 
results have not been consistent with these assumptions. Shank, Hill, and Stang 
(2013) stated that since larger firms have much better resources than smaller 
companies, availability of resources could have protected them from the 
consequences of bad corporate governance practices, not because of their 
implementation of the provisions in SOX or compliance with corporate 
governance codes. 
Shank et al. (2013) found that large firms perform better with a good corporate 
governance system. Bhagat and Bolton (2013) examined the association between 
corporate governance and the performance of companies, analyzing data from 
RiskMetrics and Investor Responsibility Research Center between 2003 and 2007. 
They found board independence was negatively associated with ROA in the 
periods before 2002, but positive and significant post-2002. Bhagat and Bolton 
also found the G-Index and the E-Index and ROA positive and significant in the 
years following the SOX (Bebechuck et al., 2009; Gompers et al., 2003). The 
result of their research suggests a positive relationship between the composition 
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of the board and firm performance, made possible by implementing the provisions 
of the SOX. 
Benjamin and Zain (2015) found board independence and frequency of meetings 
negatively and significantly associated with dividend payout, suggesting that 
corporate governance mechanisms and dividend payouts are substitutes. Cao, 
Leng, Feroz, and Davalos (2015) found smaller board size, greater board 
independence, greater gender diversity of the board, and lower concentration of 
institutional ownership positive and significantly associated with post-SEC’s 
Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases. Regulatory sanctions may force 
corporations to improve their corporate governance systems (Baran & Forst, 
2015; Cao et al., 2015). 
Gama and Rodrigues (2013) and Sun, Lan, and Ma (2014) found the urge or temptation 
to commit accounting fraud and the chances of success are negatively related to 
the size and independence of the board. Sokolyk (2015) and Wang (2015) also 
reported that governance mechanisms had a positive and significant effect on 
corporate performance. Adewuyi and Olowookere (2013) and Gama and 
Rodrigues equally found that the size of the board and the number of independent 
directors are positive and significantly associated with firm performance. 
Quttainah (2015) asserted that board independence and board size only affect 
performance when other corporate governance mechanisms are present in the 
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company. This means that a firm benefits from implementing all corporate 
governance codes, and part implementation may not be effective. 
Other important controls to strengthen corporate governance systems are through 
committees, such as audit and compensation committees. An independent audit 
committee will be composed of external independent directors, and the majority 
of the members will be qualified with adequate industry experience to make an 
appreciable impact on the governance of the firm (Hassan & Nasser, 2013). 
Jermias and Gani (2014) reported that the size of the audit committee and the 
number of audit committee meetings were negatively related to firm performance. 
Adewuyi and Olowookere (2013) found independence of the audit committee 
positive and significantly related to ROA and Tobin’s Q. Leung et al. (2014) also 
observed the independence of the audit committee was positive and significantly 
associated with ROA and stock returns. The expertise of the members of the 
committee was found equally important by many researchers and would dictate 
the tone and the quality of discussions in the committees (El-Faitouri, 2014; Ioana 
& Mariana, 2014; Leung et al., 2014). Ioana and Mariana (2014) noted that   the 
frequency of audit committee meetings was not related to company performance 
at the one percent level of significance, but members’ expertise in finance and 
accounting was positive and significantly associated with firm performance, 
measured by ROA and ROCE. 
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Expertise in accounting, audit, and risk management are essential for audit committee 
members if they are to help their firms survive in financially turbulent times (Dah, 
2016; Ioana & Mariana, 2014). In a recession, boards’ oversight tends to increase 
as well as the CEO’s power (Ciampi, 2015; Pugliese et al., 2014). Ciampi (2015) 
also reported that firms that became bankrupt in Italy in 2008 had higher debts to 
equity ratios, higher interest payments, and weak profitability ratios than firms 
that survived the financial crisis. A good corporate governance practice may have 
insulated some firms from the adverse effects of the financial crisis, and a strong 
CEO may have achieved the same thing. 
Ciampi (2015) reported  that CEO duality, a measure of CEO power,  was negatively and 
significantly associated with the incidence of bankruptcy in small firms, those 
with turnover below 5 million Euros. When the CEO shares his or her power with 
a chairperson in a small enterprise, the likelihood of financial distress increases 
(Shank, Hill, & Tang, 2013). Zona (2016)  reported that CEO duality was 
positively and significantly associated with performance, measured by research 
and development intensity. The findings of shank et al. (2013) and Zona (2016) 
confirmed that absence of conflict of interest, or a conflict of interest that is well 
managed by corporate governance systems, improves a firm’s performance. 
Ciampi (2015) that nondefaulting firms had more of CEO duality, higher ownership 
concentration, and more share ownership by insider directors. During a financial 
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crisis, management entrenchment tends to increase as well as monitoring and 
advice from the board (Pugliese et al., 2014). Dah (2016) reported a positive and 
significant association between board independence and management 
entrenchment. It is most likely that board activities and those of its committee will 
become more pronounced during a crisis. The effort to rescue a company will be 
heightened at this time, and the CEO needs all the power at his or her disposal to 
turn around the fortunes of the firm. Sharing of power with the chairperson may 
well lead to default in the company (Ciampi, 2015). 
The percentage of shares held by large shareholders, institutions, and foreigners could be 
major determinants of corporate performance (Du, Deloof, & Jorissen, 2015). If 
the founder or a family member is in charge of the day-to-day management of the 
firm’s operations, there is no separation of ownership from control. There will be 
no conflict of interest, and the cost of the agency would be low. In large 
corporations, agency problems are present and the percentage of shares held by 
large shareholders, institutional investors, and foreigners impact firm performance 
(Pugliese et al., 2014). Liu et al. (2015) did not find any relationship between 
foreign ownership of a firm’s shares and performance in their examination of all 
companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges between 1999 
and 2012. 
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Chen (2015) found that in China, companies with foreign ownership had more outside 
directors, which is positively and significantly associated with performance. Al-
Saidi and Al-Shammari (2015) stated that the type of shareholders, whether 
foreign, family, or state matters in organizational performance. This is because 
some shareholders are better at monitoring the top management than others. 
Azoury and Bouri (2015) found disparity between cash flow and voting rights of 
large shareholders and family CEOs encourage cheating and expropriation of 
minority shareholders. As stated by Yeh (2014), markets will react more 
favorably to proposals of large shareholders, as directors and management are 
more likely to take such suggestions seriously. Yeh also found that directors, most 
often, ignore the proposals of small shareholders.  
Institutional investors can ensure that the board of directors and management act in the 
interest of the shareholders through monitoring, advising, and counseling. Pension 
and mutual funds control a large proportion of many firms’ shareholding and can 
use the influence they have to shape the activities of the board as they desire. But 
the research findings have been mixed. Many institutional shareholders refuse to 
get involve and simply sell their shares rather than get into arguments with the 
CEO or the chairperson. Jermias and Gani (2014) found a positive and marginally 
significant relationship between institutional shareholding and company 
performance in the S&P 500 companies between 1997 and 2004. 
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Alipour (2013reported that  in Iran, ownership concentration was negatively and 
significantly associated with ROA the  power of institutional investors was 
positively and significantly related to ROA but negatively and significantly 
related to Tobin’s Q. As Tobin’s Q measures firm performance in terms of the 
return on stocks and firm value, the indication is that the market in Iran and other 
emerging markets may not trust corporations in which institutional shareholders 
control the board of directors. Yeh (2014) found that markets react more 
favorably to announcement of proposals by large shareholders because it has the 
effect of reducing managerial entrenchment. 
Agency literature starts from the premise that the separation of ownership from control 
motivates managers to use their position to benefit themselves at the expense of 
the shareholders (Ahmadpour & Shahsavari, 2016; Arenas & Rodrigo, 2016). If a 
business is family-run, then the problems and consequences of principal-agent 
conflict of interest should disappear. A review of the current research findings 
leaves many doubts. Jameson, Prevost, and Puthenpurackal (2014) found the 
association between organizational performance and family firms and family-
controlled boards of directors to be negative and significant. Tsai, Yu, and Wen 
(2013) found advertising intensity, market-to-book value, and independent 
directors positively and significantly associated with Tobin’s Q in family-
controlled firms.  
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Jameson, Prevost, and Puthenpurackal (2014) also found that controlling shareholders 
and family and founder firms are positively and significantly associated with 
lower Tobin’s Q. These relationships were found to be significant in non-financial 
firms in India. The research findings indicate that the validity of the assumption of 
separation of ownership from control as the major issue in corporate governance 
remains a difficult area. Gama and Rodrigues (2013) reported positive and 
significant correlation between family ownership and firm performance. In 
manager-controlled firms, Tai et al. (2013) found negative and significant 
association between debt ratio and debt ownership and Tobin’s Q. Tsai, et al. 
(2013) also found independent directors negatively and significantly associated 
with firm performance. It is possible that non-family firms outperform family 
companies because the former tend to be bigger and more professionally 
managed, and the control systems and corporate governance structures in non-
family firms are more elaborate than in family-controlled companies.  
Managerial ownership, like family ownership, is a corporate governance mechanism that 
may enhance firm performance, since theoretically, it closely aligns the interests 
of managers and shareholders. If a conflict of interest arises from the separation of 
ownership from control as stated by the agency theory, the more managerial 
ownership there is in a firm, the less should be agency problems and the better the 
performance of corporations. Baulkaran (2014) studied 218 companies listed on 
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the S&P/Toronto Stock Exchange between 2003 and 2010 with 1,744 firm-year 
observations. The researcher stated that managerial ownership decreases firm risk 
and reduces agency costs. Mangantar and Ali (2015) and Jermias and Gani (2014) 
found a positive and significant relationship between managerial ownership and 
Tobin’s Q. On the other hand, Tsai (2013) reported a negative and significant 
association between Tobin’s Q and managerial share ownership. If managers, due 
to weak corporate governance structure and poor internal control systems extract 
value they are not entitled to from the firm, they may not be motivated to manage 
the company efficiently and effectively. This is more so if the illegally obtained 
value is more than, and significantly disproportionate to, the returns they get from 
their investment in the corporation. 
Managerial share ownership is part of the broader share ownership structure in a large, 
publicly listed firm. The combination and the percentage of each of the 
components in the structure exert different influences on the performance of a 
company. Jermias and Gani (2014) found a positive and significant association 
between managerial ownership and Tobin’s Q. Kouki and Guizani (2015) did not 
find a significant relationship between managerial ownership and board 
independence not significant in 30 nonfinancial firms listed on the Tunisian Stock 
Exchange. Managerial compensation, like  managerial share ownership, is a factor 
that can affect a company’s financial performance. A compensation scheme that is 
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a combination of fixed and variable pay linked to company performance could 
motivate the CEO and top management staff to perform better than when the total 
emolument is fixed regardless of the level of performance. 
Basory, Gleason, and Kannan (2014) and Al-Matar, Al-Sivid, and Bt Fadzil (2014) found 
a positive association between CEO compensation and firm performance. Basory 
et al. (2014) reported a positive and significant relationship between CEO 
compensation and firm performance positive and significant. Al-Matar et al. 
(2014) observed that the relationship was not significant in the study they 
conducted. Sila, Gonzalez, and Hagendiorff (2016) found no evidence of a 
connection between gender diversity and CEO compensation. Nevertheless, Sila 
et al. (2016) stated that in 1,960 firms in the US between 1996 and 2010, there 
was a gender bias appointing a female director once at least one is already on the 
board of directors, but female directors as a factor do not affect CEO 
compensation. 
Alves, Couto, and Francisco (2016) found that the higher the CEO remuneration, the 
higher the book value of assets and dividend yield; that is, both the dividend yield 
and assets value were positive and significantly associated with higher CEO pay. 
A higher CEO pay is an incentive to motivate the CEO to perform better than 
when the total remuneration is lower than what is obtainable in the industry as a 
whole (Alves et al., 2016; Basory et al., 2014). It is a good policy that when firms 
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set the CEO and management compensation, directors should be aware of the 
structure of pay in the industry. Alves et al. (2016) found that the remuneration 
committee was positively and significantly associated with higher CEO pay in 
Portugal, suggesting that the firms without a compensation committee pay less to 
their CEOs. 
The agency theory posits that managers need to be monitored and closely supervised to 
ensure that they are doing their duties in the interests of the shareholders. The 
annual financial statements and the interim financial reports are the principal 
documents and main channels for informing the shareholders of how well their 
company is doing, at least financially. The law makes it mandatory to present 
financial statements to the shareholders every year in an annual general meeting 
(AGM). A balance sheet, income and cash flow statement, and explanatory notes 
are part of the documents that must be laid before the meeting for approval. Other 
information on the financial statement and annual reports are the report of the 
CEO, the report of the chair, major events that happened during the year under 
review, risk management procedures, contribution to charity, and environmental 
reporting. Sometimes, these statements do not present a “true and fair” view as 
required by law. Manipulations of financial statements have many causes, such as 
the need to meet profit estimates, the need to shore up share price to satisfy major 
shareholders, the desire to cash-in on options, or management’s objective to 
79 
 
 
increase the firm’s performance and earn higher pay when part of the pay is 
linked to performance (Morgenson, 2016). 
An independent firm of certified accountants is required to audit financial statements and 
certify them as true and fair to prevent untrue statements in financial reports. One 
of the important mechanisms in corporate governance is the establishment of 
audit committees to supervise the work of the external auditors. The SOX also 
established the PCAOB  with similar aims and objectives. Ioana and Mariana 
(2014) and Al-Matar et al.  (2014) found a positive and significant association 
between audit committee and Tobin’s Q. The size of the committees, its 
frequency of meetings, independence of the members, corporate complexity, audit 
fees, and the status of the audit firm also have effect on the relationship between 
audit committee and corporate performance. Ioana and Mariana (2014) found no 
correlation between audit committee structure, frequency of meetings, and the 
independence of audit committee members. Research findings on the relationship 
between audit committee process and firm performance are mixed (Adewuyi & 
Olowookere, 2013; Alves et al., 2016; Dalwai, Basiruddin, & Rasid, 2015; 
Jermias & Gani, 2014). In their study of 487 listed firms on the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange, Leung et al. (2014) found the effect of family ownership on the 
interaction between audit committee independence and firm performance mixed. 
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Hassan and Naser (2013) found a negative and significant association between audit fees 
and the proportion of the members of the committee that are independent. Hassan 
and Naser (2013) also reported  a positive and significant relationship between the 
presence of audit committee and the size of the committee, profitability, status of 
the audit firm, and corporate risk in non-financial companies listed on the Abu 
Dhabi Stock Exchange. Ioana and Mariana (2014) reported a positive and 
significant association between the professional experience of audit committee 
members and ROA .Contrary to the findings in Hassan and Naser (2013), Jermias 
and Gani (2014) found the size of the committee and the number of meetings 
were negatively associated with performance. Adewuyi and  Olowookere (2013) 
examined the effect of corporate governance codes on firm performance in 70 
nonfinancial companies listed on the Nigeria Stock Exchange following the 
introduction of the code by Securities and Exchange Commission in 2003. They 
found that firms that have independent audit committees recorded a good 
corporate governance change. A good governance change was defined as an 
increase in board independence and director share ownership, and a decrease in 
CEO duality and board size. Adewuyi and Olowookere (2013) found board size 
negative and significantly related to a good corporate governance change. 
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Stakeholder Theory 
 The industrial revolution made it possible for a large number of people, first in 
England, then around the world, to escape poverty. The quantities and quality of 
goods and services available multiplied, and at this time, what was more 
important was to safeguard the interests of the owners of capital, the capitalists, 
that made the substantial progress possible. As many ventures became too large 
for one person or family to finance, partnerships, and later, companies whose 
liabilities were limited, were formed. The first of those companies were chartered 
companies, specially authorized by the government or the king to carry out trade 
in a particular territory or business area. Special protections were afforded the risk 
takers. Even later when ordinary citizens began to own shares, the focus of the 
legislation was on the supremacy of the shareholders over the financial and other 
affairs of the firms, and the need to protect investors from acts of fraud by 
dubious businesspeople. 
The agency model is based on a narrow view of contractual relationships, whose 
underlying philosophy is internally driven (Giudice, Peruta, & Maggioni, 2013; 
Miletkov, Moskalev, & Wintoki, 2014). The stakeholder model’s underlying 
philosophy is a much broader, and an externally focused model, as it considers the 
interests of shareholders, employees, clients, suppliers, strategic partners, and 
other groups that have connections with the firm (Conyon & He, 2016; Haβ, 
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Johan, & Schweizer, 2016). Some researchers have stated that the notion of 
considering the interests of all stakeholders may have been extended to an 
impracticable extent, and it is important for corporate managers and practitioners 
to know where to draw the line (Arenas & Rodrigo, 2016; Perrault & HcHugh, 
2015). 
Corporate organizations have a contractual relationship with many entities apart from 
their stockholders, all of who are considered as stakeholders of the firm 
(Donaldson & Preston, 1995). To be considered a stakeholder, the relationship 
with the company needs not be contractual, but it should be limited to those that 
establish contact with the company and a relationship that is capable of producing 
mutual benefits. It is reasonable to assume that a company should expect 
stakeholders’ support only if the firm undertakes projects that are seen as 
desirable by those who have a reasonable expectation that they would benefit or 
suffer harm from the actions of the corporations. In other words, a company’s 
action or inaction should have a potential impact on an individual, community, or 
other entities for them to be qualified as stakeholders of the firm. 
Andre and Pache (2016) did not see why there should be a limit to the definition and 
scope of the concept of the stakeholder as advocated by other researchers, such as 
Van Oostenhout et al. (2006). Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), local 
communities, and the natural environmentalists are included in the definition of 
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stakeholder advocated by Andre and Pache (2016). Andre and Pache 
differentiated between stakeholders that provide resources to the firm (suppliers, 
partners, and customers) and those that are without resources. Each of the two 
different types of stakeholders requires equal but separate treatment by firms 
(Andre & Pache, 2016). 
A firm draws resources from the environment and ought to be responsible for the 
preservation of it for the present, incoming, and future generations. The question 
is whether future generations can be considered as stakeholders (Arenas & 
Rodrigo, 2016). Whether or not future generations are so considered, the question 
of fairness and equity in the use of resources is a fundamental one. It is difficult to 
determine the identity of future generations, and what is a fair allocation to them 
out of a firm’s resources. Arenas and Rodrigo (2016) stated that the solution is to 
consider future generations as the direct descendants of the present stakeholders, 
out of who the firm will get future employees, customers, suppliers, and 
managers.  
Research has shown the benefits to businesses of having a broader view of participants in 
the corporate entity. Mande and Rahman (2013) found that employees’ 
involvement in decision-making ensures effective firm performance. Jameson, 
Prevost, and Puthepurackal (2014) reported a negative and significant association 
between controlling shareholders and firm performance measured by Tobin’s Q. 
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To tap the benefits that come along with looking after the interests of all 
stakeholders in a company, managers need to keep them informed about the 
affairs of the company by giving timely and accurate information (Conyon & He, 
2016; Sendjava, Pekerti, Hartel, Hirst, & Butarbutar, 2016). All employees, and 
most importantly managers, must at all times think of how their actions and 
decisions affect every stakeholder in the organization (Sendjaya et al., 2016). 
One of the most important performance indicators in a firm is the ability to generate cash 
for the financing of the business. In the short-term as well as over the long period, 
availability of cash is crucial to organizational survival and growth. As the 
managing partner of Idea Booth has stated, cash not EBITDA is the best test of 
survival and growth opportunities (Cole, 2016). Martin, Campbell, and Gomez-
Mejia (2016) also said if a company is to have good reputation and grow, it has to 
obtain good financing terms from relationships it has built with its various 
stakeholders. Cole (2016) remarked that every CEO needs to think of survival in 
the short-term and growth and expansion in the long-term. Having partners in the 
form of suppliers and other stakeholders to help achieve these twin objectives is 
crucial in today’s ever-changing business climate. 
Fair dealing with all stakeholders also affects a firm’s reputation and corporate image. 
The opinions that are held by the company’s partners affect the relationship with 
stakeholders and the way and extent to which they participate in the firm’s 
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activities. The firm’s image also affects the type of employees that are attracted to 
the company and the type of commitment and loyalty the organization gets 
(Ayoso, Roca, Arevalo, & Aravind, 2016). The concept of reciprocity is important 
in obtaining stakeholders’ cooperation. For taking the risks to invest in the 
company, shareholders deserve to be fairly treated for the important contribution 
they are making in the firm. Also, creditors and finance providers need to trade 
with the firm at profit. 
The firm needs to consider the interests of all the stakeholders so that there would be a 
mutually beneficial relationship between them. The organization contributes value 
to the stakeholders in return for unfettered access to the resources and expertise 
they bring to the firm. Shen and Gentry (2014) found that a firm’s strategic 
decisions affect corporate governance because such actions alter ownership 
structure. In the stakeholder theory, researchers must strike the right balance 
between what is possible and what is simply impracticable. There must be some 
delineation in the definition of who a firm’s stakeholders are. Those who have 
contractual relationships can be considered as stakeholders as well as those who 
stand to lose if the firm goes out of business, degrades the environment, or carries 
on activities that are damaging to the community interest and wellbeing. Beyond 
the aforementioned stakeholders, it becomes increasingly difficult and 
conceptually problematic to argue that a firm should take into consideration the 
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interests of all persons, whether foreseeable or not, when setting and executing 
corporate strategy. 
Stewardship Theory 
The stewardship and agency theories are at the different ends of a continuum of corporate 
governance. While the agency theory is based on the rational economic human 
beings, always striving to look after their self-interest and think and act basically 
in the short-term, the stewardship theory is based on the model that sees a 
manager as an equal partner in business. The steward tries at all times to render 
faithfully and truthfully the resources committed to his or her hand, always with 
unequivocal devotion to the objectives of the business even at the expense of his 
or her economic interest. The stewardship attitude of the manager engenders trust 
and dependability and little control is necessary to see that the steward gets the 
job done satisfactorily (Hiebl, 2013; Miletkov et al., 2015). 
The stewardship theory emphasizes that the manager is committed to the long-term goals 
of the organization instead of the steward’s interests. There are thus little 
mechanisms that need to be put in place to ensure corporate objectives are 
achieved (Hiebl, 2013). The savings in agency costs when managers imbibe the 
philosophy of a steward instead of that of an agent should improve organizational 
performance. Perhaps the best test of the differences between the attitudes of 
agents and stewards is seen during takeover battles and recessions. Agents tend to 
87 
 
 
entrench themselves in the organization during recessions and use the opportunity 
to maximize personal gains. During takeover battles, agents employ various 
stratagems like poison pills and issuance of new shares to frustrate a merger deal 
(Bebchuck et al., 2009). Stewards will not only present truthful information to the 
decision-makers, but will work in the overall interests of the organization and 
shareholders (Dah, 2016). 
Stewardship theory posits that the ultimate goal of the stewards is to maximize the wealth 
of the shareholders and that of their organizations. To the extent that the steward 
focuses exclusively on the interest of the organization, the goals of the firm, the 
shareholders, and managers would have been perfectly aligned, and the 
consequences of divergence of ownership from control considerably reduced. But 
it would appear that the stewardship theory suffers from the same problem as the 
agency theory because the concern and focus of the theory is still quite narrow. 
The two theories are still not as broad in their outlook as the view taken by the 
stakeholder theory, which takes a bigger picture view of all the participants in a 
corporate environment. 
The stewardship theory is yet to be fully accepted as a basis for analyzing organizational 
dynamics. But there are various benefits for using the theory to analyze 
organizations: 
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The adoption of the theory is likely to ensure a relationship between managers and 
shareholders based on trust and cooperation. 
As stewards are motivated by a higher order of needs, such as self-esteem and self-
actualization, they are likely to work for the long-term interests and sustainable 
performance of the organization. The benefits of the stewardship model will also 
be of benefit to shareholders and stakeholders. 
By emphasizing a different model of the economic person who is only motivated by self-
interest, the stewardship theory ensures a corporate atmosphere where decision-
taken is simplified and easier than in a pure agency relationship. Information 
asymmetry and moral hazard that make decision-making difficult are not present 
when the central philosophy of management is to serve as stewards of the 
organization (Almadi, 2015). 
As a model of governance, the stewardship theory changes employees’ orientation and 
behavior from individualistic, self-serving agents, to a different type of 
individuals whose primary concern is advancing the collective benefit of other 
individuals and the organization. For an individual to have a sense of 
responsibility and an other-centeredness orientation, there is a need to transition 
from an agency-centered to a stewardship-centered person. The organization must 
change the control system from the traditional ones that lay emphasis on budgets, 
individual key performance indicators, and an appraisal system that recognizes 
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only individual efforts, to one that focuses on relationship-centered collaboration 
and promotion of collective responsibilities of employees for desired outcomes. 
The organization also needs to change the reward system from individual-centered, 
winner-takes-all to those that emphasize intrinsic benefits, compensation for self-
efficacy, and self-determination. Lastly, the organization needs to develop 
individual’s commitment to self-actualization rather than a short-term pursuit of 
financial gains. The outcome of all these efforts is an inculcation of stewardship 
behavior in employees. But the stewardship model cannot stand alone, and needs 
to be considered together with organizational policies, managerial structure, and 
leadership styles, which are the control and reward systems through which most 
things in the organization, including the stewardship model, works. 
Corporate Governance: The Historical Context, Attributes, and Principles 
 Page (2005) defined corporate governance as the principles and legal and 
contractual frameworks that define and regulate the sharing of power in a 
corporation. The modern firm may be incorporated in the United States, has its 
headquarters in Hong Kong, manufactures in Taiwan and China, and source raw 
materials from Africa and Latin America. Corporate governance is the process 
and procedure for coordinating the various activities of the firm and ensuring 
stakeholders are treated fairly and equitably. The legal framework is necessary to 
ensure the firm respects the law and the contractual system that regulates the 
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firm’s business behavior with all stakeholders: Debtors, creditors, financial 
institutions, shareholders, employees, regulatory authorities, the community, the 
government, and the general public. 
 The contractual framework defines the relationship between the actors in a 
corporation and the power relationship between the parties. The legal and 
contractual frameworks within which companies operate are necessary and 
justifiable because markets are imperfect, and managers usually have superior 
information than shareholders, and a contract needs to define the duties and 
responsibilities of the parties. Corporate governance is also defined in terms of the 
duties, responsibilities, and interactions of top management of the firm with the 
members of the board of directors. The board represents the shareholders in the 
company, and the most important duty is to oversee the managers and ensure that 
strategic goals of the firm are achieved without damaging its reputation. 
The Historical Context of Corporate Governance 
 Corporate governance started in antiquity, from the time of tribal communes. The 
communities selected leaders to ensure members comply with the norms and 
standards of behavior in the community and that crimes are kept to the minimum 
to ensure progress of the society. In the 16th century, tribal communes gave way 
to global trading entities that were given Charter by the Crown to trade in a 
particular territory. Some of the well-known companies at this time were the East 
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Indian Company, the Hudson’s Bay Company, and the South Seas Company. 
Corporate governance, as we know it today, was weak in these companies at the 
time. For example, the East India Company became a colossus, with a standing 
army. Charles II of England even granted the company a right to declare war. But 
all was not well with these early companies because of their weak corporate 
governance practices and extremely weak internal structure. The South Sea 
Company gave rise to the South Sea bubble, following massive fraud and 
economic disaster that followed the chartered firm’s collapse (The Thorogood 
Publishing). The Bubble Act of 1720 was probably the first attempt to formally 
regulate companies and put in place corporate governance mechanisms. The aim 
of these efforts was to protect the members of the public and the investors. The 
Act itself had unintended consequences in that it hampered the development of 
joint stock companies. 
 The granting of charter was slow and inconvenient for businesses. The next 
progress came when the Parliament in England started incorporating companies, 
but this process took considerable Parliament time. Some of the legislations at this 
time in England were the Trading Acts of 1834 and the Chartered Companies Act 
of 1837. The real breakthrough came when the Parliament set up a committee 
chaired by William Blackstone to look into the issue. The result was the 
enactment of the Joint Stock Act of 1844, which required company registration, 
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but no limited liability. The Act also set up the Companies House and the office 
of the Registrar of Companies (The Thorogood Publishing). This was the first 
piece of legislation in the world that put incorporation of companies within the 
reach of ordinary business people (The Thorogood Publishing). 
 The U.K. Parliament passed the Companies Act of 1855 and the Joint Stock 
Companies Act of 1856. The Acts introduced the concept of limited liability and 
amended the Act of 1844. The specific requirements of the Acts of 1855 and 1856 
foreshadowed corporate governance systems as corporations practice it today. The 
key provisions were: The U.K. Parliament passed the Companies Act of 1855 and 
the Joint Stock Companies Act of 1856. The Acts introduced the concept of 
limited liability and amended the Act of 1844. The specific requirements of the 
Acts of 1855 and 1856 foreshadowed corporate governance systems as 
corporations practice it today. The key provisions were: 
All companies should file annual returns with the Registrar of Companies at the 
Companies House. 
All limited liability companies should appoint external auditors 
The word “limited” or its shortened version “Ltd.” shall end the company’s name. 
The amount of authorized and paid-up capital should be stated. 
The dividend paid, and the amount of loans given to directors, must be specified. 
The companies must have a minimum of 25 members. 
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Despite these requirements, dishonest businessmen exploited the loopholes in the law and 
practice of the time to perpetrate frauds and dupe shareholders. One of these 
frauds, the run on Overend, Gurney bank, made the Bank of England to increase 
interest rate to 10%. The gurney bank episode was the last known run on an 
English bank, that is, until 2007 when a similar faith befell the Northern Rock. 
Poor corporate governance practices and inadequate board oversight brought the 
Northern Rock down, the same as what corporate governance codes, the Joint 
Stock Act of 1856, and many other companies’ legislations tried to prevent. 
The Cadbury Committee. In May 1991, the stakeholders in company management in 
the United Kingdom, concerned about the number of corporate collapses and 
financial scandals in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and investors’ lack of 
confidence in the financial statements following these collapses, took action. The 
Financial Reporting Council, the London Stock Exchange, and the accountancy 
profession in England and Wales established the Cadbury Committee to address 
the financial aspects of corporate governance. Some of the issues the committee 
was charged with were: (a) to review the structure and responsibilities of the 
board of directors and recommend a code of best practice, (b) to consider the 
statutory duty of independent auditors and make necessary recommendations to 
the accountancy profession, and (c) to address the rights and responsibilities of 
the shareholders. 
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 The Cadbury Committee’s recommendations became a landmark and innovative 
thinking on corporate governance. Some of its recommendations have been 
incorporated into legislation and stock exchanges’ codes and principles of 
corporate governance around the world. The rate of adoption of the 
recommendations shows that the system, process, and challenges of managing a 
corporation is universal, and most especially that concerted efforts and 
cooperation are required to minimize fraud, irregularities, and misstatements in 
companies’ financial affairs to ensure free flow of capital in free market 
economies. 
Some of the relevant recommendations of the Cadbury Committee were: 
All listed companies on recognized stock exchanges should comply with the code of 
corporate governance, both in the spirit and the letter. The annual reports of all 
companies must contain a statement of compliance. 
All listed companies should separate the office of the chairman from that of the CEO. If 
the two offices are combined in one person, the board should nominate a Lead 
Director from the group of non-executive and independent directors to counter-
balance the considerable power vested in the Chairperson/CEO. 
Non-executive directors should be independent and of high caliber, regarding 
qualifications, experience, and integrity. 
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The nomination committee, the audit committee, and the compensation committee, 
ideally, should be composed entirely of non-executive or independent directors to 
improve corporate governance standards. 
The remuneration of directors, including the chairperson, should be disclosed in the 
financial statements. 
The audit report should state the responsibilities of the directors for the financial 
statements and the auditor’s responsibility to express their opinion on the 
financial statements. 
Audit fees, rotation of audit partners, and earnings from non-audit services should be 
disclosed in the financial statements. 
The collapse of Enron and the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. After the 
Second World War, the U.S. economy considerably expanded, many American 
corporations witnessed tremendous growth, both locally and overseas. The major 
priority at this time was to make money and satisfy shareholders’ objective of 
wealth maximization. How the corporation was being governed was of less 
concern to shareholders: Dividends and share price appreciation were major 
concerns. SEC initiated a major reform agenda in the mid-1970s. SEC sued Penn 
Central directors in 1974 for preparing false financial statements and for 
misrepresenting the state of the company’s financial health (Cheffins, 2012). 
96 
 
 
The financial scandals in Enron brought the world’s attention, once again, to the danger 
of neglecting corporate governance practices. The demise of Enron led to the 
enactment of the SOX. The Act’s cornerstone was the requirement for an 
independent board, independent audit committee, and independent remuneration 
committee. The Act also established the PCAOB The board was charged with the 
task of overseeing the external audit process and authorization of the audit firms 
that audit public companies. The committee also has the power to discipline 
erring firms. 
Attributes of Corporate Governance 
 Corporate governance systems and mechanisms are meant to address the conflict 
of interest that arises in corporations where ownership is divorced from control. 
The twin problems of information asymmetry and moral hazard are largely a 
result of the mistrust that exists due to that separation. Managers, on the one hand, 
are rational human beings and are concerned with self-interest, which typically, 
are career progression and security of employment, personal development, and 
adequate remuneration. The shareholders, the owners of the firm, on the other 
hand, have as their objective the maximization of returns on their investments 
consistent with the risks they assume. The objectives of shareholders and 
managers are incompatible, which is why there is a conflict of interest with 
consequent agency costs entirely borne by the shareholders. 
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 Effective corporate governance practices lower the conflict of interests between 
shareholders and managers by more closely aligning the two interests (Jameson et 
al., 2014). Two types of conflict can be distinguished in firms: A conflict of 
interest exists between shareholders and the debt holders as well as between 
stockholders, board, and management. While the last conflict is internal to the 
firm, the first is external, involving a specialized group of creditors, mainly the 
bondholders and others who hold secured and unsecured credit of the firm. If 
management takes unreasonable risks because it wants to increase returns to 
shareholders, it may jeopardize the assets secured creditors depend on as a last 
resort for the repayment of their loans. The situation is even worse for unsecured 
creditors because they get paid after secured creditors have been settled and 
certain regulatory obligations have been satisfied. 
 The lenders rely on a firm’s integrity, the quality of its assets, the soundness of its 
business fundamentals, and the dependability of its financial statements in making 
loan decisions. A company’s integrity and reputation and a high standard of 
financial reporting should translate to superior performance. Many studies have 
found significant improvement in the performance of firms that are transparent 
(Bijalwan & Madan, 2013; Gu & Hackbarth, 2013; Kara, Erdur, & Karabiyik, 
2015). Governance and transparency are good for firms, but a more transparent 
company may attract corporate raiders. 
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Characteristics of good corporate governance practices. Certain characteristics 
differentiate a good corporate governance mechanism from others. Some of these 
features are as follows: 
Transparency. This is an essential component of corporate governance. It ensures that the 
affairs of the firm are run in an open manner and information for decision- 
making is accurate, relevant, and promptly available. It means that management 
and the board have no hidden agendas, employees know the direction of the firm 
and understand their roles in the organization, and other stakeholders know the 
company’s policies in areas that affect each of them. 
Fairness. The modern corporation has many actors. The shareholders are technically the 
owners of the company, while the managers are the agents of the shareholders 
who have been charged with the responsibility of the day-to-day management of 
the firm. There are other members of the corporation without whom the company 
cannot grow and thrive. The employees, the suppliers, the bondholders, the 
various service providers, and the community are all stakeholders. These 
stakeholders supply labor, credit facilities, materials, and a peaceful environment 
for a firm’s operations. While the agency and the shareholders’ wealth 
maximization theories focus on the needs of the shareholders exclusively and how 
to align the managers’ and shareholders’ interests, the stakeholders’ theory 
recognizes that every stakeholder has the right to receive information from the 
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company and be treated fairly. In today’s connected, interdependent, and 
technology-driven world, the concept of ownership is changing, so also should be 
the focus of firms. Shareholders are becoming more dispersed, leaving control 
and management in the hands of the very few. With the directors’ control over 
proxy votes, the real owner’s voice is unheard. Also, institutional shareholders 
now own large chunks of a company’s equity, complicating the concept of 
ownership further. The financial institutions and the debt holders supply needed 
finance to the corporation, just like the shareholders, and ought to be treated fairly 
and equitably as well. In the new economy, employees must be well treated as 
knowledge now trumps capital. The shareholder supremacy as a philosophy is 
becoming outdated. The focus of corporate governance should not be only 
shareholders, but employees as well, specifically how to recruit, train, control, and 
retain knowledge workers. 
Discipline. A company’s corporate governance mechanism works within the legal 
framework of a nation, and what is required first and foremost is for the firm to 
obey the laws of the host country and rules and regulations of the particular sector 
or industry in which it operates. Part of the characteristics of good corporate 
governance is for the board and management to be disciplined enough to obey the 
rules. The Volkswagen’s emissions cheating scandal occurred when the company 
thought that the U.S. emission standard was too onerous to follow, and cutting 
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corners only brought temporary gains. The costly scandal that followed the 
exposure of the cheating has been described by the company’s communications 
chief as embarrassing (Hakim, 2016). The directors took an unreasonable and 
unnecessary risk. 
Self-evaluation. The board of directors charged with the duty to control and monitor the 
management must evaluate each director and the work of the subcommittees on 
which they are nominated. The periodic evaluation will ensure the board 
continues to meet its obligations, and that the directors are still qualified, 
independent, and fit for the office of the director of the firm. As Mack (2016) 
stated, a constant evaluation ensures that potential problems are spotted, 
communicated, and mitigated before they become real and embarrassing issues. 
Effective risk management. The Board and management need to understand, evaluate, 
dimension, and measure the firm’s risks to reduce or eliminate them before they 
become major disasters. The risk management process in the firm should be 
enterprise-wide, proactive rather than reactive, and cover operational, country, 
environmental, reputational, regulatory, and other risks affecting the particular 
area in the company. Good risk management seeks to balance the cost of risk 
management with potential benefits, the procedures being subject to ongoing 
review by the board and management. The directors also need to report the firm’s 
risk management procedures in the annual financial statements, especially how 
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they identify and measure the risks, and the contingency plans in place in case of 
unexpected crystallization of known and unknown risks. 
Clear strategy. Strategic planning and strategy implementation are the exclusive preserve 
of the top management. The board must also devote considerable attention to the 
company’s strategic goals and its implementation. A clear strategy sets the limits 
to what the company can and cannot do, and how it wants to be perceived by its 
customers. If the strategy is clear and unambiguous, it has the power to rally 
employees and set a clear path for the firm to achieve its objectives. 
Social responsibility. A firm must be socially responsible, both to the host community 
and to the environment. Social responsibility starts with obeying the written and 
unwritten rules of the community. It also covers the company’s efforts at waste 
disposal; the policy on global warming and use of recycling materials; the policies 
on employment of the disabled, charitable contribution, and political donations; 
and investment in the community. 
Principles of Corporate Governance 
 The Merriam-Webster Dictionary (2016) defined a principle as “a moral rule or 
belief that helps you know what is right and wrong, and that influences your 
actions”, or “a basic truth or theory: An idea that forms the basis of something”, 
or “a law or fact of nature that explains how something works or why something 
happens” (The Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 2016). The principles of corporate 
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governance help the shareholders, management, and all other stakeholders to 
know why corporate governance is important and the basis of the rules. The 
Business Round Table (BRT) is an association of American CEOs of large 
corporations with combined annual revenues of over $6 trillion and 14 million 
employees. In 2012, the association established corporate governance principles 
that all members are to adopt in their firms. The Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) also has corporate governance principles, 
which were revised in 2015. Stock exchanges around the world have adopted 
some of these principles as best practices. The United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP) also listed characteristics of good corporate governance, which 
include participation, the rule of law, transparency, equity, accountability, and 
strategic vision (UNDP, 1997). 
 The Business Round Table principles of corporate governance. In their 2016 
statement of the principles of corporate governance, the BRT identified corporate 
actors, to whom the document is addressed, as the board and the shareholders, and 
their relationship with the other stakeholders. They stated that the relationship 
between the actors should be based on fairness and transparency, some of the 
attributes of a good governance system that were earlier addressed in this study. 
The firms must also be good citizens of the community where their operations 
take place, and must be committed to complying with the rules and regulations of 
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their host country. The BRT sees the duties of the board as one of selecting and 
overseeing qualified and ethical CEOs, monitoring management performance, and 
complying with the laws and corporate ethical standards. Management is to give 
unbiased information to the board and be responsible for corporate planning, risk 
management, and strategy setting. The shareholders are not saddled with the day-
to-day administration of the corporation, but are to elect representatives to look 
after their interests and receive information to make voting and investment 
decisions. Perhaps, the most important point on the BRT principles is the section 
on board oversight. The SOX also placed considerable emphasis on board 
oversight and its independence, and the independence of board committees. The 
BRT principles on board oversight are as follows: 
Board composition. Directors should be elected by majority vote, and the elected 
directors should come from a variety of backgrounds to guide the company 
through the various stages of an increasingly complex business environment. 
Board leadership. Board leadership structure cannot be the same in all organizations. The 
complexity of the firm’s business, industry, ownership structure, business 
environment, and area of operations dictate the type of board leadership structure 
in a firm. The BRT recommends that where the positions of CEO and chair are 
combined, there should be appointed an independent director as a lead director. It 
is the same requirement recommended by the United Kingdom’s Cadbury 
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Committee on corporate governance. The lead director would chair and 
coordinate executive sessions and has the right to call meetings of the 
nonexecutive directors. He or she chairs the meetings in the absence of the 
chairperson of the board, reviews and approves agendas of the meetings, and 
oversees performance evaluations of both the CEO and top management of the 
corporation. The same recommendation is advocated in the OECD principles of 
corporate governance. 
Board organization. The BRT favors the use of committees to address in-depth key issues 
affecting the organization that may not be accommodated in a full board meeting. 
The committees supported by the BRT principles of corporate governance are as 
follows: 
Audit committees. The audit committee should be composed of at least three independent 
directors, who are financially literate as defined in the listing particulars; at least 
one member should be a financial or accounting expert. The audit committee is to 
select and oversee the terms of engagement of the external auditors and see to 
their independence on an ongoing basis, oversee the firm’s financial reporting and 
its crucial accounting policies, judge the accuracy of its estimates, and read and 
review the management letter on the state of the firm’s internal control and 
reporting systems. The provisions in the PCOB established by the SOX of 2002 
are similar to the audit oversight requirements of BRT principles. Apart from its 
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oversight functions on the firm’s accounting and reporting systems, the committee 
should also review the firm’s risk management processes; its ethical, legal, social, 
and corporate code of conduct; the scope, depth, and comprehensiveness of the 
internal audit plan; and the appraisal of the senior internal auditor and the key 
staff, including their qualifications, independence, competence, and quality of 
reports. The committee should have direct communication with the chief internal 
auditor, meet frequently, and make their reports available to the full board. 
Nomination committee. The committee, which should be composed only of independent 
directors, should have at least three members. Its duties are to (a) recommend 
director nominees to the board, (b) oversee the structure of the board, its 
composition, and regular evaluation, (c put in place and review the succession 
planning, (d review board policies, agenda, and processes, (e) monitor the board’s 
efforts to connect and engage with all stakeholders, and (f) recommend, where 
appropriate, changes to the firm’s principles of corporate governance. 
Compensation committee. Some of the duties of the compensation committee may be 
shared with the nomination committee, especially the duty of overseeing the 
compensation of the board. Every firm should have a compensation committee to 
address the important issue of remuneration in the company, especially the 
compensation of top management and directors. The Cadbury Committee, the 
OECD, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 recommended a compensation 
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committee to be composed of independent directors. A minimum of three 
directors is recommended by the Business Round Table to oversee all 
compensation matters. Many researchers have also found a significant and 
positive association between compensation and firm performance (Dah, 2016; 
Perryman, Fernando, & Tripathy, 2016). The committee should have a 
compensation scheme that links pay with performance, but should also be aware 
of the incentives and motivation pay-for-performance compensation structure 
affords management in terms of potential for misstatements in financial 
statements and accounting fraud. The most important task for the committee is to 
ensure managers’ remuneration structure establishes meaningful goals for 
performance and reduces the gap between their interest and the long-term 
objectives of shareholders by encouraging the managers to invest in the company. 
Relationship with stakeholders. The board must establish a relationship with all 
stakeholders based on equity, fairness, and trust. Although the interest of the 
shareholders is paramount, other stakeholders should also be considered, and their 
views taken into account as follows: 
Shareholders. Firms should be responsive to shareholders’ grievances and concerns, 
educate them on the policies and procedures in the company, and bring them up to 
date on the role and activities of the board and the challenges facing their 
company. The board should encourage the shareholders to attend meetings and 
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make recommendations for the interest of the company. Effective communication 
with the shareholders through annual reports, press releases, proxy statements, 
and other corporate communications channels are important to get the shareholder 
informed and engaged in the firm. 
Employees. Many firms claim employees are their most valuable assets, yet actual 
corporate practice may not reflect this sentiment in most corporations. Employees 
must be treated fairly and equitably, informed of the firm’s policies and 
procedures, especially concerning job responsibilities, security, and in seeking 
redress if wrongfully treated. Employees must feel that they are making 
meaningful contributions to their firm’s objectives and that the company values 
their contributions. 
Communities. The host communities provide the raw materials, labor, and a peaceful 
working environment for the firm. The company must be a good corporate citizen, 
contributing to community projects, promoting awareness of public health and 
safety, and be seen as ethical and responsible. It is a good policy to report in the 
annual financial statements the company’s policy towards the physically 
challenged, the number of the physically challenged employed from the 
community, recycling policies, preservation of the natural environment, and 
participation in community activities. 
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Government. To be a good corporate citizen, the firm must first and foremost operate 
within the law and be actively involved in the legal compliance and development 
in its area of operations. Political activities should be handled very carefully. The 
board needs to oversee all the firm’s political activities and contributions to 
political parties. Full disclosure should also be considered in the financial 
statements (BRT, 2016). 
The Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development/G20 principles of 
corporate governance. In 2015, the OECD revised its principles of corporate 
governance originally developed in 1999 and revised in 2004. The principles have 
been widely adopted in many countries and have influenced several corporate 
governance codes. The organization stated that corporate governance is not an end 
in itself, but a means of achieving market efficiency, business confidence, and 
liquid equity markets. All the G20 countries partook in the review of 2015; as 
well as the Basel Committee, the Financial Stability Board, the World Bank; and 
regional governance roundtables in Latin America, Asia, the Middle East, and 
North Africa. 
 The principles were in six chapters. Chapter 1 deals with the role of governance in 
promoting a transparent and fair market and efficient allocation of scarce 
resources. Chapter 2 of the OECD principles of corporate governance is 
concerned with the rights of shareholders, their responsibilities, and how they can 
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be treated equitably. The chapter emphasizes the shareholders’ rights to accurate 
and timely information, and the importance of their participation in decision-
making and in setting management remuneration. Chapter 3 deals with 
institutional investors, the stock market, and other intermediaries. The need for 
institutional investors to act in a fiduciary capacity in company matters is 
emphasized, and the importance of disclosing information to avoid conflict of 
interest with proxy advisers, analysts, brokers, and rating agencies. 
 Chapter 4 of the OECD principles of corporate governance focused on the role of 
stakeholders in a firm’s corporate governance. Active cooperation between firms 
and stakeholders is to be encouraged. Firms must respect the rights of 
stakeholders recognized by law. Corporations must also give access to timely and 
accurate information to all stakeholders. Chapter 5 details key areas of disclosure: 
Financial and operating results, company objectives, remuneration, ownership 
structure, related party transactions, and risk factors affecting the firm. Finally, 
Chapter 6 focuses on the responsibility of the board. Key functions of the board 
include a review of corporate strategy, selecting competent and effective CEOs, 
overseeing major acquisitions and divestiture, and reviewing the firm’s risk 
management procedures. Other duties include ensuring the integrity of accounting 
and financial reporting, tax planning, selecting and supervising board committees, 
and board evaluation and training (OECD, 2015). 
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 I have reviewed the history, attributes, and the principles that guide corporate 
governance codes and implementation in publicly listed firms. A close look at the 
different principles shows that a common thread runs through the provisions. 
Foremost is the power of the board to shape whatever happens in a corporation. 
When shareholders are widely dispersed, the board is charged with the 
responsibility of directing the affairs of the firm by establishing control and 
monitoring the top managers through various tools such as the use of committees, 
reviewing the company’s performance, hiring the best professional managers for 
the top jobs, and disciplining erring managers. But in practice, some boards are 
manipulated by powerful CEOs, which is the reason why the law and codes of 
corporate governance call for a fully independent board of directors for public 
companies and for separating the position of the chair of the board from that of 
the CEO (El-Faitouri, 2014; Lin, Hutchinson, & Percy, 2015; Mehrotra, 2016). 
The Effect of Conflict of Interest on Firm Performance 
 The professional managers act as the agents of the shareholders who are the 
owners of the firm. Being a paid agent, the manager could not be expected to 
devote as much time, commitment, and diligence to the company’s affairs as the 
owners (Smith, 2003). The separation of ownership from control is the primary 
cause of agency problems and its associated costs. Some managers exploit the 
situation to self-deal and make considerable gains for themselves, using price-
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sensitive information in their possession. Other managers pressure a weak board 
to award huge compensation to them, higher than what the firm’s complexity and 
performance justifies, and far above the industry average. Some other ways in 
which the conflict of interest manifests itself in a firm are when managers post 
huge short-term but unsustainable profits that could lead to massive losses in the 
future. Another is when managers delay a strategic investment that may affect 
short-term profit but which is good for the long-term survival and growth of the 
company. Top management is prone to taking bad risks if their remuneration is 
linked to short-term profit performance and a board that does not spell out what is 
an acceptable and unacceptable risk (Cybinski & Windsor, 2013). 
 Perhaps the best example of the conflict arises during takeover battles and merger 
and acquisitions negotiations. Ordinarily, the directors should advise the 
shareholders objectively, disclosing their relationship with the bidders, the merit 
of the proposal, and what shareholders should do given the information at the 
managers’ disposal. The managers and directors should act in the best interests of 
the firm and the shareholders. Gu and Hackbarth (2013) has stated that, although 
governance and transparency are complements and positively and significantly 
associated with firm performance, transparent firms are much more susceptible to 
takeover than less transparent ones. But Quttainah (2015) stated that antitakeover 
provisions are injurious to shareholders’ wealth. If anti-takeover provisions 
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damage shareholders wealth, then their presence in the articles of corporations is a 
sign of weak corporate governance (Bebchuck, Cohen, & Ferrell, 2009). Bhagat 
and Bolton (2013) also found a negative and significant association between 
return on assets and the G-Index (Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick, 2003). This 
indicates that the higher the scores on the G-index, the weaker the corporate 
governance practice, and the lower the firm's return on assets. 
 Some of the financially hurtful managerial actions in takeover situations are 
greenmail, where managers buy the potential acquirers’ shares at a higher amount 
than the proposed price; golden parachute, where employment contract are drawn 
up to guarantee a lump sum or cash flow over a period when a manager loses his 
job as a result of hostile takeover; poison pills, a cash flow right or other benefits 
triggered by a hostile takeover; and overpaying for acquisitions. All these actions 
are detrimental to the wealth-maximizing objective of shareholders, and 
overpayment for acquisitions directly hurts them because wealth is being 
transferred from the vendors to the acquirers. Transparency and objectivity are 
important. But as Gu and Hackbarth (2013) found, transparent firms are more 
prone to takeovers because the acquirer is more confident of the value of the 
company and they will get adequate value for what they paid. The art of corporate 
governance practice is for managers to know the essential information to disclose 
to company stakeholders without compromising trade secrets. 
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Conflict between Managers’ Attitude to Risk and Shareholders’ Need to Embrace Risk 
 Risks are the perfect partner of opportunity. Instead of running from risk, business 
managers should embrace and exploit it. Sensible risk-taking not only gives short-
term profit, but it also gives the firm sustainable long-term growth and survival. 
To embrace risk, managers must understand, assess, measure, and dimension 
every aspect of a decision. Exploitation of risk requires patience, deliberation, and 
hard work. Managers and analysts may be impatient for the result of risk-taking, 
which may exacerbate the conflict of interest between managers and shareholders. 
As Shank et al. (2013) observed, the governance-stock performance is better 
studied over the long-term, as the outcomes of a risk-aversion or risk-seeking 
attitude can be fully assessed over the long period. 
 To make substantial and long-term sustainable profit, firms must take risks in 
marketing; manufacturing innovation; research and development; investment in 
property, plant, and equipment; expanding overseas; and innovation in 
management, operations, and control systems. All these actions are risky, and 
many come with a trade-off with the current period’s profit with which managers 
are judged, and the long-term profitability, which ensures survival and increase in 
share price. Instead of investing for the long-term and running the risk of failure 
or termination of employment due to perceived nonperformance, managers may 
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devote considerable attention to short-term profit at the expense of long-term 
sustainable profit and growth. 
 Nowhere else is the tradeoff between short-term profit and long-term growth and 
survival more evident and pronounced than in funding research and development. 
Managers may delay research and development (R&D) expenditures to meet 
profit and sales forecast, which may hurt shareholders in the long run. El-Faitouri 
(2014) noted a negative and significant association between changes in R&D 
spending and Tobin’s Q, meaning that a reduction in research and development 
expenditure will improve performance, but only in the short-term, but hurt long-
term profitability. The tremendous growth and profitability of pharmaceutical and 
other companies and the amount they devote to research and development is a 
clear testimony. Jermias and Gani (2014) reported a positive and significant 
correlation between growth opportunity (R&D/Sales) and firm performance. 
Shortterm Profit versus Longterm Sustainable Performance 
 The theory that financial markets are efficient and make a good judgment of true 
value of firms may not be so in practice, and certainly not in all cases. There is 
evidence that managers hide information from the shareholders (Page, 2005). 
Managers may also conceal or delay bad news to achieve a particular objective, 
like cashing in on their stock options before releasing damaging information 
about the firm. Untrue and fraudulent information is also common. It is in the 
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interest of managers to exploit their information advantage, and to give out untrue 
and fraudulent information to achieve their short-term interests to the detriment of 
shareholders’ long-term goals. In the long-term, the agency mentality of the 
managers will end up hurting them. A lackluster performance compared with 
what the market expects could well mean that the managers will lose their jobs or 
a smarter corporate raider will acquire the company. Dah (2016) reported a 
significant and positive association between industry turnover and firm value 
from the data obtained from RiskMetrics, Compusat, and ExecuComp from 2001 
to 2009. 
Conflict of Interest between Shareholders and Managers 
 The shareholders are the real risk-takers. They put equity or risk capital in the 
firm and hope to make substantial profit and capital gains if all goes well. They 
also stand to lose everything if the unexpected happens. In theory, shareholders 
ought to have significant and overriding influence and control over managers. 
According to Page (2005), the preferred corporate governance model is the one 
that places the interests of shareholders above those of other stakeholders in a 
capitalist society. In practice, what obtains is radically different from this 
commonsense view. 
 While it is indisputable that shareholders’ power is a result of law, contract, and 
informal rules, the board and management most often have absolute power over 
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the affairs of the firms. First, stockholders are usually widely dispersed and may 
not have the time, information, or willingness to form a critical mass to challenge 
the directors. Secondly, management has a clear advantage; being in possession of 
superior information and proxy powers, they could use the leverage to oppress the 
shareholders. Thirdly, even though shareholders’ activism is becoming 
established in corporate governance, what often happens in real life is for large 
stockholders to sell off their entire shareholding when dissatisfied with the way 
managers run the firm rather than challenging the status quo. 
Conflict of interest Between Shareholders and Bondholders 
 Bondholders are creditors of the company, and whether the company makes a 
profit or not, they have to be paid interest due on the debt and, eventually, the 
original loan. The debt covenants usually require firms to do or abstain from 
doing certain things, such as the prohibition to sell a property or relocate a 
business or merge with another firm without the creditors’ permission. In good 
times, these conditions are easily met, especially the payment of interest or 
repayment of principal. But in bad times, leverage becomes very burdensome and 
risky, and keeping to the agreements difficult. During economically difficult 
times, the bondholders have a bigger voice in the organization. 
 In theory, there should be no conflict of interest between the shareholders and the 
bondholders. The availability of debt in a firm’s capital structure is good for the 
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company. In many jurisdictions, the cost of debt is tax-deductible, and the effect 
is to lower the cost of funds and improve the bottom line. The downside is that 
overleveraged firms have more difficulty borrowing further, and when the 
debt/equity ratio rises, the cost of capital increases, as creditors demand more risk 
premium. Not all research findings found support for the relationship between 
leverage and firm performance. Al-Najjar (2014) and Arora and Sharma (2015) 
reported  no or weak support for the relationship between leverage and firm 
performance. Al-Najjar (2014) did not find any relationship between leverage and 
firm performance in Tunisian companies, but this may be limited to the 
specialized tourism industry investigated and the country where the inquiry was 
done. 
 In practice, a conflict of interest arises when shareholders, through the managers, 
take on more risky ventures that bondholders perceive as a danger to their 
investment. Firms may also borrow excessively on the same assets or sell 
mortgaged properties without the knowledge or permission of the debt holders. 
Also, managers can exploit a bad economic condition to obtain more private 
benefits, hurting both the bondholders and shareholders (Dah, 2016). 
Conflict of Interest between Firms and Society  
 It used to be assumed that what was good for business was also good for the 
society. The industrial revolution and the industries that were established in its 
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wake raised the living standards of the people of England, which then spread 
around the world. The concerns today are different. Substantial progress in the 
reduction of poverty and want allows people to devote more time and attention to 
global warming, environmental degradation caused by industrial activities, the 
gap between the rich and poor, exhaustion of natural raw materials, the 
intergenerational inequity, and the limits to harmful scientific advances. Themes 
such as stem cell research, artificial contraceptives, transgender issues, assisted 
suicide, genetically modified foods, and many other concerns, all made possible 
by advances in technology, are generating fierce debates in the society. 
 For example, the decision of Valeant to increase its drug prices to recoup research 
and development expenditure backfired and resulted in the sacking of the firm’s 
CEO. The company’s business model was not only attacked in the media, but the 
firm was also seen as the ugly and unacceptable face of capitalism. The 
company’s pricing strategy was considered inhuman; it generated political storms, 
with Hilary Clinton, the U.S. Democratic Party presidential nominee quoted as 
saying, “I’m going after them” (The Economist, 2016). The U.S. Senate also 
invited the management of the company to appear before it. As businesses expand 
and affect the whole society, unsavory business practices will continue to be 
attacked. Business managers must realize that members of the society are not just 
shareholders and providers of various services to business, but are also the 
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consumers of firms’ products and services. The business world must not only 
listen to their voices, but also anticipate their reaction to strategic initiatives, 
products and service offerings, race and gender equality, and the treatment of 
those that physically challenged. 
 There is little doubt that industrial and scientific activities, though beneficial, have 
costs associated with them. And society, ultimately, bears those costs. This is 
because there is no way the societal costs can reasonably be traced and charged to 
any firm in particular. Collectively, the society has to pay from the 
commonwealth. Another challenge is that the decision from thousands of firms 
often creates costs, which is difficult, and sometimes impossible to quantify. 
These social costs are created by firms but paid by everyone in the society. Some 
may argue that the tax paid by firms is adequate and sufficient for the central 
government to solve the problems of the common costs. The proportionate tax on 
profits is arbitrarily fixed by law and in no way represent an equitable distribution 
to firms of the cost incurred in polluting the environment or in causing other 
harms. 
Major Areas of Focus in Corporate Governance Research 
 Agency problems arise whenever a principal mandates an agent to carry out 
specified activities on his or her behalf. The agent sometimes exceeds the terms of 
his engagement or performs so woefully as to cause losses to the principal. 
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Although the problems predated the establishment of the joint-stock companies, 
the focus and attention of modern day research are on the problems in business 
organizations that arise when ownership is separated from control. In any 
relationship where there is cooperation or a joint effort, even though strict 
principal-agent relationship does not exist, there are agency problems lurking 
somewhere in the background (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
 Agency problems are important research focus because there are costs associated 
with them. According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), agency costs are the sum of 
the cost of observing and controlling the agent’s behavior. Firms try to control 
agents’ behavior by instituting controls such as budget and expenditure 
restrictions, policies based on a cap on compensation, audit and internal control 
systems, operating rules, and strict supervision. Jensen and Meckling  stated that 
there are other residual costs that may be difficult to measure or quantify. For 
example, there is a cost incurred whenever the agent’s decision diverges from 
those that maximizes the principal’s welfare. To minimize the cost of agency, and 
to more closely align the principal’s objectives to those of the agent, research has 
focused on several corporate governance mechanisms and principles. In this 
section of the dissertation study, I will focus on the board of directors, 
shareholders’ rights, executive compensation, audit oversight, and committees. 
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The Board of Directors 
 The board of directors is the organ of the business. In a large corporation, the 
shareholders are widely dispersed and do not have the time and professional 
competence to manage the business. Professional managers are employed to run 
the firm on a day-to-day basis, reporting to a board of directors as frequently as 
possible. The boards of directors, the members of which have been appointed in a 
general meeting by the shareholders or appointed by the board to fill a temporary 
vacancy, are put in charge to monitor the activities of the company and the 
behavior of the managers, and report on the stewardship of both to the 
shareholders at an annual general meeting. 
 It would seem that the shareholders exercise considerable control over the affairs 
of their companies. The nature of this control is not only ambiguous and illusory, 
but may have been overstated as well. The fact is that the controls shareholders 
exercise over their corporations have been weakened over the years by the wide 
dispersion of share ownership, the lack of time and experience to devote to 
company affairs by the owners, and the absolute control directors have over proxy 
votes and other key decisions in the company. The current reality is that in the 
major companies in America and Europe, shareholder control have been severely 
weakened and significantly reduced because of the forces referred to above. 
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 The SOX and the OECD principles of corporate governance lay much emphasis 
on the duties of directors, the leadership of the board, board independence, and 
the role of the committees. Both in America, Europe, and the emerging markets, 
corporate law and governance principles focus attention on the directors who are 
the representatives of the shareholders, holding the individuals constituting the 
board of directors accountable, not only to the shareholders but to all 
stakeholders. This century-old governance arrangement is still the best we have, 
and a better alternative has not been found for the Anglo-Saxon model. The 
German and Japanese model, a two-tier board, is a variant of the one-tier board of 
the British-American model, where a supervisory board is sandwiched between 
the regular board and the management. The two-tier model is not without its 
difficulties, especially that of coordination and lack of unity of command. 
 Board leadership. Board leadership refers to how the board is structured to 
deliver on its objectives. Both the BRT and OECD corporate governance 
principles favor a board structure in which the role of the CEO is separated from 
that of the chairperson. If the roles are combined, it is recommended that a leader-
director, who is selected from independent members of the board, be appointed. 
The leader-director will be a senior member of the board and will function to 
minimize some of the considerable power the chairperson/CEO wields. 
Combining the positions of chair and CEO, named CEO duality, without the 
123 
 
 
necessary safeguards may affect the functioning of the board and the firm. Zona 
(2016) discovered a positive and significant association between a firm’s research 
and development intensity and CEO duality. But Bhagat and Bolton (2013) 
reported a negative and significant association between CEO duality and ROA. 
 In takeover situations, CEO duality may lead to wrong and self-serving advice 
from the board to the shareholders. Bhagat and Bolton (2013) and Knockaert, 
Bjornali, and Erikson (2015) noted a negative and significant relationship 
between CEO duality and firm performance. Knockaert et al. reported a negative 
and significant association between CEO duality and board service involvement. 
It means that a powerful CEO somehow prevents the board members to get 
involved in the firm’s affairs, leading to poor company performance. Bhagat and 
Bolton documented a negative and significant relationship between CEO duality 
and the E-index, the entrenchment index, that is an abridged version of the G-
index (Gompers et al., 2003). Not all researchers found a negative association 
between these variables. Rashid and Islam (2013) reported that CEO duality 
affects performance, but too many market imperfections limit the explanatory 
power of the variables in Malaysia, an emerging economy. 
 Board size. There is no absolute size for a board of directors. The appropriate size 
depends on many factors such as the size of the firm, the complexity of its 
operations, the experience of its members, and the age of the company since 
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incorporation. Size could be both a strength and liability for the company. The 
bigger the size of the board, the more likely is the experience and quality of the 
members of the board, and the greater its diversity. Unwieldy size would increase 
bottlenecks, bureaucracy, and bickering in the board of directors, and slows down 
decisions that may adversely affect performance. Research findings have revealed 
positive and significant associations between board size and performance, 
measured by Tobin’s Q, return on assets, and return on capital employed (Kouki 
& Guizani, 2015; Xie & Fukumoto, 2013). 
 Other research findings reported a negative and significant association between 
performance and board size (Jermias & Gani, 2014; Nath, Islam, & Saha, 2015). 
Knockaert et al. (2015) stated that board size did not moderate the relationship 
between top management team and board service involvement in Norwegian 
universities and public research institutes. This means that board size has no 
effect on the involvement of the members of the board in the affairs of the 
institutions. White, Woidtker, Black, and Schweitzer (2014) also posited that  the 
likelihood of appointing a business expert unto the board decreases with the size 
of the board. 
 Board independence. If the board is to control, advice, and monitor the behavior 
of managers, the independence of each member cannot be compromised. While 
the corporate governance principles call for formal independence, independence is 
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essentially an attitude of mind. For the board to be seen as formally independent, 
the majority of the members must not be past or present employees of the firm, or 
employees of a significant shareholder, who owns 5% or more of the ordinary 
stock of the company, or the relatives of present or past director, past auditor, or a 
large shareholder (Quttainah, 2015; Tai et al., 2013). Independence of the board 
has a significant effect on the quality of board deliberations, the power of its 
recommendations, the impact of its controls on the CEO and entire management, 
and the extent of its contribution to the firm’s strategic planning agenda. Some 
research findings suggested that the impact of board independence on firm 
performance is situation-specific. Bhagat and Bolton (2013) noted that board 
independence was negatively associated with return on assets pre-2002, before the 
passage of SOX of 2002, and positively associated post-2002, after the passage of 
the Act. 
 Dah (2016) also reported board independence and management entrenchment 
positive and significant post-SOX. The independence of the board was weaker 
before the Act of 2002 was passed, as it was the tradition at the time for the board, 
and especially the CEO, to handpick directors loyal to them. The various research 
findings were mixed. Sun, Lan, and Ma (2014) discovered  a weaker association 
between board independence and firm performance post-SOX of 2002. But 
Adewuyi and Olowookere (2013) noted  the increase in the proportion of outside, 
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independent directors, was associated with good corporate governance change. 
Liu et al. (2015) and Leung et al. (2015) reported a positive and significant 
relationship between board independence and firm performance. Also, Liu et al. 
(2015) documented a positive association between board independence and 
organizational performance. Sun at al., (2014) found board independence 
negatively and significantly associated with firm performance before the SOX Act 
of 2002. 
 Board diversity. Board diversity refers to the number of female directors on the 
board. For several decades, men dominated boards of directors in Europe and the 
US. But the situation is changing as research into board structure confirms the 
advantages of having women on board. Women constitute a large percentage of 
the work force, and many pursue careers in management, engineering, and in 
other fields of human endeavor. Women also buy firms’ products for themselves 
and the entire household. It stands to good reason that women’s views and voices 
are essential and needed on the board of directors. Lucas-Perez, Minguez-Vera, 
Baixauli-Solar, Martin-Ugedo, and Sanchez-Marin (2014) reported  a positive and 
significant association between women on board and the variable pay of 
managers. An equitable payment structure increases employees’ satisfaction, 
which may enhance their loyalty and firm performance. Isidro and Sobral (2015) 
reported no statistical evidence of a direct relationship between women on board 
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and the value of the firm, but a positive and significant association between firm 
performance and the indirect effect of women on the board of directors. 
 Board meetings. The members of the board of directors typically meet once in a 
quarter to deliberate on the progress of the company. Meetings may be more 
frequent during an economic crisis and when takeover battles are being fought. 
Corporate governance principles lay emphasis on attendance at meetings and 
making positive and objective contributions as board and committee members. 
The board is charged with the responsibility of overseeing the firm’s strategic 
planning, the risk management process, the audit function, and top management 
remuneration. These tasks are accomplished during meetings of the members of 
the board. Board meetings represent a major part of corporate life where decisions 
on the vision and strategy of the firm take place. 
 The frequency of these meetings, the quality of the deliberations in them, and the 
positive impact on organizational management of the decision taken in them, have 
far reaching effects on corporate performance. Al-Matar et al. (2014) documented  
a positive and significant association between board’s frequency of meetings and 
Tobin’s Q. Sahu and Manna (2013) also discovered a positive and significant 
association between board meetings and annual stock returns, net profit, and 
market value added (MVA). Pugliese et al. (2014) found board monitoring to be 
positively and significantly associated with the past performance of firms. Mishra 
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and Mohanty (2013) also found that board effectiveness improves return on 
assets. While a well-planned and productive meetings increase board monitoring 
and effectiveness, an unproductive meeting or meetings that only rubber-stamp 
CEO’s proposals would likely have a negative impact on profitability and 
corporate value. Many researchers have found a negative and significant 
relationship between the number of board meetings and firm performance 
(Jermias & Gani, 2014; Mehrotra, 2016). An unproductive meeting could well 
lead to weaker company valuation (Jermias & Gani, 2016). 
Shareholders’ Rights 
 The shareholders, being the owners of the business, ought to have control over the 
affairs of the firm through their appointed representatives. Sometimes, the control 
may be more apparent than real. The rights of the shareholders are enshrined in 
the company’s law and the articles of the association of the firm. But due to the 
inability of the shareholders to exercise adequate controls over the affairs of the 
company, the power to force the directors to do what is in the stockowners’ 
interests are severely curtailed. 
 The legal model in most countries has always regarded the shareholders’ interests 
as exclusive and supreme, all other rights and interests in the firm are satisfied at 
their pleasure. But these rights and privileges may not be more apparent than real 
in practice. Shareholders are widely dispersed, and they neither have the time nor 
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the experience to manage the business. They employ managers who are more 
interested in self-interest and self-preservation. Even the board of directors 
appointed to monitor the managers may do a poor job and may not devote enough 
time and attention to the affairs of the business. The law still upholds the 
supremacy of shareholders’ right: Anything the firm does should be in the 
furtherance of the objective to maximize returns to the stockholders. The 
American case of Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. (1919) succinctly illustrated this 
point. The court held that it was wrong for the management to limit dividend 
payments to the shareholders by lowering the price of their cars to increase 
employment and spread the benefits to employees (Richardson, 2002). 
 Seeing the futility of the strict application of the legal model in the modern firm, 
the corporate governance model recognizes other important actors beside the 
shareholders. Even within the shareholders as a group, there are challenges. For 
example, the Companies and Allied Matters Act of 2009 in Nigeria gives majority 
shareholders the right to buy off minority shareholders in a hostile takeover after 
certain conditions have been met. Rashid and Islam (2013) noted that  majority 
shareholders sometimes expropriate minority shareholders in Malaysia. Francis, 
Hassan, and Wu (2013) stated that  cumulative stock returns to be significantly 
and positively associated with accounting conservatism that may benefit the 
shareholders but harm the interest of other stakeholders. 
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 In summary, the directors are required by law to maximize the interest of 
shareholders, the interests being defined purely in financial terms. In looking 
exclusively after the interests of the shareholders, managers seek to maximize the 
value of the firm, after satisfying all claims, such as those of creditors, finance 
providers, employees’ agreed wages, and costs of other inputs and services. In 
other words, maximizing the value of the company is equivalent to profit 
maximization. Whatever the managers do should, theoretically, contribute to the 
profit maximization objective since the stock market is assumed to be efficient by 
theory of Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH). The wealth of shareholders is 
rarely maximized because markets are not efficient in the strong sense. Also, 
information exists that is known only to company managers and markets cannot 
take account of this in pricing the shares. Other institutional arrangements, like 
entrenched CEOs, large shareholders, and proxy votes may also impact company 
performance and wealth maximization. 
Executive Compensation 
 The board of directors determines the firm’s executive compensation, which may 
be a combination of cash and stock options. The remuneration of the top 
management should be high enough to attract the smartest and the most able 
applicant to the company, but not too high that it may amount to unfair 
exploitation of the shareholders, but also not woefully inadequate as to deter good 
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applicants. Executive compensation should reflect the complexity and risk of an 
employee’s duty and the expected performance targets. The performance goals 
must be meaningful and achievable and should not be perceived as punitive. 
Usually the board’s remuneration committee decides on executive compensation 
and takes their recommendations to the board for approval. 
 Alves, Couto, and Francisco (2016) found the presence of a remuneration 
committee in a firm positively and significantly associated with CEO pay in 
Portugal. This means that executive pay tends to increase with the presence of a 
remuneration committee. Al-Matar et al. (2014) documented a positive but  
nonsignificant relationship  between executive compensation and firm 
performance. Sila, Gonzalez, and Hagendiorff  (2016) discovered  no evidence of 
a relationship between the proportion of female directors and executive 
compensation. Alves et al. (2016) reported a negative and significant association 
between independent members of the board and CEO remuneration. Independent 
members of the board tend to reduce the total remuneration paid of the company’s 
CEO. This may be good or bad for the company depending on the industry 
practice in a particular context and the impact of executive pay in attracting 
talents to the organization. 
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Audit Oversight 
 The law requires that a company should prepare its financial statements and have 
it audited at least once a year. It is also a requirement for all public companies to 
have the account and other reports read out to the shareholders in an annual 
general meeting. For example, the Nigeria’s Companies and Allied Matters Act of 
2009, in Sections 357 to 369 set out the rules for the appointment of auditors, 
their qualifications, remuneration, duties and powers, attendance at the annual 
general meetings, and resignation. The codes of corporate governance in Nigeria 
and the Nigeria’s Financial Reporting Council (FRC) make it mandatory for the 
board to oversee the work of the auditors. In the U.S., the PCAOB established 
under the SOX is a government agency that performs the same function for public 
companies. 
 The oversight function of the board with regard to the audit of the financial 
statements is discharged through the audit committee of the board. The BRT 
principles of corporate governance require that audit committee be composed 
entirely of independent directors and with at least three members. At least one of 
the members must be an expert in finance and accounting. Information for 
decision-making is important to all of the company’s stakeholders. The 
shareholders, the financial analysts, the creditors, and the bondholders all need 
information to make informed decisions. The Cadbury Committee on the 
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Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance noted that the weakness in the 
financial reporting arose from the use of different accounting methods applied to 
what are essentially the same transactions in different companies (The Cadbury 
Committee, 1990). 
 To prevent accounting irregularities and fraud, like using off-balance sheet and 
special purpose vehicles to hide losses as was done in Enron and many other 
companies, the board through the audit committee must supervise the auditors. 
This is done by reviewing the audit plan, attending to auditors’ queries, and 
asking managers to provide timely and accurate response to the auditors’ 
enquiries. The committee must also review key areas of financial disclosure, 
operating results, related party transactions, and risk factors as highlighted in the 
financial statements. 
 Audit committees, no matter the degree of their independence and proficiency, 
cannot completely prevent audit failures or eliminate accounting fraud in its 
entirety. The primary responsibility of auditors is to report to members, but in 
practice, auditors are appointed by the shareholders on the recommendation of the 
directors, who are also empowered by the members at the annual general meeting 
to fix the auditor’s remuneration. This arrangement, although convenient and 
efficient, is highly unsatisfactory. The loyalty of the auditors most of the time is to 
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the members of the board, and if other services are provided, like consultancy and 
special reviews, the loyalty may be total, stumping all other safeguards. 
 The Enron scandal and the collapse of its auditors, Arthur Andersen, may be seen 
as a leadership failure or as a clannish organizational culture taken too far; but the 
signs were all there to see if one looked well enough (Carter & Greer, 2013). 
Arthur Andersen provided Enron with audit and several other financial services. 
The closeness between the directors of Enron and the partners of the accounting 
firm did not allow a healthy skepticism that auditors should have, and the caution 
they should take in arriving at their audit opinion (Pugliese et al. 2014). The board 
of Enron failed to oversee the work of the auditors, and the audit committee did 
not exercise the required due diligence. 
 In Nigeria and many other countries, the auditors are required specifically to 
introduce a paragraph in their audit report on the respective responsibilities of 
auditors and directors. While the directors are responsible for the preparation of 
the financial statements, the duty of the auditors is to form an opinion on the 
accounts and reports as prepared and presented by the directors. Nevertheless, 
most directors in Nigeria do not behave as if they understand the import of these 
statements. 
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Committees 
 Board time is limited, and there are many issues that cannot be comprehensively 
deliberated upon in a full board meeting. A committee is the most efficient and 
effective forum to discuss matters in-depth and find solutions to the company’s 
problems. In this dissertation study, I will highlight the work of the audit, 
compensation, and nomination committees. These are the subcommittees of the 
board, and their reports go to it for approval and action. 
 Audit committee. The audit committee is a subcommittee of the board. The BRT 
principles of good corporate governance require that at least three independent 
directors be appointed to the committee, who are experienced and knowledgeable 
about the business. In Nigeria, the law requires six members, at least three of who 
will be independent, representing the shareholders. An independent director will 
be nominated as the chairperson. At least one of the members of the committee 
must be a financial or an accounting expert. The committee recommends to the 
board the selection and retention of the external auditors, deliberates on an 
ongoing basis the independence of the auditors, oversees the critical aspects of the 
firm’s accounting and disclosure requirements, and carries out risk assessment 
and procedures of the firm. Other functions of the audit committee are oversight 
of the system of internal controls in the company, disaster recovery readiness 
procedures, and internal audit function. A direct communication between the 
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committee and the chief internal auditor is also desired and recommended. The 
committee should also deliberate on the merit and demerits of hiring former 
auditors and their staff and the potential conflict of interest this recruitment may 
entail. 
 Audit committee independence, number of meetings, and size. Hassan and Naser 
(2013) noted a negative association between the proportion of independent 
members of the audit committee and audit fees. The size of the audit committee, if 
unwieldy, may affect the performance of the firm by making the meetings a forum 
for arguments and nothing else. Jermias and Gani (2014) documented that the size 
and number of meetings of the audit committee had a negative and significant 
association with Tobin’s Q. On the other hand, Leung et al. (2014) noted that  the 
effect of family ownership on the relationship between audit committee 
independence and performance of family firms mixed. 
 Compensation committee. This subcommittee of the board should, ideally, be 
composed of nonexecutive and independent directors only. They duty of the 
committee is to address the firm’s compensation and remuneration issues. The 
committee, according to the BRT’s  recommendations should (a) oversee every 
aspect of remuneration and compensation structure in the firm, (b) recommend to 
the board the appropriate performance goals against which top management 
should be judged, (c) put systems and procedures in place to link remuneration 
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with goals, (d) ensure that part of the remuneration of directors and senior 
managers are performance-driven and that the rules are clear and fair, (e) establish 
goals that are meaningful, objective, and easy to measure, (f) be aware of 
incentives that may lead to dysfunctional behaviors, (g) understand all aspects of 
executive compensation, taking into account industry standards, (h) attempt to 
link the interest of managers to those of shareholders through compensation 
packages, and (i) advise the board and the auditors on disclosure aspects of 
executive compensation (The BRT, 2015). 
 Nomination committee. The nomination committee should have at least three 
directors and the members must be external directors who are independent from 
the firm (BRT, 2015). The committee deals with the important subjects of 
nominations to the board of directors and other corporate governance matters. The 
work of the committee sometimes overlaps with that of the compensation 
committee. The directors are recognized in law and practice as the organ of the 
business, and are made responsible for the acts of their firms. They also set the 
agenda for the company, determine its strategy and determine how they want 
customers, suppliers, financiers, and the general public to perceive the firm and its 
activities. 
 It is important to carefully select men and women who will occupy this position 
from time to time. The duties of the committee are (a) recommend to the board 
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persons who are qualified both academically and ethically for board nomination 
(b) study the composition, structure, and independence of the board and make 
recommendations, (c) oversee the firm’s top management succession planning 
and ensure that it is adequate and appropriate to the needs of the firm, (f) ensure 
the board continues to play a leadership role in the firm, monitor and safeguard 
the integrity and independence of the board, (e) review the board’s policies and 
procedures, (f) review the relationship between the firm and its stakeholders to 
ensure the later are treated fairly and equitably, and (g) ensure good working 
relationship between the chairman of the board, the CEO, and other directors. 
Financial Performance 
 The overriding objective of a business is to maximize the wealth of its 
shareholders. Maximization of the wealth of the shareholders means the firm will 
make adequate and sustainable profit, generate enough cash flow to run the 
operations, pay dividends, and retain the rest for research and development and 
future investment. A firm’s financial performance continues to be the yardstick 
for measuring the efficiency of management and the effectiveness of the use of 
corporate assets. Any other objective of the firm is subordinate to the financial 
objectives because the business must survive and thrive to compensate 
employees, contribute to the community, and pay taxes. 
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 The wealth or profit maximization objective of the firm has come under severe 
criticisms. According to Jensen and Meckling (1982), many commentators have 
accused corporations for several antisocial activities in the guise of profit 
maximization, including behaving irresponsibly, using excessive profit to bribe 
government officials, polluting the environment, destabilizing foreign 
governments, and discriminating when hiring, especially against women, 
minorities, and the disabled. As Smith (2003) stated, making profit is ethical and 
justifiable. Friedman (1970) stated that the social responsibility of business is to 
make profit, without it investors will not put in their money and take the risks that 
they will be compensated with adequate returns. The profit maximization 
philosophy is only considered from the point of view of economic efficiency, but 
social welfare maximization theory states that individuals are free to pursue other 
interests apart from maximization of wealth. Nevertheless, companies are 
appraised and rated first and foremost on their financial performance. The 
financial performance metrics that will be examined in this section of the 
dissertation are ROA, ROCE, and Tobin’s Q. These are the performance measures 
that will be used in the analysis of the results. 
 Return on Assets (ROA). ROA measures the efficiency with which an asset is 
used during the period. It is through the assets that a company generates its profit. 
Baulkaran (2014) defined return on assets as the ratio of EBITD and the total 
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assets of the firm. Some analysts prefer this measurement due to its neutrality to 
tax and depreciation treatments, and the company’s source of financing, whether 
debt or equity. Liu et al. (2015) defined return on assets as operating income 
before extraordinary income divided by total assets. Extraordinary incomes are 
not recurrent by nature; they do not arise from normal operations. An example of 
income of an extraordinary nature is a gain from sale or divestment of a business 
or compensation paid to a company by a foreign government that expropriated its 
assets. Extraordinary items are not recurrent, they are once off; including them in 
the computation of return on assets will make comparison between one period and 
the other difficult. The ratio will not be comparable to that of other firms, which 
do not have the same extraordinary income during the period. 
 Many empirical accounting studies have focused on earnings research, 
investigating the association between corporate governance mechanisms and 
return on assets (Adewuyi & Olowookere, 2013; Alipour, 2013; Dalwai, 
Basirudden, & Rasid, 2015). But as Mattessich (1995) remarked, accounting 
ratios like return on assets are not without problems. First of all, the extent to 
which management can manipulate earnings depends on whether they can select 
accounting methods to manage earnings without problems from the auditors. 
Secondly, earnings announcements have information content that the market rely 
on, and when those earnings figures are not in line with forecasts, the market 
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reacts in a negative way, which may lower the share price and the value of the 
company. The IFRS and the accountancy bodies have imposed uniform 
accounting rules and treatments for similar transactions in many jurisdictions. 
This is to ensure that accounting ratios such as return on assets can be relied upon. 
Audit oversight provided by the audit committees will also reduce the disparity 
between financial statements of firms reporting similar transactions. 
 An important consideration is whether the highest degree of ethics has been 
observed in the preparation of the financial statements from which the researchers 
compute the ratios. According to Stuart, I., Stuart, B., and Pedersen (2014), the 
important considerations are (a) when and how the directors recognized revenue 
in the financial statements, as the amount of revenue recognized should not be 
below what the directors expect to collect as cash, (b) how the current and long-
term liabilities have been recognized and recorded, and (c) whether there was 
distinction between operating and finance leases. Several other issues affect the 
figures in the financial statements that have important implications for earnings. 
Some of these issues are the company’s depreciation policy, accounting treatment 
of defined benefits pension plans, the decision to recognize losses in a subsidiary, 
treatment of stock options, purchased goodwill accounting, patents and copyright, 
and restructuring expenses. All these accounting issues have different effects on 
return on assets. 
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 Schroeder, Clark, and Cathey (2014) remarked that some adjustments are 
necessary to improve return on assets, such as making adjustments incorporating 
the effect of off-balance sheet financing. Nevertheless, return on assets is 
frequently used as a measure of a firm’s performance. For example, Chen (2015) 
discovered that, return on assets, defined as net income standardized by the firm’s 
total assets in the previous year, have a positive but nonsignificant  relationship 
with a firm’s access to finance, while negatively and significantly related to 
private ownership, and positively and non-significantly associated with foreign 
ownership. Sila, Gonzalez, and Hagendorff (2016) defined return on assets as the 
earnings before taxation divided by the book value of total assets. Sila et al. 
(2016) found a negative and significant association between total, systematic, and 
idiosyncratic risks and return on assets. A firm’s return on assets tends to decrease 
as more risks are taken. The more debts that are added to the firm’s capital 
structure, the higher the risks, and the cost of funding may be so high as to reduce 
the firm's profit. 
 Balsmeier, Buchwald, and Stiebale (2014) carried out a research study on German 
companies on the impact of outside directors on return on assets. Their definition 
of return on assets was net income after taxes divided by total assets. The earnings 
figure was taken after corporate tax, and thus the differential tax incidence on 
firms of similar size and profitability was not considered (Schroeder et al., 2014). 
143 
 
 
Alipour (2013) documented  a negative and significant association between return 
on assets and ownership structure and state ownership in 60 nonfinancial 
companies listed on the Tunisian Stock Exchange. Adewuyi and Olowookere 
(2013) also used return on assets as a measure of corporate performance. They 
found a positive and significant relationship between a good governance change 
that is an increase in the number of independent directors and in the independence 
of the board and audit committees, and splitting the board leadership between the 
CEO and an independent director as chairperson, and return on assets. The 
research studies mentioned above and many more like them show that analysts 
and researchers alike consider return on assets a good measure of corporate 
performance despite the conceptual and theoretical challenges described above. 
 Return on Capital Employed (ROCE). Like ROA, ROCE uses earnings as the 
numerator of the performance ratio. Accountants measure capital employed in a 
firm in a variety of ways. While some use net assets as the denominator (after 
deducting current and long-term liabilities from total assets), others include debt 
and bonds. The classical accounting equation remains assets equals liabilities plus 
equity. Liabilities and equities make a claim on the enterprise’s assets whereas 
equity is an ownership interest. Liabilities are claims of creditors, some of who 
receive priority treatment in liquidation and insolvency situations. For decision-
making and disclosure purposes, assets, equity, and liabilities are listed separately. 
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 According to the entity theory, there is little to no difference between liabilities 
and equities (Schroeder et al., 2014). The accounting equation in the entity theory 
is assets equal equities. Both debt and equities are compensated by interests and 
dividends respectively, even though dividends are not mandatory and can be 
deferred or not paid at all, except for cumulative preference shares, but interest on 
debts is accrued and paid whether or not the firm is making profits. 
 Under the proprietary theory, the net assets of the firm belong to the owners, the 
shareholders. The net asset is equal to the equity in the firm, and it is also the 
equity of the owners, or what is termed as shareholders’ funds in Nigeria. The 
accounting equation under this theory becomes assets less liabilities equal equity. 
In the preparation of financial statements under the IFRS and the pronouncement 
of the Auditing Practices Board in their Statement Number 4, “Basic Concepts 
and Accounting Principles Underlying Financial Statements of Business 
Enterprises” (Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB, 1970), the above 
accounting equation is implicit (Schroeder et al., 2014). Also, the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) in Statements of Accounting Concepts 
Number 6 defined liabilities and equity in accordance with the propriety theory: 
Liabilities are future economic benefits given up in exchange for current or past 
transactions, and equities are the residual interest in assets belonging to the 
owners after deducting the firm’s liabilities (FASB, 1970). 
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 Return on equity is sometimes treated as if it is equivalent to return on capital 
employed. The book value of equity is different from the book value of capital 
employed. The capital structure of a firm might include equity and long-term 
debt, such as bonds, loans, and preference shares. Some preference shares are like 
long-term debts in all respects and many others are not too different from equity. 
The accounting treatment is also different, and sometimes, very complicated when 
preference shares are convertible to equity at the happening of specific events. 
The trigger for the events that makes conversion possible may be set up by 
conditions not under the control of management, and thus unpredictable. Return 
on capital employed measures the efficiency with which the firm uses all of its 
capital, whether liabilities or equity. 
 Return on capital employed, as defined in this study, equals EBITDA divided by 
the total capital employed. EBITDA does not take account of debt levels and 
taxes, which will be different from firm to firm. Total capital employed is a 
combination of equity and long-term debt in the capital structure of the firm. The 
return on capital employed measures the results of operations relative to the 
amount of capital used in generating the earnings. Compared to return on assets, 
return on capital may be a more appropriate measure for investors that desire to 
beat the market. 
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 Return on capital employed and return on equity have been used as measures of 
company performance in research studies. The return on equity considers only the 
returns to shareholders without considering creditors. Where there is no debt in a 
corporation, the two measures give the same answer. The ratio will be lower the 
more debt is in the capital structure of the firm. Sun et al. (2014) documented a 
positive and significant association between return on equity and the growth in 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Whaba (2013) also reported a positive and 
significant relationship between CEO duality and return on equity. Alipour (2013) 
found a negative and significant association between ownership concentration and 
return on equity in companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange. What these 
research findings show is that the measures of firm performance have a lot in 
common, and they are essentially measuring the same things, although from 
different conceptual and theoretical viewpoints. 
 Tobin’s Q. Tobin’s Q ratio was named after the great James Tobin, the Yale 
University Nobel Prize winner in economics who stated that the cost of 
replacement of a firm’s assets is about the same value as its market value. The 
ratio is equal to the market value of the company’s equity divided by the cost of 
replacement of its tangible fixed assets, that is the market value of the installed 
capacity divided by the replacement cost of the installed capacity. According to 
the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), the price of securities fully reflects all 
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publicly available information. If the EMH is valid in the strong sense, the Q ratio 
should hover around one, and any increase above and decrease below one will 
quickly be brought to equilibrium by market forces. But as Scott (2009) noted, 
share prices may not fully react to financial information immediately, and 
abnormal securities prices may prevail for some time. Market imperfection could 
cause information in the financial statements to be interpreted incorrectly, leading 
to opportunity for arbitrage. 
 Any value of the Q ratio above one means the firm is efficiently utilizing its assets 
and should buy more to increase shareholder’s wealth. A ratio less than one 
signals to management or a predator that the company is undervalued and a 
candidate for a takeover. Some analysts have attacked the theoretical basis and 
assumptions of Tobin’s concept. Roche (2015) stated that there are problems 
associated with determining the replacement cost of assets, and many analysts 
assume the book value should be a close approximation. In a highly inflationary 
economy, this assumption may be incorrect. Lewellen and Badrinath (1997) 
proposed a better measure of asset replacement costs by properly understanding 
the purchase history of the assets. For a large corporation, this may be a difficult 
task. Also, Roche did not believe that a ratio above one indicates overvaluation or 
undervaluation for a ratio below one: Everything depends on the firm context, and 
the economy in which the firm is operating. 
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 The rational question is why firms don’t act quickly to exploit the differences 
between the firm’s market value and the replacement costs of its assets (Smith, 
2015). The reasons are many, but two are the heterogeneity of capital and 
monopoly rents. According to Powell (2010), capital is not only heterogeneous, 
but multi-specific as well. The problem for the economists is how the capital can 
be aggregated and summed together since their value derives from firm-specific 
intention for the capital goods. A computer may be a capital good if used in a 
business, but it will be classified as consumption good if used at home for movies 
and video games. In summary, summing-up and aggregating the monetary costs 
of these goods will be valid only if the heterogeneous plans of the actors are 
perfectly coordinated (Powell, 2010). And if a firm can earn monopoly rent with 
the present investment, there may be no motivation to invest more. 
 The possibility of monopoly rent is also one of the reasons why firms do not 
respond quickly or at all to an apparent overvaluation as evidenced by Tobin’s Q 
ratio. According to Harvey (2013), all rents are based on monopoly power. It is 
the ability to extract excessive value from a consumer based on the uniqueness or 
scarcity of the product or service. The scarcity or uniqueness could be due to a 
technical innovation or marketing and advertising power that create an illusion of 
doing well (Harvey, 2013). Firms may not border much about overvaluation if 
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they could use scarce resources to create a monopoly situation, sometimes 
pressurizing governments to achieve this aim (OECD, 2002). 
 Nevertheless, Tobin’s Q is used to evaluate capital expenditure decisions. There 
has also been an expansion in the use of the ratio in research examining the 
association between corporate governance and firm performance (Bhagat & 
Bolton, 2013; Jermias & Gani, 2014; O’Reilly, Caldwell, Christman, & Doerr, 
2014). Other uses of Tobin’s Q are in evaluating the performance of managers 
and decisions on divestment. 
 Baulkaran (2014) defined Tobin’s Q as the market value of common and 
preferred stocks plus the book value of debt divided by the firm’s total assets. El-
Faitouri (2014) calculated the ratio as total assets minus book value of equity, plus 
market value of equity, divided by the total assets. In a study of CEOs and board 
characteristics of Thai family firms, Sitthipongpanich and Polsiri (2015) measured 
Tobin’s Q as the ratio of market value of total assets to book value of total assets. 
In all these studies, the proxy for the replacement cost of total assets was the book 
value of total assets. These values may not be the same, and could depend on the 
economy and the inflation rate prevailing at the time of measurement. Book value 
of assets also depends on each firm’s accounting policies, especially the 
accounting basis for charging depreciation and amortization.  
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El-Faitouri (2014) added liabilities to the market of equity in the numerator, agreeing 
with the propriety theory that holds that the firm belongs to the owners, and the 
accounting equation then becomes equity plus liabilities equal assets. This is 
precisely the case in family-controlled firms, especially in developing and 
emerging countries. 
 Many researchers considered Tobin’s Q as a market-based measurement, different 
from measures such as return on assets and return on capital employed that are 
accounting measures of firm performance (Baulkaran, 2014; Bhagat & Bolton, 
2013; Sun et al., 2013; Wahba, 2014). Wahba (2014) regarded Tobin’s Q and 
other profitability measures such as return on assets and return on capital 
employed as complements rather than substitutes, there being no evidence that 
either type is a better measure than the other, and both types of performance 
metrics contain useful information about market power, profitability, and 
efficiency. 
 Endogenous issues may arise when a market-based measure is used as the 
outcome variable and investment opportunity is the independent variable (Sun et 
al., 2013), as a market-based measure focuses on investment opportunity set. For 
example, a Q ratio below one is a sign to potential investors that the firm is 
undervalued, and buying it could be profitable. A ratio greater than one, on the 
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other hand, means the stock is overvalued and it is profitable to sell the stock. 
Investment opportunity and Tobin’s Q are highly correlated. 
 Baulkaran (2014) noted that voluntary corporate governance best practices lead to 
higher Tobin’s Q ratio in 218 firms quoted on the S&P Toronto Stock Exchange 
Composite Index. Poutziousis, Savva, and Hadjielias (2014) reported that  
ownership concentration in firms quoted on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) 
Financial Times FTSE Index between 1998 and 2008 negatively and significantly 
associated with Tobin’s Q. Alipour (2013) also discovered a negative and 
significant association between ownership concentration and ROA in the listed 
companies on the Tehran stock exchange. Alipour documented a positive and 
significant correlation between ownership concentration and return on equity, 
which also is a measure of market performance. The research findings in are 
mixed when the relationship between Tobin’s and corporate governance 
mechanisms were examined. 
 According to Adewuyi and Olowookere (2013), the shareholding of directors is 
positively and significantly associated with Tobin’s Q. Yeh and Kuo (2015) 
reported that  directors’ shareholding to be non-linearly associated with firm 
performance. Sun et al. (2014) reported a positive and significant relationship 
between company performance and directors’ shareholding, concluding that 
directors with shares have the required incentive to maximize shareholder value 
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and firm performance. Yeh (2014) also noted that large shareholders’ proposals 
are positively and significantly related to market value, as the market reacts more 
favorably to their proposal announcement than those of small shareholders. 
Evaluating the Corporate Governance Structure of a Firm 
 Corporate governance structure needs to be assessed and reviewed periodically to 
ensure that the mechanisms are still effective and appropriate to the firm. As 
many researchers have stated, what works are different from firm to firm, from 
industry to industry, from country to country, and from period to period (Almadi, 
2015; Nath, Islam, & Saha, 2015; Poutziouris et al. 2014). To evaluate a firm’s 
corporate governance structure, the analysts use qualitative factors to make a 
sense of what may not be seen. The elements for analysis are found in documents 
and declarations, like in financial statements, press releases, conferences, 
employees’ handbook, policy statements, and seminars organized by the 
company. 
 The analyst must understand the context of the corporation; including its history, 
ownership, capital structure, locations, leadership styles, organizational culture, 
and products and services; as well as research and development activities. These 
factors play a decisive role in corporate governance systems as they affect the 
firm’s complexity, the type of directors that are attracted to the company, and the 
issues and challenges the firm faces. Understanding the company context is very 
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important because corporate governance principles and codes do not have the 
same impact in all companies in equal measure. The analyst must understand the 
context of the corporation; including its history, ownership, capital structure, 
locations, leadership styles, organizational culture, and products and services; as 
well as research and development activities. These factors play a decisive role in 
corporate governance systems as they affect the firm’s complexity, the type of 
directors that are attracted to the company, and the issues and challenges the firm 
faces. Understanding the company context is very important because corporate 
governance principles and codes do not have the same impact in all companies in 
equal measure. 
Independence of the Board 
 If the board is not independent, it will function only to rubber-stamp the decisions 
of management. The analysts must evaluate the leadership structure and 
composition of the board of directors. Ideally, the majority of the members of the 
board should be independent, to have the motivation to look critically into the 
activities of the management (Quttainah, 2015; Tai et al. 2013). The firm’s share 
structure is another area that indicates whether the board is independent or not. If 
there are multiple voting classes or if some shareholders have more voting power 
than their cash flow rights, it is an indication that the board may lack 
independence of action (Eklund, Palmberg, & Wiberg, 2013). 
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 The leadership of the board is another matter for corporate governance analysts to 
evaluate in determining its degree of independence. The OECD and the BRT 
principles of corporate governance recommend creating the position of a lead 
director when the office of the CEO and the chairperson is combined in one 
person. The danger to the company is that CEO duality may lead to a CEO who 
will exploit his power to the detriment of the shareholders. Kouki and Guizani 
(2015), Miller and Yang (2015), and Wahba (2014) reported that  CEO duality 
was negatively and significantly associated with a firm’s performance. 
Poutziouris et al. (2014) found a positive and significant association between 
CEO duality and company performance. Xie and Fukumoto (2013) did not find 
any  relationship between CEO duality and firm performance non-significant in 
Japanese companies. The results of these findings have not been consistent in all 
countries. 
 Tsai et al. (2013) reported a positive and significant association between board 
independence and Tobin’s Q. The independence of the board increases when the 
majority of the directors are independent. When a director owns shares in the 
company, agency theory predicts that the director, being a part owner, will devote 
his or her attention to the affairs of the firm. Adewuyi and Olowookere (2013) 
stated that director shareholding and exposure to debt are significantly associated 
with bad governance changes. The reason for the relationship between the 
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directors’ shareholding and bad governance changes is that directors may use the 
opportunity of their seat on the board and their considerable shareholding to 
extract better returns than the cash flow rights to which their share ownership 
entitles them. Some of the ways directors with significant shareholding exploit 
their position, such as engaging directly in the company’s contracts or using 
hidden, price-sensitive information, to their advantage. In contrast to Adewuyi 
and Olowookere  Sun and Ma (2014) reported that  the coefficient of the 
interaction between CEO shareholding and investment intensity positive and 
significant. If the CEO has substantial shareholding, which constitutes a large 
proportion of his or her investment, it is likely that this will be a motivation to do 
the best for the company. 
 No matter the range of experience possessed by the members, the board may need 
to hire advisers from time to time for consultation regarding legal, ethical, 
business, environmental, and regulatory issues. The power to hire outside 
consultants independent of the CEO and management is an indication of the 
independence of the board. Directors should also be able to meet members of the 
management, especially the chief internal auditor and the Chief Finance Officer, 
without the approval of the CEO. The ability to hold meetings and consultations 
between nonexecutive directors and take decisions is also a measure of the 
independence of the board of directors. 
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Accountability of the Board of Directors 
 The members of the board of directors are the representatives of the shareholders. 
The relationship between the shareholders and each board member is both legal 
and contractual. The Companies’ Acts in many jurisdictions require each 
incorporated company to have at least two directors. For example, Section 246 of 
the Nigeria’s Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) of 1990, the main 
company law in Nigeria, specifies at least two directors for every company 
incorporated in Nigeria under the Act. If the number should fall below two, the 
company is given 30 days to appoint another director. The firm should cease 
doing business if it fails to appoint a director within the stipulated time. In 
Subsection 3 of Section 246, any director that remains a director for more than 60 
days after the number of directors has fallen below the minimum shall be 
responsible personally for the debt and liabilities of the firm incurred during the 
entire period when the number of directors falls below the minimum. 
 The relationship between the directors and the shareholders is also contractual. 
The directors are appointed because they agree to represent the shareholders on 
the board of the company, and they are required to follow the terms of their 
appointment, which clearly set out the remuneration, duty, and other conditions. 
The law imposes its own duty on the director as well, such as the requirement to 
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act in a fiduciary manner and attend meetings regularly. The directors owe a duty 
of accountability, both at law and contract, to the shareholders. 
 The directors must develop and abide by a formal code of conduct. The code of 
conduct sets out the standard of ethics that a director must observe in carrying out 
his or her duties. The standards are common to many firms but the areas of 
emphasis may be different. The European Investment Bank (EIB) code of conduct 
for directors includes the basic conduct required of a director, responsibility to the 
firm, conflict of interest, confidentiality and insider information, acceptance of 
gifts and other advantages, proper use of company’s property, treatment of 
reimbursable expenses, relations with staff and members of the board, and 
cooperation with investigating bodies (EIB,2011). 
 General Mills, a big U.S. food company, has similar codes to EIB, but added that 
directors should deal fairly with suppliers, creditors, service providers, 
competitors, and other stakeholders in the firm. Credit Union One, a U.S. 
financial institution, added to the code of conduct the directors’ oversight duty on 
continuity. This means directors must oversee the firm’s strategic planning, 
capital adequacy, assets and liabilities, succession planning, and directors’ 
continuing education. By reviewing the code of conduct of directors and the level 
of compliance with it, the analyst would be able to judge the independence with 
which directors perform their duty of care to the company. 
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 The way directors are compensated is also part of their accountability to the 
shareholders. Improper use of company information, assets, and a wrongful claim 
of reimbursable expenses depart from proper accountability and conduct expected 
of a member of the board. The remuneration of the directors should also be 
properly disclosed in the financial statements. Proper accountability means going 
beyond the requirements of the law to include and disclose the benefits-in-kind 
the directors enjoy. 
 In Nigeria’s listed companies, many of the perks enjoyed by the directors are not 
disclosed because the law does not require disclosure. Sometimes, the benefits-in-
kind significantly exceed the emoluments paid to them. For directors whose total 
emolument includes performance-based bonuses, the performance metrics ought 
to be disclosed to ensure accountability. The firm should also disclose directors’ 
related-party transactions, interest in the company’s contract, and any criminal 
proceedings against a director. 
Shareholders’ Rights 
 The shareholders employ or appoint directors to act as their agents. Although the 
interests of other stakeholders are important, the supremacy of the shareholders’ 
objectives in the firm cannot be compromised. In the eyes of the law, the 
shareholders are the owners of the business, entitled to the firm’s residue of assets 
after every other claim has been satisfied. A good corporate governance system 
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would treat the interests of shareholders as very important. The rights of 
shareholders will be enshrined in the corporation’s articles of association. In a 
company where the corporate governance system is strong, a number of 
provisions will be in the articles of association. The internal rules concerning 
supermajority votes, proxy voting, greenmail, golden parachute, and poison pills 
will be part of the code of conduct of directors. 
 The requirements for supermajority votes. To amend articles of association, 
approve a merger plan, or change the objects clause of a company, majority votes 
(50% and above) is usually required. Supermajority votes require an approval 
from at least 67% to 90% of the shareholders present in the meeting and voting 
(Investopedia, 2016). This is a good corporate governance mechanism that 
ensures that weightier issues are decided on by a large number of shareholders. 
 Proxy voting. In very large corporations, with thousands of shareholders 
dispersed widely, proxy voting is very important device in giving shareholders 
that cannot attend a meeting a voice and vote. The disadvantage is that the 
directors may hijack the proxy machine and get the votes for the outcome that 
they desire. If a proper and objective outcome is desired, an outsider should 
handle the process of proxy voting. 
 Harmful managerial actions. Provisions in the directors’ employment contracts 
like the poison pill (making a company less attractive to a hostile bidder), 
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greenmail (own share purchase far in excess of what it is worth), and golden 
parachute (unmerited and large compensation to managers for loss of office if the 
merger succeeds) are harmful to the interest of the shareholders for two main 
reasons. One is that provisions such as these have a way of entrenching the 
directors in their positions, as shareholders become reluctant to oust an ineffective 
director because of the financial cost of the disengagement. Dah (2016) 
documented  a negative and significant association between firm value and the 
entrenchment index. The higher the score on the entrenchment index, the smaller 
the value of the firm. The second reason is that the provisions constitute a 
technical expropriation of shareholders’ assets. 
 Director Education. The OECD principles of corporate governance require 
directors to keep abreast of the development in their companies. Director 
education is important as it enhances a director’s contribution to corporate value. 
Knockaert et al.  (2015) reported that the board chair industry experience is 
positively and significantly associated with board service involvement, which 
entails monitoring and advising top management and networking. Many 
researchers have also found that the audit committee is more effective when a 
finance expert is a member (Ioana & Mariana, 2014; Leung et al., 2014). Director 
education is also crucial because we live in a fast changing world, the changes 
being brought about by technological innovation, globalization, complex financial 
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products, cultural diversity due to migration, and internationalization of tertiary 
and technical education. 
Sources of Information for Corporate Governance Analysis 
 To evaluate the strength of corporate mechanisms in a firm, the analysts need the 
following documents and facts: 
The website of the firm should contain information about most aspects of corporate 
governance; including director information, education, other directorships, 
shareholding, qualifications, and experience; information on leadership of the 
board; board size; risk management; audit oversight; and committees. 
The corporate governance section of annual financial statements. 
Company’s memorandum, articles of associations, and bylaws. 
The annual reports to shareholders concerning the firm’s corporate governance processes. 
The code of corporate governance concerning the industry to which the company 
belongs. If listed on a recognized stock exchange, the firm must also comply with 
the Exchange’s code of corporate governance. In Nigeria for example, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission of Nigeria has a code of corporate 
governance and the Nigeria Stock Exchange has one as well. 
General Websites like those of Business Roundtable, Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, the World Bank Group, trade groups, stock 
exchanges, and the professional accounting organizations. 
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Corporate Governance in Nigeria 
Introduction 
 Nigeria is a developing country, a member of Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC), and one of the largest economies in Africa by gross 
domestic product (GDP). It has a population of around 200 million people; many 
of these are literate and speak the English language, a legacy of the British 
colonial rule. The country is governed centrally from the capital, Abuja, although 
it has 36 states with elected chief executive officers designated as governors of 
the states. Politically, it adopts the executive presidency, patterned after the U.S. 
model, but with less mature democracy and rule of law. There are two legislative 
houses that make up the national assembly, the Senate and the House of 
Representatives. The states’ laws are made in the States’ Houses of Assembly. 
The laws are only made on the concurrent lists, while the exclusive lists are for 
the federal government alone. The country has a vibrant judiciary and law 
enforcement, but these institutions, including the executive branch, are plagued by 
fraud, corruption, and a fragrant self-dealing and rent seeking culture. The 
government elected in 2015 won the platform of its declared war on corruption. 
The Listed Securities Market on the Nigerian Stock Exchange 
 The Nigerian government derives 35% of its GDP from its oil producing activities 
(OPEC, 2015). Apart from oil and gas production, the country has other mineral 
163 
 
 
deposits such as coal, tin, iron ore, bauxite, and limestone. The rural populace 
engages in agriculture, although majority of them engages in subsistence farming. 
At December 31, 2015, 171 equities were listed on the NSE, with total 
capitalization of $85.3 billion. There were also 15 federal government bonds, 21 
corporate bonds, 22 state and municipal bonds, 7 exchange traded products, and 
two supranational bonds. The companies listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange 
were in 12 industrial sectors, including agriculture and agro-allied, conglomerates, 
construction, real estate, consumer goods, financial services, healthcare, 
information technology, industrial goods, natural resources, oil and gas, and 
utilities. This research study will be conducted on all the non-financial companies 
in the main and premium board that contain 171 listed equities. 
The NSE tracks markets and sector performances by indexes, amongst which are the NSE 
All Share Index, NSE 30 Index, NSE Pension Index, NSE Banking Index, NSE 
Consumer Goods Index, NSE Industrial Index, NSE Insurance Index, NSE Lotus 
Industrial Index, NSE Premium Bond Index, NSE Main Board Index, and  NSE 
Alternative Market  Index. The main index is the NSE 30 Index. The average 
daily volume for the last quarter of 2015 was 296.34 million units; average daily 
traded volume was $13.98 million, translated at the official exchange rate of 
N199.98 to one U.S. dollar. The market’s average price per share to earnings per 
share (PE ratio) for the listed equities was 17.8; compared with FTSE 250 of 11.2. 
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The majority of businesses in Nigeria are not publicly listed, and in terms of numbers, the 
greater percentage are not even registered for many reasons, such as lack of 
proper education, the need to escape the tax net, and the insignificant nature of the 
business carried on by these businesspeople. Oyejide and Soyibo (2001) estimated 
that 13.3% of businesses in the country are not publicly listed, and of the 
registered companies, only 38% operate in the formal sector. More than 87% of 
Nigerian businesses carry out their operations outside the rules governing the 
stock market; such as duty to comply with corporate governance codes and IFRS 
(Oyejide and Soyibo, 2001).  
Between 1995 and 1998, the government owned 8.1% of the companies quoted on the 
Nigerian Stock Exchange, and domestic investors only 35% (Oyejide & Soyibo, 
2001). The shareholding structure is not as diverse as in other nations, and the 
market is subject to manipulation and dominance by large shareholders and 
foreign-owned companies. Compliance with corporate governance codes, like the 
law that governs most activities in the country, is poor. 
Enforcement of Corporate Governance Codes in Nigeria 
 According to Ejavbekpokpo and Esuike (2013), corporate governance in Nigeria 
is an entirely new concept. Although the CAMA, Banks and Other Financial 
Institutions Act of 2002 (BOFIA, 2002), as amended, Investments and Securities 
Act of 1999 (ISA; 1999), and the Securities and Exchange Commission Act of 
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1988 (SEC; 1988) included many provisions concerning corporate governance 
practices, the laws are merely in the books but not in action. Enforcement is poor 
in the country where matters are more often than not settled through quasi-legal 
means. Also, many investors are only interested in receiving yearly dividends, and 
because most are widely dispersed and of little education, the directors are in total 
control of the affairs of the business, and the annual general meetings are usually 
rigged in their favor. 
 The enforcement of compliance with corporate governance codes does not rest 
with one institution in Nigeria. The CBN supervises the financial institutions and 
ensures compliance. If a bank is quoted on the NSE, the exchange also assumes 
some jurisdiction. Lately, the IFRS has come on the scene after Nigeria joined 
other nations in implementing IFRS. The Financial Reporting Council is now 
claiming to be the preeminent enforcer of these codes. There is a lot of confusion 
regarding which institution a listed company should be answerable. 
 The Securities and Exchange Commission’s code, which was approved in 2003, 
focused on board responsibilities and composition, CEO duality, procedures and 
frequency of meetings, requirements for nonexecutive directors, compensation of 
the members of the board, and financial reporting and control (Afolabi, 2015; 
Ejuvbekpokpo & Esuike, 2013). The NSE’s code, which was fashioned after the 
OECD principles of corporate governance, also stipulated the rights and 
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responsibilities of shareholders; audit committees’ duties and responsibilities, 
qualifications, and meetings; and the size, diversity, experience, and 
independence of the board of directors. Afolabi (2015) stated that the reason why 
corporate governance is ineffective in Nigeria could be traced to a wholesale 
adoption of the British company’s law of 1948 by the Nigeria legislatures without 
considering the peculiar history and business environment in Nigeria, and the 
country’s level and stage of development. 
 The failure of Nigeria’s businesses is traceable to other factors than corporate 
governance weaknesses, though a poor control system is a significant contributor 
to corporate collapses in the country. The aftermath of Cadbury NigeriaPublic 
Limited Company (PLC)’s financial scandals and fraud is a revealing example of 
a much deeper problem in the country’s business environment: The cavalier 
attitude with which law enforcement treats the business elite that behave 
inappropriately. Between 2002 and 2006, Cadbury Nigeria PLC inflated its 
income statements by some N13 billion ($65 million). The three directors 
involved confessed to account manipulation to manage profit, meet analysts’ 
expectations, and improve share price. The SEC found the company guilty of 
inadequate disclosure, noncompliance with corporate governance guidelines, 
obtaining loans to pay dividends contrary to SEC regulations, fraudulent and 
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unauthorized share buybacks, giving the auditors false stock certificates, and 
illegal payment to directors (http//nairaland.com, 2015). 
 The auditors of Cadbury Nigeria PLC, Akintola Williams Deloitte, was equally 
found guilty by the SEC. The auditor failed to properly carry out its statutory 
duties. They failed to check and verify inventory certificates and bank 
reconciliation statements, and they received oral representations without third 
party confirmation and documentary evidence. When the directors’ statements 
were unclear and contrary to the evidence in plain sight of the auditors, they were 
not put on notice and they failed to probe the matter to the bottom. In the case of 
Enron, some directors went to jail, some committed suicide, while Arthur 
Andersen, the auditor, collapsed. The Nigerian executives and the company 
involved got the lightest sentences ever in a case like this. Cadbury was fined only 
N21, 215, 000.00 ($134, 272.15) and the three directors involved, the CEO, the 
CFO, and another director, were only banned from operating in Nigeria’s capital 
market and from being a director in a public company. The auditors and the guilty 
directors got off absolutely free (http://nairaland. com, 2015). 
Corporate Governance Research in Nigeria 
 A number of research studies in Nigeria have focused on the association between 
corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance, and the incidences of 
accounting scandals in the country. Adewuyi and Olowookere (2013) found that 
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31.71% of all the nonfinancial firms on the NSE surveyed between 2000 and 2008 
showed good corporate governance changes. A change that resulted in the 
increase in independent directors, independence of the audit committee, decrease 
in board size, and lower leverage was deemed to be a good corporate governance 
change. The fact is that in many cases appointment to the boards of Nigerian 
companies is based on family ties, recommendations by large shareholders, and 
close networks of individuals or professionals. The prevailing practice is that 
merit takes a backseat in board appointments in Nigeria. The culture of not 
appointing the right persons to the board makes implementation of good corporate 
governance systems difficult in the country. 
 Zango, Kamardin, and Ishak (2016) examined the impact of corporate governance 
characteristics and the IFRS 7 on 14 banks listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange 
between 2008 and 2012. Zango et al. reported that IFRS 7 (financial instruments 
disclosure) was positively and significantly associated with board committee, 
board financial and accounting expertise, and board gender. The findings show 
that accounting and financial expertise of board members matter. Hassan and 
Ahmed (2012) also documented a negative but not significant association between 
audit governance scores and absolute discretionary accruals. They also found a 
negative and significant relationship between institutional shareholding and 
discretionary behavior of managers, meaning that at least in Nigeria, the freedom 
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enjoyed by managers of corporations to deliberately misstate accounting 
information decreases with the presence of institutional investors. This means that 
institutional investors act as a check on managers’ excessive risk taking and 
accounting manipulations. The presence of other nationalities on the board of 
directors tends to promote competition amongst various listed companies. 
 Obembe and Soetan (2015) stated that competition had a positive and significant 
effect on productivity growth in Nigerian companies. Obembe and Soetan  also 
reported that  the interaction effect of productivity with corporate governance 
mechanisms had substitution effect but not significant effect in productivity 
growth in Nigerian companies. Akinkoye and Olasanmi (2014) noted that 
corporate governance initiatives were embedded in Nigerian companies that they 
studied between 2003 and 2010. Furthermore, Akinkoye and Olasanmi 
documented the compliance rate with corporate governance best practices among 
Nigerian companies to be 72.15%. They also observed a shift in corporate 
governance structure in Nigerian companies and a slow-down in corporate 
governance practice. 
 The issue of nationality and ethnicity are extremely important in Nigeria’s 
business life and politics. Foreign companies dominate the listings on the 
Nigerian Stock Exchange in terms of capitalization, where foreign nationals hold 
a high proportion of the shares. Although the Nigerian authorities continue to 
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promote homegrown investment culture, the efforts are hampered by poverty, 
poor savings culture, and a lifestyle of conspicuous consumption. The average 
person does not believe in investment in shares due to poor working knowledge of 
the stock exchange. Ethnicity is also a very important consideration in Nigeria 
and an important variable that should be taken into account when considering 
board composition, because the country has about 250 ethnic groups, and each is 
a powerful force in business and politics (World Fact Book, 2016). Board 
composition with different ethnic nationalities is a bulwark against unethical 
practices. 
 Salaudeen, Ibikunle, and Chima (2015) investigated unethical accounting 
practices and financial reporting of companies quoted on the NSE. In a case study 
conducted in one of the biggest first generation banks in Nigeria, Afribank PLC, 
which collapsed in 2015, the researchers found extended audit tenure impaired 
auditor’s independence. Before the SEC of Nigeria started to implement corporate 
governance principle in the country from 2003, many companies retained external 
auditors for as long as possible, many of them also serving as tax and internal 
audit consultants, advisers on strategy and information technology, and training. 
Salaudeen et al. (2015)  stated that poor corporate governance was largely 
responsible for the eventual collapse of the banks. 
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Summary 
I focused on agency, stakeholder, and stewardship theories in this review 
of the literature. The stakeholder theory assumes that, by taking into account the 
interests of all stakeholders in all decisions in the corporation, organizational 
performance should improve. The stewardship theory assumes that managers who 
act as stewards looks after the interests of the shareholders without any 
consideration for their self-interest, thereby reducing agency problems and agency 
costs. The agency theory posits that the separation of ownership from control 
causes agency problems in firms. Agency problems lead to costs, which are 
entirely borne by the shareholders as managers exploit their superior information 
knowledge to extract value from the firm and stockholders. Using agency, 
stakeholders, and stewardship theories, I explained the relationship between 
managers, shareholders, and other stakeholders, and how managers can be made 
to act in the best interests of all stakeholders, especially the stockholders. 
Specifically, the literature review covered (a) the theories corporate governance, 
including agency, stakeholders, and stewardship theories, (b) corporate 
governance antecedents and attributes, (c) conflict of interest and firm 
performance, (d) major themes in corporate governance research, (e) financial 
performance, using return on assets, return on capital employed, and Tobin’s Q as 
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performance metrics (f) evaluating the corporate governance of a firm, and (g) 
corporate governance practice in Nigeria.  
In Chapter 3, I provided I provided information on the research design and 
method that was used to organize and analyze the data. I also documented the 
dependent and independent variables and their measurements, the type of data that 
were used, the data gathering and organization techniques, and the target 
population. I also gave details of the sampling method, instrumentation, and the 
data analysis software that was used. In addition, I restated the research questions 
and the research hypotheses of the study. 
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Chapter 3: Research Method 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I described the research methodology that I used to conduct this study. I 
described in detail the research design, hypothesis formulation, target population, 
sampling strategy and methods, instrumentation, data sources, and data analysis 
and reporting. While this study was entirely based on secondary data sources and 
did not involve any population that might be at risk in the process of data 
gathering, nevertheless, I sought and obtained the approval of the Institutional 
Review Board (IRB) before commencing any aspect of the research. Also, I 
included in this chapter a literature review of the proposed research design and 
other designs that could have been used to conduct the study. 
Research Design 
 I used a quantitative research design and multiple regression analysis to examine 
the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on firm financial performance. 
The general equation for k independent variables in the model is given by: Y = a 
+ b1X1 + b2X2 +…….+ bkXk + e, where Y is the dependent or criterion 
variable, a is the intercept of the model, b1….bk are the regression coefficients 
applied to the Xs, X1…Xk are the predictor or independent variables, and e is the 
residual or random error in the model (Pedhazur, 1997, p. 136). The dependent 
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variable in this study was financial performance, measured by three ratios: ROA, 
ROCE, and Tobin’s Q. 
Dependent Variables  
 ROA is defined as the ratio of EBITDA and the total assets of the firm 
(Baulkaran, 2014; Poutziouris et al., 2014). ROA has been used to measure 
financial performance in many studies (Dah, 2016; Muttakin et al., 2016; 
Perryman, Fernando, & Tripathy, 2016). ROCE is the ratio of EBITDA to the 
capital employed in the firm (Zona, 2016). Capital employed is measured as the 
total of equity and debt, or simply total assets less current liabilities (Investopia, 
2015). Tobin’s Q is the ratio of market value of assets to the cost of replacing the 
assets (Jermias & Gani, 2014). Tobin’s Q ratio measures the company’s market 
value, where a ratio above one indicates an overvaluation, and a ratio below one 
indicates undervaluation of the firm (Eklund & Poulsen, 2014). 
Independent Variables 
 In the model, the independent variables that I selected for the study were board 
independence, independence of the audit committee, executive compensation, 
number of board meetings, and the size of the board. The five variables are some 
of the metrics shareholders and analysts use to measure how their companies are 
performing. Board independence is present when there is separation of the role of 
the CEO from that of the chair and when more than 50% of the members are 
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outside, nonexecutive directors, who do not have any relationship with the 
company, either as a former employee, auditor, or a family member of the CEO or 
other directors (Quttainah, 2015; Tsai et al., 2013). 
 To assess the independence of the audit committee, the OECD’s corporate 
governance principles require that it be composed entirely of independent 
directors. In this study, I defined an independent audit committee as one 
composed mainly of independent directors, at least more than 50%, with a direct 
communication between committee members and the chief internal auditor 
without obtaining approval from the CEO. Executive compensation was defined 
in this study as the total amount of money and benefits-in-kind paid to top 
management of the firm, disclosed in the financial statements as required by the 
Nigeria’s Company and Allied Matters Acts of 1990 and the FRC. 
 I measured the number of board meetings by the total number of meetings held in 
any one year, where a quorum was formed. The board directs the affairs of the 
firm by holding meetings. Apart from satisfying statutory requirements, the 
frequency of board meetings indicates board activity, the time and attention the 
board devotes to the organization, and board service involvement (Knockaert et 
al., 2015). The number of board meetings also indicates to the executives how 
seriously the board considers the affairs of the corporation. The size of the board 
is the absolute number of directors. The appropriate board size depends on the 
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organizational context, the complexity of the company’s operations, the number 
of foreign subsidiaries, the macro-economic situation, and the need for proper 
coordination and control (Knockeart et al., 2015; Lucas-Perez et al., 2014). The 
size of the board may not be sensitive to the benefits and costs of monitoring and 
advising the management of the firm. 
The Different Types of Research Design 
 There are three types of research designs that may be used for studying a 
phenomenon: qualitative, quantitative, and mixed-methods. There are alternatives 
strategies that a researcher may use in his or her study within the three types of 
research designs. In a qualitative research design, the strategies can be a narrative 
research, phenomenology, ethnographies, grounded theory, and case study 
(Babbie, 2014). In a quantitative inquiry, the alternative approaches are 
experimental designs and nonexperimental designs, such as surveys and 
correlational studies (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008). According to 
Trochim and Donnelly (2008), a qualitative research design is appropriate when 
the researcher desires to generate new theories or hypothesis or explore a new 
phenomenon to gain a deeper understanding of the issues, and to develop detailed 
stories to describe a phenomenon (p. 142). 
 Quantitative research design allows the researcher to test theories by examining 
the relationships among the variables (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008). 
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According to Babbie (2014), quantification makes observations more explicit, and 
data are easier to summarize, compare, and aggregate (p. 24). Quantitative 
research also offers advantages of precision because numbers remove ambiguities 
and subjectivity. Quantitative research can be correlational, (i.e., looking for 
relationships among variables) or experimental (Hill & Lewicki, 2006). 
 In correlational research, the relationship between the variables is investigated to 
find out whether there is a statistically significant correlation between them (i.e., 
whether the changes observed in one variable are correlated with the changes in 
the other variable (Bonna, 2012). In social science research, the variables are not 
usually susceptible to manipulation; in other words, the researcher cannot state 
whether there is a cause and effect in in the variables, because there is no 
possibility of performing the study in a laboratory. But in experimental research, 
some variables are manipulated and the effect is measured on the other variable 
(Hill & Lewiscki, 2006, p. 3). Usually, a cause and effect can be established in 
pure experimental research. 
 A mixed-methods design stands in-between qualitative and quantitative inquiries. 
It is used when neither of the two other research designs is deemed appropriate to 
understand the phenomenon under investigation (Babbie, 2014). By combining 
the strengths of the two traditional methods of inquiry, the mixed-methods 
researcher is able to address and understand complex social problems that neither 
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the qualitative nor quantitative inquiry can handle satisfactorily and completely. 
In a mixed-methods inquiry, the researcher may choose to do sequential, 
concurrent, or transformative research designs (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 
2008). 
 Qualitative research uses small samples to explore and understand human 
perspectives to a problem or phenomenon by using rich and lengthy and full 
descriptions to capture those experiences and perspectives (Babbie, 2014). 
Qualitative researchers are less interested in generalizing their findings to the 
whole population, but only in a deep understanding of the phenomenon from the 
few samples selected. This is one of the flaws of qualitative research; that the 
research findings may not be capable of generalization to other populations, 
groups, or geographic areas (Babbie, 2014). Quantitative research, on the other 
hand, relies on large samples randomly drawn from a population to test data and 
find correlations or relationships among the variables for generalization to the 
whole population, but a quantitative measure may not be as rich in meanings as a 
qualitative design (Babbie, 2014). 
 According to Babbie (2014), research serves three main purposes; and these are 
exploration, description, and explanation. An exploratory research is typically 
done for three purposes: (a) to satisfy the researcher’s curiosity for better 
understanding, (b) to test the feasibility of undertaking a study, and (c) to develop 
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the methods to be employed in any subsequent study (Babbie, 2014, p. 90). A 
qualitative research design is suitable for exploring and understanding social and 
human problems from the worldview of particular participants (Frankfort-
Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008). No predetermined answers are assumed in a 
qualitative study, and the method allows the researcher to deal with new questions 
and theories (Babbie, 2014). 
 Although various researchers have used qualitative inquiries to examine the 
impact of corporate governance mechanism on financial performance, a 
qualitative inquiry was not suitable for this study, which was based on 
correlational study. Researchers have advocated using qualitative characteristics 
in corporate governance studies to gain a deeper understanding of the issues. 
Almadi (2015) used a narrative method to explain the significance of 
incorporating context with corporate governance systems to assess how it works 
in practice. 
 Qualitative methods have the advantage that complex cases can be studied in-
depth, but it also suffers from serious disadvantages in that results cannot be 
generalized to other populations. It is also difficult to test hypotheses and make 
quantitative predictions, and the results frequently incorporate the researcher’s 
biases (Babbie, 2014). The distinguishing characteristics of qualitative from the 
quantitative inquiry are not only the absence of quantification, but also the 
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underlying assumptions, data gathering techniques, data analysis tools, and 
generalizability of the results  (Jackson, 2015). Madill (2015) stated that what 
distinguishes qualitative from quantitative inquiries is not mere labeling, such as 
descriptive, interpretative, or lived experience. The labeling will exclude many 
research studies using this method of inquiry that produce conceptual and 
theoretical explanations of observed phenomena. 
 The major purpose of a quantitative inquiry is to test theories through examination 
of the relationships among variables (Pedhazur, 1997). In this study, I used the 
correlational analysis method and a multiple regression model, which tests a 
relationship between two or more variables where changes in one are associated 
with changes in the other (Babbie, 2014). A quantitative method of inquiry was 
suitable for this study because I tested the association between corporate 
governance mechanisms and firm financial performance. Although correlation 
does not mean causation; nevertheless, it is one of the criteria of causality 
(Babbie, 2014). 
 A quantitative research design using a multiple regression model is suitable when 
the researcher’s aim is to test the relationship between a dependent or criterion 
variable and several predictor variables (Hill & Lewicki, 2006; Pedhazur, 1997). 
Multiple regression models have been used in many studies to examine the 
relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance 
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(Baulkaran, 2014; Bhagat & Bolton, 2013; Francis et al., 2013; Muller, 2014). 
Researchers have also predicted the likely magnitude of change in financial 
performance by using corporate governance indices (Chahine & Zeidan, 2014; 
Gompers et al., 2003; Quittainah, 2015). Gompers et al. (2003) constructed the 
24-item G-Index that indicates a manager’s control and influence over important 
decisions affecting the firm using multiple regression analysis (Dah, 2014). 
 Bebchuck et al. (2009) stated that only six of the 24-item G-Index governance 
provisions have a significant effect on the value of a firm. Bebchuck et al.’s 
modified Entrenchment Index (E-Index) included provisions in the firm’s articles 
for golden parachutes, poison pills, staggered boards, a supermajority requirement 
for charter amendment, a supermajority requirement for merger amendments, and 
placing limits on shareholders’ bylaw amendment (Dah, 2014). For example, Dah 
(2014) used multiple regression analysis to study the effect of recession on 
management and found that managerial entrenchment was significantly higher 
during periods of recession, by using the E-Index (Bebchuck et al., 2009). 
 Ioana and Mariana (2014) used multiple regression models to examine the 
association between the characteristics of corporate governance and firm 
performance in Romania; the proxies for firm performance chosen were ROA and 
return on equity (ROE). Satayesh, Razaie, and Kazenezhad (2016) also used a 
quantitative research design with multiple regression analysis to investigate the 
182 
 
 
role of investment in R&D as it relates to corporate governance and 
organizational performance in listed companies in Iran. Several other research 
studies cited in the literature used quantitative methods and multiple regression 
analysis to examine the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on company 
performance (Abdioğlu, 2016; Arena, Cirillo, Mussolino, Pulcinelli, Saggese, & 
Sarto, 2014; Haji, 2014; Mishra & Mohanty, 2014; Reutzel & Belsito, 2015). 
 To investigate the impact of corporate governance on firm performance, many 
researchers have used primary data collected through surveys and structured or 
semistructured questionnaires and then used the multiple regression method to 
analyze the data. For example, Du, Deloof, and Jorisen (2015) examined the role 
of the board of multinational companies’ subsidiaries in Belgium by distributing 
questionnaires to the CEOs of 428 firms. Pugliese et al. (2014) investigated how 
company profitability and industry regulation affect corporate performance by 
surveying the CEOs of top 2, 000 Italian firms through questionnaires in 2004, 
and using multiple regression analysis of quantitative method to analyze the data. 
 Knockart et al. (2015) sent questionnaires to the CEOs of 300 firms in Norwegian 
universities and public research institutes in their study on the role of top 
management staff and board chairperson as antecedents of board service 
involvement. Knocaert et al. (2015) used multiple regression analysis of 
quantitative method to analyze the data. Many other researchers have used 
183 
 
 
multiple regression analysis to analyze data with the help of statistical software 
such as SPSS   (Akash & Abbas, 2015; Kouki & Guizani, 2015; Yeh, 2014).  
 Although many researchers gather primary data through questionnaires and then 
use quantitative method of multiple regression analysis to analyze the data, there 
are several issues with questionnaire design, administration, and analysis. As 
Fowler (2014) remarked, designing questionnaires is equivalent to creating a 
measure (p. 75). It is important to ensure that bias and double meaning are 
removed from the questions. Some of the biases in question design are leading, 
threatening, and double-barreled questions, which may render the survey 
inaccurate (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008). Other types of errors and 
biases in questionnaires are incomplete and poorly worded sentences, and poorly 
defined terms and multiple questions (Fowler, 2014). Common sources of error in 
the wording of questions also arise from ambiguous and loaded questions, and 
those that are difficult to understand or beyond the level of comprehension of the 
respondents (Donovan & Hoover, 2014). Questionnaire administration is also 
costly and time consuming (Fowler, 2014). 
 According to Babbie (2014), questionnaires are versatile tools used in many 
research studies, including experiments, field research, and other data collection 
activities (p. 261). In this study, I collected data on corporate governance from 
secondary data, using the financial statements of the target companies. The 
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audited financial statements will be accessed from multiple sources: The 
corporations’ websites, the website of the NSE and from the websites of FRC and 
SEC. 
 I have chosen the multiple regression method for the data analysis stage of this 
dissertation after a careful consideration of the other tools of analysis that are 
possible and readily available. Some of the other methods considered are simple 
regression analysis, ANOVA, correlational analysis, discriminant analysis, log 
linear models, and nonparametric test. Simple regression analysis only applies 
when the independent variable is limited to one, and in correlation analysis, no 
distinction is made between the independent and the dependent variable 
(Pedhazur, 1997). These two types of analysis methods were not suitable for this 
dissertation study. 
 ANOVA combines cases under study into groups of independent variables and 
the extent to which the group differs from one another is investigated (Babbie, 
2014, p. 486). The discriminant analysis method is similar to multiple regression 
analysis but the dependent variable can be nominal. The log linear models “test 
the factors used in cross-tabulations and their interaction for statistical 
significance” (Pedhazur, 1997, p. 311). Many of these tests measure the variables 
at the ratio level. The advantage of measuring variables at the ratio level is the 
precision of their numerical values, which allows statistical manipulation 
185 
 
 
(Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008, p. 147). Nonparametric methods are 
applied where the traditional statistics are not applicable, and the assumptions for 
parametric tests are not met (Gibbons, 1993, p. 2). Nonparametric analysis is also 
used when the researcher does not know the parameters of the distribution of the 
variables, such as the mean and the standard deviation (Pedhazur, 1997, p. 381). 
Target Population 
 The research population for this study consists of all the 116 nonfinancial 
companies listed on the NSE between 2011 and 2015. At the end of December 
2015, 55 companies in the financial services industry were quoted on the NSE 
excluding banks and insurance firms. These will be excluded from the analysis. 
The financial and related companies were excluded from this study because they 
are subject to different rules dictated by their regulators, and based on the 
conditions of the license given to them to operate. The CBN, the Nigeria Deposit 
Insurance Corporation, and the Nigerian Insurance Commission regulate the 
financial services companies listed on the stock exchange. Including any of these 
corporations will seriously bias this study as they are subject to different 
accounting and financial regulations that are separate and distinct from those that 
the firms in non-financial industries are required to observe 
 The 116 nonfinancial firms on the stock exchange represent this study’s 
population. These firms are in many industrial sectors, including manufacturing, 
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hotels and tourism, energy, equipment, and services; petroleum products 
distribution; apparel retailing; courier, freight, and deliveries; road transportation; 
and services. The study covered 5 years from 2011 to 2015. All the 116 non-
financial companies listed on the stock exchange was examined to determine 
whether they met the eligibility criteria for inclusion in the sampled companies. 
To be included in the final sample, a firm must have met the following criteria: (a) 
compliance with the NSE code of corporate governance, (b) trading for at least 3  
years prior to 2011, (c) the share must be active on the stock exchange throughout 
the  5 years under study, (4) the market capitalization must be a minimum of $1 
million, (5) no loss is recorded in any of the 5 years under analysis, (6) the audited 
financial statements must contained financial and corporate governance 
information for analysis, and (7) the firm must be in active operation throughout 
the 5 years ending on December 31, 2015. This research covered all the 
nonfinancial companies listed on the main and premium boards of the NSE that 
meet the above conditions. 
 The NSE is a member of International Organization of Securities Commissions 
(IOSCO), the World Federation of Exchanges (WFE), SIIA’s Financial 
Information Services Division (FISD), and Intermarket Surveillance Group (ISG). 
Equities are listed under several industrial sectors, including consumer goods, 
food products, financial services, healthcare, pharmaceuticals, industrial goods, 
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chemicals, energy, equipment, services, integrated oil and gas services, 
hospitality, and printing and publishing. The Exchange tracks stock and market 
performance by 12 indices, including the NSE All Share Index, NSE Main Board 
Index, NSE 30 Index, NSE Banking Index, and NSE Oil and Gas Index. The main 
index is NSE 30 Index. Institutional investors, including pension and mutual 
funds, use the NSE Indexes to monitor the performance of their stock holdings 
and check the performance of their individual holdings against the NSE stock 
index. 
Sampling Methods 
 There were 252 listed securities on the NSE at the end of December 2015. Three 
securities were listed on the premium board, 171 equities on the main board, 11 
on the alternative securities market board; seven exchange traded products, and 15 
federal government bonds. There were also 21 corporate bonds, 22 state and 
municipal bonds, and 2 supranational bonds. The total market capitalization of all 
the listed securities as on December 31, 2015 was $85.3 billion (NSE, 2016). This 
study considered only listed equities on the main board of the NSE. 
 Fifty-five equities on the main board of the NSE belong to banks and other 
financial institutions. The 55 equities belonging to the financial institutions were 
excluded from the analysis because these institutions are subject to different 
regulations and accounting and disclosure requirements by the regulatory 
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authorities, including the CBN, Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation, and 
Nigerian Insurance Commission. Including the financial institutions with the non-
financial companies may make interpretation of the findings difficult. The 
exclusion of financial institutions left 116 firms as the population for the study. 
The 116 nonfinancial firms belong to 10 industrial sectors, namely: (a) 
agriculture, (b) conglomerates, (c) construction/real estate, (d) consumer goods, 
(e) healthcare, (f) ICT, (g) industrial goods, (h) natural resources, (i) oil and gas, 
and (j) services. 
 There were  several sampling techniques that may be considered to obtain a 
representative sample for this study: (a) a simple random sampling technique 
selects samples from the population with every sample having equal chance to be 
selected (Trochim & Donnelly, 2008),  (b) in stratified random sampling, the 
population  is divided into homogeneous subgroups and a simple random 
sampling taken in each subgroup (Trochim & Donnelly, 2008),  (c) a systematic 
random sampling technique involves the researcher first determining randomly 
where to start sample selection from the sample frame, and thereafter, every nth 
item is then selected,  (d) convenience sampling is based on convenience and 
availability of information the researcher is seeking, and (e) finally, a purposive 
sampling method is a sampling technique used when the researcher has a purpose 
in mind that he or she desires to achieve. According to Trochim and Donnelly 
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(2008), subcategories of purposive sampling are modal instance sampling, expert 
sampling, and snowball sampling. 
 The sampling technique for this dissertation study was based on convenience 
sampling method, because it was based on the availability of data, and whether 
the sampled companies met a set of conditions, such as the numbers of years since 
being listed on the NSE availability of audited financial statements, number of 
directors, absence of loss in all the 5 years covered by the study, and market 
capitalization. Researchers call this type of sampling technique nonprobability 
sampling. It is nonprobability because it does not involve a random selection of 
samples, and it is impossible for the researcher to specify the chance of each unit 
being included (Frank-fort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008). But as Trochim and 
Donnelly (2008) stated, it does not necessarily mean that nonprobability samples 
are not representative of the population. What it means is that the statistical rules 
of the probability theory may not be applicable, and the researcher may not know 
how well the samples represent the population (Trochim & Donnelly, 2008). 
From the 116 nonfinancial firms whose securities were listed on the NSE between 2011 
and 2015, I selected all the companies that met the following criteria: 
A quotation history on the exchange for three years prior to 2011. 
A verifiable tradition of implementation of SEC’s corporate governance codes and 
compliance with the listing rules of the Nigerian Stock Exchange. 
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Active quotation on the NSE throughout 2011 to 2015. 
Financial statements for the five years that comply with IFRS,  which also contain 
information for the computation of ROA, ROCE, and Tobin’s Q; with the 
disclosures of corporate governance variables of board composition, audit 
committee composition, executive remuneration, number of board meetings, the 
size of the board, and the age and size of the firm. 
Be in operational existence throughout the 5 years ending December 2015. 
Have total market capitalization of $1 million or above, translated at the prevailing 
official exchange rate determined by the CBN in any particular year. Have total 
market capitalization of $1 million or above, translated at the prevailing official 
exchange rate determined by the CBN in any particular year. 
Recorded no losses throughout the 5 years covered in the study (i.e., from 2011 to 2015). 
I assumed that companies that have traded for 3 years prior to 2011 would have a 
tradition of implementation of good corporate governance practices and be 
comfortable disclosing the governance process in the financial reports. Companies 
with market capitalization of $1 million and above would also have the resources 
and motivation to put in place good corporate governance practices in the 
Nigerian context. Large cap companies as defined above with a minimum of $1 
million in market capitalization, in the unique situation in Nigeria, tend to have 
structures, systems, and ability to set up and implement effective corporate 
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governance mechanisms to monitor and advice the top management. Market 
capitalization is defined as the total outstanding shares multiplied by the price per 
share at the end of the business day when the market value was determined.  
Smaller firms, those with less capital than $1 million and those that have not been quoted 
for a minimum of 3 years, may have constraints to implement sound corporate 
governance systems, arising from lack of ability to attract widely sought-after 
independent directors to the board. Company size is important in corporate 
governance systems. For example, the studies by Li and Tan (2015) and Quttainah 
(2015) reported that company size is positively and significantly associated with 
firm value. The purpose of a good corporate governance system is to reduce 
agency problems in firms by reducing the conflict of interest between managers 
and shareholders. One of the mechanisms to ensure agency problems are 
minimized is to institute a system of control and monitoring of executives through 
an active board and its committees (Berle & Means, 1932; Fama, 1980; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1979). Only large companies have the resources and attractiveness to 
bring to the firm independent and experienced directors. 
Big companies, because of size, position in the economy, the number of shareholders, 
and the number of employees are under more scrutiny by regulators, activist 
shareholders, and financial institutions. Analysts and institutional investors are 
less tolerance of weak corporate governance practices in large companies than in 
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smaller ones. I will exclude small firms and those whose shares are newly listed 
on the stock exchange because these corporations may not have had the time, 
resources, and tradition to develop an effective corporate governance structure 
due to their size and lack of resources to implement a robust system. 
Big companies, because of size, position in the economy, the number of shareholders, 
and the number of employees are under more scrutiny by regulators, activist 
shareholders, and financial institutions. Analysts and institutional investors are 
less tolerance of weak corporate governance practices in large companies than in 
smaller ones. I will exclude small firms and those whose shares are newly listed 
on the stock exchange because these corporations may not have had the time, 
resources, and tradition to develop an effective corporate governance structure 
due to their size and lack of resources to implement a robust system. 
I relied on the publicly available financial information of the firms listed on the 
companies’ websites, the NSE websites, the companies’ 2011 to 2015 filing with 
the NSE, the websites of the SEC, and the NSE’s Daily Activity Summary for 
Equities. The Daily Activities Summary, published daily in all major newspapers 
in Nigeria, includes the    total capitalization of each company, price per share, 
and the volume of trading. The convenience or judgmental sampling used in this 
study was based on substantial evidence; I relied on figures published in the 
official websites of the companies, the stock exchange, and in national 
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newspapers. According to Deming (1990), an evaluation of the reliability of 
judgmental sampling rests on the researcher’s expertise, as the theory of 
probability cannot be used to test its reliability. Deming (1990) also stated that it 
is necessary to report full details of a judgmental sampling procedure. 
Instrumentation 
Although corporate governance systems have existed as part of company management 
infrastructure since the separation of ownership and control became inevitable due 
to the size and scale of operations of modern business enterprises, a uniform 
measuring instrument has not been devised (Bonna, 2012). Rather, many 
instruments have been developed by researchers to measure corporate governance 
mechanisms (Zona, 2016). Also, financial performance has traditionally been 
measured by objective performance such as accounting ratios, but some 
researchers have used subjective performance measures as well. 
While financial ratios are based on the historical data from a firm’s accounting records, 
researchers compute subjective performance metrics by asking managers what, in 
their views, constitute good performance and how they rate their own company. 
Throughout this study, I used objective accounting and financial data to measure 
company performance. Researchers have also constructed many instruments and 
indexes to measure different aspects of corporate governance, and others are still 
been invented as businesses become more complex and global. Many researchers 
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have used several instruments to investigate the impact of corporate governance 
mechanisms on firm performance. For example, Adewuyi and Olowookere (2013) 
classified a decrease in board size and separation of the CEO and the board chair 
as good corporate governance changes. 
In this study, I investigated many corporate governance indexes in the review of the 
literature. The G-Index, devised by Gompers et al. (2003), computes a firm’s 
score based on certain provisions that decrease shareholders’ rights and hence 
weakens corporate governance, provisions such as poison pill, staggered boards, 
limitations of the right of shareholders to call meetings, and golden parachute. 
The higher is the index, the greater the manager’s influence over important 
decisions in the firm. The higher score indicates a weak or poor corporate 
governance structure. The G-Index is a 24-item governance provisions 
constructed from RiskMetrics, formerly Investors Responsibility Research 
Center’s (IRRC) publicly available information on the company’s database. The 
lowest figure is 0 and the highest 24 for each provision in the company’s byelaws. 
Bebchuck et al. (2009) believed that only six provisions, out of the 24 proposed by 
Gompers et al., (2003) were needed to determine whether there is a poor or strong 
corporate governance structure in a firm. Bebchuck, et al., (2009) constructed the 
managerial E-Index from IRRC data and the six provisions are a subset of the G-
Index. The six provisions are golden parachutes, poison pills, staggered boards, 
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supermajority requirement for merger amendments, supermajority requirement for 
changes to the firm’s charter, and limit to shareholder bylaw amendments. The E-
Index scores the six provisions from 0 to 6, and a higher score is associated with 
poor corporate governance while a lower score indicates strong corporate 
governance (Bebchuk et al., 2009). 
Brown and Caylor’s (2006) governance score (Gov-score) was constructed from 
Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS’s) database, using a 52-item firm 
characteristics to assign scores to provisions of the firm’s bylaws (poison pill, 
supermajority provisions, etc.), board structure (independence, CEO/chair duality, 
nominating committee, etc.), audit committee (independence, auditors’ fees from 
other services, auditor rotation, and changes), firm progressive practices 
(directors’ term limits, mandatory retirement age, etc.) and management and 
directors’ compensation (directors’ stock options, interlocks in compensation 
committee). The Gov-score ranges from 0 to 52, with high scores associated with 
better corporate governance practices. Many of these instruments measure the 
same things although from different perspectives. 
The Corporate Library is a commercial vendor of corporate governance data analysis and 
assessments tools. The instrument is based on 100 criteria, scores range from 0 to 
100 for constructing a benchmark score. The scoring follows closely the G-Index 
(Gompers et al., 2003), the E-Index (Bebchuk et al., 2004), and the Brown and 
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Caylor’s (2006) Gov-score. The provisions concern bylaws (poison pills, 
supermajority rules), board structure (independence, CEO duality, nominating 
committee), audit committee, executive compensation, and progressive practices. 
A high Gov-score indicates good corporate governance practices and a low score 
weak signifies a weak corporate governance practice. 
 S&P’s Corporate Governance Scores (CGI) is another index that offers a detailed 
measure of a firm’s corporate governance structure, benchmarked by reference to 
global best practices. S&P’s corporate governance scores assigns scores to 
companies’ practices ranging from 1 to 10, with 10 standing for best corporate 
governance practices. A high score indicates good corporate governance practices 
while a low score is associated with poor or weak practices. S&P corporate 
governance scores are divided into three sub-indices. The first focuses on 
ownership structure and relationship with investors, the second concerns financial 
and information transparency, and the third addresses the firm’s board and 
management structure and processes. 
The G-Index of Gompers et al. (2003) and the E-Index of Bebchuck et al. (2009) are the 
most traditional corporate governance indices used in extant literature. Support is 
found in the literature for both composite and separate measures of corporate 
governance (e.g., Bebchuk et al., 2009; Bhagat & Bolton, 2013; Gompers et al., 
2003). But as Bhagat and Bolton (2013) stated, a single measure of board 
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characteristics can be as effective as the multiple measures of the G-Index, the 
S&P CGI, and Bebchuck et al. (2009)’s E-Index. The reasons are: (a) because the 
board of directors has the power to make all decisions, they have an incentive to 
provide effective monitoring and supervision of managers if they own stocks in 
the firm, (b) the errors associated with a single measure would be less than those 
arising from multiple measures. 
Poutziouris et al. (2014) used a combination of primary data on compensation, 
ownership, internal governance, and financial and market information from the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. Xie and Fukumoto (2013) also used 
separate measures of corporate governance (board size, average CEO tenure, non-
CEO chair, and financial kereitsu) to examine the impact of corporate board size 
and financial performance (ROA and Tobin’s Q) in Japanese companies listed in 
the first section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange. There are many instruments that 
researchers have developed to measure separate components of corporate 
governance mechanisms. 
Following Bhagat and Bolton (2013), I accomplished the objective of this dissertation 
study by combining separate and combined measures of corporate governance. I 
calculated and used several indexes to measure corporate governance mechanisms 
by the equal weighting technique used in constructing the G-Index (Bonna, 2012; 
Gompers, et al., 2003). The index for each variable was computed for each of the  
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5 years from 2011 to 2015. To calculate the average score for each variable, the 
total score was divided by the number of years the study covers. I followed the 
convention established in both Corporate Library and Brown and Caylor (2006) 
where a high score indicates a strong corporate governance practice and a lower 
score a weak corporate governance system. The separate measures of corporate 
governance mechanisms were  (a) board independence, (b) independence of the 
audit committee, (c) executive compensation, (d) number of board meetings, and 
(e) board size. I calculated the indices by following the equal weighting technique 
in the G-Index and the E-Index. To ensure that the measurements were content-
valid, I defined adequately the key concepts of the constructs that I measured 
(Bonna, 2012). The following definitions and measurements of the variables have 
been adopted in this study: 
Board Independence 
 In this dissertation study, I defined board independence as the proportion of 
directors on the board that is independent, and whether the positions of the chair 
of the board and the CEO are combined in one person or separated (CEO duality). 
CEO duality arises when the positions of the chairperson and CEO are combined. 
An independent director will have no financial ties with the firm, neither will he 
or she be a former employee, auditor, or connected to a former or present 
employee, auditor, finance provider, major supplier, or a large stockholder who 
199 
 
 
owns 5% or more of the firm’s stock. I measure board independence using a 5-
point Likert scale, where 1 equals presence of CEO duality and less than 50% of 
the board members are independent, 2 is presence of CEO duality and exactly 
50% of board members are independent, 3 is the presence of CEO duality and 
greater than 50% of board members are independent, 4 is absence of CEO duality 
and exactly 50% of board members are independent, and 5 is absence of CEO 
duality and greater than 50% of the board members are independent. A high score 
indicates more independence while a low score means less independence of the 
board of directors (Brown & Caylor, 2006). 
Independence of the Audit Committee 
 Audit committee independence was defined as the proportion of independent 
directors on the committee and whether the committee is free to communicate 
with the internal auditor without the CEO’s approval. Ideally, the entire members 
of the audit committee should be independent. Members of the committee are 
independent if they do not have any financial ties with the firm, neither would 
they be former employees, auditor, or connected to a former or present employee, 
auditor, finance provider, major supplier, or a large stockholder who owns 5% or 
more of the firm’s shares. To measure audit committee independence, I use a 5-
point Likert scale, where 1 equals independent members constitute less than 50% 
of the total with no right to communicate with the chief internal auditor without 
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authorization of the CEO, 2 equals exactly 50% of the audit committee members 
are independent without direct communication with the chief internal auditor, 3 
equals independent members constitute more than 50% of the total but with no 
right to communicate with the chief internal auditor, 4 equals independent 
members equals 50% of the total and can communicate freely with the chief 
internal auditor, and 5 equals more than 50% of the members are independent and 
can freely communicate with the chief internal auditor. A high score indicates 
more independence while a low score indicates less independence of the 
committee. 
Executive Compensation 
 The agency theory is based on the conflict that arises when ownership is separated 
from control. Managers tend to pursue strategies motivated by self-interest. By 
adequately remunerating the managers, especially by giving them ownership stake 
in the company, the interest of managers and that of the shareholders should be 
more closely aligned and agency costs reduced. Managers’ compensation was 
measured by the total remuneration given to them, which may be a combination 
of cash payments, stock options, paid holidays and insurance, and all kinds of 
benefits-in-kind. In this dissertation study, I used the figure of the highest paid 
director disclosed in the financial statements as proxy for executive 
compensation. The CAMA in Nigeria makes it mandatory that a range of 
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executive pay should be disclosed in the annual reports, including the amount 
paid to the highest paid director. 
Number of Board Meetings 
 The board of directors carries out its statutory duties by holding meetings. The 
frequency of the meetings is an indication of the level of involvement of the 
members in the firm’s activity, and the regularity of attendance of members 
shows their commitment to the company.  Knockaert et al. (2014) stated that the 
frequency of meetings indicates board activity and the level of involvement of the 
members in the organization. The Nigerian Company and Allied Matters Act of 
1990 does not indicate the minimum frequency of board meetings, but the SEC 
code of corporate governance says that directors should meet at least once every 
quarter, and a director must attend at least two-thirds of all meetings. In this 
study, I assigned one score to every full board meeting held during the year. For 
example, when the board meets eight times in a year, I scored the firm 8, seven 
meetings was scored 7, six meetings was scored 6, and so on. 
Board Size 
 The size of the board is the number of directors on the board, including the 
chairman and the CEO, but excluding alternate directors and the secretary of the 
board. To measure the size of the board, I assigned 1 point to each director, using 
the equal weighting approach. From the literature review, there has not been total 
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agreement whether larger boards impact firm performance better than smaller 
ones. Larger boards are prone to the problems of coordination, which may reduce 
firm performance. On the other hand, larger boards tend to have a greater 
diversity of experience, necessary management capacity, and ability for quality 
advice and counseling to the top management of the firm. Many researchers have 
stated that the coordination, communications, and free-rider problems in larger 
boards may diminish the advantages of diversity of experience and ability for 
quality and impartial advice (Al-Matar et al., 2014; Al-Najjar, 2014). Although 
there is no absolute size for an active board, in this study, I adopted the view that 
larger boards enhance better firm performance. I used the equal-weighting 
approach in this study by scoring a 20-member board 20, a 19-member board 19, 
an 18-member board 18, and so on. 
Firm Size 
 The size of the firm confers advantages and disadvantages on the firm. A large 
firm may be able to negotiate substantial discounts from suppliers, get 
concessions from the government, and benefit from substantial cash available for 
research and development. On the other hand, large firms tend to be inundated by 
bureaucracy and red tape, bitter rivalry among executives, and complacency. In 
this research, I adopted the view that large firms have the resources to engage in 
research and development, negotiate good terms with suppliers and governmental 
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agencies, attract and retain brilliant minds, and recruit directors that contribute 
substantially to the firm’s performance. I used the natural logarithm of total assets 
as the proxy for size of the firm. 
Firm Age 
 The age of the firm is a proxy for experience. An older firm should be able to 
withstand better a severe economic shock to the system than a new firm. The age 
of the company may also be a point of attraction for employees who see older 
firm as safe and steady, and a place to build careers on a long-term basis. In this 
research, the age of the firm is measured as the number of years since 
incorporation. 
Financial Performance 
 In this study, I measured financial performance with three outcome variables. The 
firms’ ROA is the EBITDA divided by the total book value of assets. The ratio 
was calculated using the firms’ historical results published in the financial 
statements and reports. I computed the ratio for each of the 5 years and then 
divided by 5 to get the average for the 5 years. I also compared each of the 
company’s accounting and disclosure policies to ensure that the financial 
statements have been prepared, as much as possible, on the same basis of 
accounting principles and concepts. 
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 ROA  is the yield on the total capital employed in the corporation. Stockholders 
invest in a particular stock to earn returns. The same capital could have been 
invested in government treasury bills or bonds, which are far less risky than 
investment in shares. ROA can be compared with returns on these guilt-edged 
securities to know how efficient the company managers deploy the capital. ROA 
was computed as the ratio of EBITDA and the total capital employed. The total 
capital employed is the firm’s book value of equity plus preferred stocks and the 
long-term borrowings. 
 Tobin’s Q, which is a market measure, is the third outcome variable in this 
dissertation study. Tobin’s Q was defined as the ratio of the firm’s market value 
to the replacement cost of its assets (Jermias & Gani, 2014). It is approximated to 
the ratio of market value of common equity plus book value of preferred stock, 
plus book value of long-term debt, plus book value of inventory, plus current 
liability, minus book value of current assets, to book value of total assets 
(Dharmadasa, Gamage, & Herath, 2014). Mathematically, Tobin’s Q is computed 
as 
MV (CS) + BV (PS) + BV (INV) + BV (CL) – BV (CA) 
  BV (TA) BV (TA) 
Where MV and BV are market and book values respectively, CS, PS, LTD, INV, CL, 
CA, and TA are respectively common stock, preferred stock, long-term debt, 
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inventory, current liabilities, current assets, and total assets (Dharmadasa et al, 
2014). 
Data Collection Sources 
 The data collection in this dissertation study was from multiple sources. The 
sources included the companies’ annual financial statements from 2011 to 2015 
published and filed with the NSE  and displayed in the firms’ corporate websites, 
proxy documents, companies’ articles of association, press statements, the NSE 
Daily Official List, and the Fact Book of the NSE Every company listed on the 
stock exchange must cause its accounts to be audited by registered auditors and 
filed with the exchange and other regulatory bodies. 
  Data were collected from the financial statements on the independence of the 
board, the independence of the audit committee, executive compensation, 
frequency of board meetings, the size of the board, the age and size of the 
company, and the firms’ accounting ratios of return on assets, return on capital 
employed, and Tobin’s Q. The market value of common stock is the price per 
share of the common stock multiplied by total amount of stock outstanding. The 
share price information for the 5 years was obtained from the historical data 
department of the NSE. The firms’ total assets; EBITDA; current liabilities, 
inventory; current assets; and book value of preferred shares were also obtained 
from the published financial statements. 
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Data Organization Techniques 
I collected the data for this dissertation study from public documents that have been filed 
with the NSE from 2011 to 2015. Every listed company is required to file their 
annual financial statements with the exchange in compliance with the listing 
requirements. The annual financial statements are also available from the websites 
of the sampled companies. The various financial ratios and corporate governance 
statistics collected from the annual reports and accounts was organized and 
summarized into a composite dataset. I manually reviewed the data using 
Microsoft Excel to ensure all errors were corrected before exporting the data to 
SPSS for statistical analysis. The Excel spreadsheet is a good tool for calculating 
the ratios and other figures for this study, specifically (a) ROA, (b) ROCE, (c) 
Tobin’s Q, (d) mode, (e) mean, (f) standard deviation, (f) median, (g) sum, and (h) 
variance. The SPSS was also used to calculate measures of central tendency such 
as mean, median, and mode. 
Data Analysis Plan 
 I carried out the data analysis with the aid of SPSS. The SPSS software contained 
both the descriptive and inferential statistics. With the aid of the SPSS, I 
computed measures of central tendency (i.e., the mean, median, mode, and sum; 
dispersion measures such as standard deviation, variance, minimum and 
maximum, and range; and partial correlations). Inferential statistics includes 
207 
 
 
ANOVA analysis, the t test, and multiple regression analysis that enables a 
researcher to calculate part and partial correlations, collinearity diagnostics, R 
squared change, and residual statistics such as Durbin-Watson and casewise 
diagnostics. 
 Prior to using the multiple regression analysis method to analyze my data, I 
calculated a simple correlation analysis to identify the variables to be included in 
the regression analysis. In the literature review section of this study, I developed 
the theoretical framework based on agency, stakeholders, and stewardship 
theories. I hypothesized that there was a statistical relationship between the 
corporate governance mechanisms, measured by board independence, audit 
committee independence, executive compensation, number of board meetings, 
and board size, and firm performance. I also hypothesized that the age and size of 
the firm were mediators of the relationship between corporate governance and 
firm performance. The firm performance was measured by ROA, ROCE, and 
Tobin’s Q. My aim was to examine whether the selected corporate governance 
variables are predictive of organizational performance in nonfinancial companies 
quoted on the NSE. It is possible that some of the predictor variables may be 
measuring the same things, which will be revealed by Pearson’s Product Moment 
correlation analysis. 
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 Many researchers have used multiple regression models to examine the 
association between corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance. For 
example, Yeh (2014) used multiple regression method to examine whether a 
legally binding shareholder resolution has the effect of making the top 
management to put in place a good corporate governance system. Pouziouris et al. 
(2013) used multiple regression analysis to see whether family involvement in 
management affects the performance in corporations listed on the LSE, using 
agency and stewardship theories as the theoretical framework, and ROA and 
Tobin’s Q as the outcome variables. 
 Francis et al.  (2013) investigated the extent to which conservative accounting 
affects the shareholder value in the S&P 1500 composite index between 2007 and 
2009 using multiple regression analysis. Kouki and Guizani (2015) also used 
multiple regression analysis to examine the extent to which the involvement of 
independent directors affects firm performance in 30 companies listed on the 
Tunisian Stock Exchange. Quttainah (2015) equally used multiple regression 
analysis to examine the impact of internal and external mechanisms on firm 
performance during the financial crisis of 2007 to 2008. 
 Based on the literature review, multiple regression analysis method is suitable as 
the research design to examine the relationships between the variables that I have 
chosen in this study. The generic equation is Y = a + b1X1 +b2X2 +..….+ bnXn + 
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ε. Where Y is the dependent variable, X1…..Xn are the independent variables, a 
is the intercept of the model, b1 to bn are the beta coefficients of the regression 
model, and ε is the random error (Pedhazur, 1973). The five model specifications 
for the multiple regression equations are as follows: 
ROA = α1 + β1BodInd + β2AuditCommInd + β3BodSize + β4BdMtgs + 
 Β5Execomp + β6FirmAge + β7FirmSize + ε 
ROCE = α2 + β8BodInd + β9AuditCommInd + β10BodSize + β11BodMtgs + 
 Β12Execomp + β13FirmAge + β14FirmSize + ε 
Tobin’s Q = α3 + β15BodInd + β16AuditCommInd + β17BodSize + β18BodMtgs + 
 Β19Execomp + β20FirmAge + β21FirmSize + ε 
FirmSize = α4 + β22BodInd + β23AuditCommInd + β24BodSize + β25BodMtgs + 
 Β26Execomp + β27FirmAge + β28FirmSize + ε 
FirmAge = α5 + β29BodInd + β30AuditCommInd + β31BodSize + β32BodMtgs + 
 Β33Execomp + β34FirmAge + β35FirmSize + ε 
Where a1 to a5 = the intercept of the model, BodInd = board independence, 
AuditCommInd = audit committee independence, BodSize = board size, BodMgts 
= number of board meetings, Execomp = executive compensation, FirmSize = 
firm size, and FirmAge = firm age; β1 to β35 are the beta coefficients of the 
regression model; ROA and ROCE are the return on assets and return on capital 
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employed respectively; Tobin’s Q is ratio of the firm’s market value to the value 
of the replacement cost of its assets; and ε is the random error in the model. 
Threats to Validity 
 The research project must be logical, accurate, and credible to be useful to those 
interested in answers to the research questions. The conclusion arrived at by the 
researcher must be logically derived from the data, and the result should be 
generalizable beyond the specific situations and conditions of the research. 
Internal validity is the degree to which accurate results can be drawn on the 
relationship between the variables, while external validity is the extent to which 
the result can be generalized to other populations, geographic areas, or situations 
(Leedy & Ormrod, 2010). 
External Validity 
 The identified threat to external validity in this research is an unrepresentative 
sample. To ensure that the research is generalizable, I took precautions to describe 
the basis of the convenience sample I drew, and why some firms were removed 
from the sample. The sampling strategy was based on convenience sampling, and 
it involved including all the nonfinancial firms listed on the NSE that met the 
predetermined criteria, such as availability of data, number of years since listed, 
and market capitalization. All the companies that met the criteria of inclusion 
were included in the study. 
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Internal Validity 
 To prevent threats to internal validity in this research study, I took precaution to 
eliminate all other possible explanations for the relationships that I examined. The 
secondary data was collected from two sources. In the first case, data were 
collected from published financial statements where information on corporate 
governance and financial performance was obtained from the websites of the 
firms. The same data was verified with the data available on the website of the 
NSE. I paid particular attention to the computation of ratios, indexes, and 
averages. I ensured there were no errors in aggregating the data of the sampled 
firms over the 5-year period the study covered. To prevent errors of coding, I did 
the coding personally and meticulously. I also handled every aspect of the data 
analysis personally. In interpreting the result of my findings, I took account of all 
the factors that may affect the internal validity of the result and I was careful not 
to make exaggerated claims. 
Construct Validity 
 According to Donovan and Hoover (2014), construct validity is probably the most 
important way to consider the issue of validity in research. Construct validity is 
the extent to which the variables measure what they are supposed to measure. The 
measure must be logically compatible and in agreement with the underlying 
concept. In this research study, the constructs measured were the independence of 
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the board, the independence of the audit committee, executive compensation, 
number of board meetings, and the size of the board. I also examined the 
mediating role of firm size and age on the relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms and organizational performance. This study relied on 
secondary data, and the data sheets were the instruments that reflected the values 
of the variables measured. I constructed indices and ratios as needed, being 
careful to ensure that the ratios and indices were accurate. According to Donovan 
and Hoover, construct validity is probably the most important way to consider the 
issue of validity in research. Construct validity is the extent to which the variables 
measure what they are supposed to measure. The measure must be logically 
compatible and in agreement with the underlying concept. In this research study, 
the constructs measured were the independence of the board, the independence of 
the audit committee, executive compensation, number of board meetings, and the 
size of the board. I also examined the mediating role of firm size and age on the 
relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and organizational 
performance. This study relied on secondary data, and the data sheets were the 
instruments that reflected the values of the variables measured. I constructed 
indices and ratios as needed, being careful to ensure that the ratios and indices 
were accurate. 
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Ethical Procedures 
 The following ethical procedures were adopted in this dissertation study: 
 Protection from harm. Secondary data was used throughout this study. No 
human intervention was involved. Collection of secondary data would have 
necessitated a more stringent measure on how to protect human subject. The most 
vulnerable of the human subjects were children, drug addicts, prisoners, people 
with mental health, pregnant woment, the elderly, the disabled, and many others. 
 Informed consent. The data used for construction of the indices was obtained 
from publicly available documents. There was no need for informed consent. An 
informed consent would be necessary if primary data were collected. In a survey 
or questionnaire, participants’ consents must be obtained. Participants must also 
be told that thgey are free to withdraw from the survey or participation in the 
questionnaire at any time and stage they desire. 
Right to privacy. I ensured that the raw data were kept in a fire-proofed, locked drawer, 
and the information processed on SPSS is password-protected on the computer 
and external disks and flash drives. No information will be released to any person, 
and the sampled firms will not be identified by name. The data will be retained for 
a minimum of 5 years. 
Institutional Review Board (IRB). I collected data for this dissertation research study 
after I received the approval from IRB. The IRB ensured that I fulfilled all 
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conditions precedent to collecting the data before I was given the permission to 
proceed. IRB did this to protect the integrity of my research.  
Hypothesis Formulation 
To answer the questions concerning the primary focus of this study, that is, whether there 
is a linear relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and the three 
dependent variables comprising ROA, ROCE, and Tobin’s Q, I conducted many 
statistical tests. The statistical tests were to examine whether there were linear 
relationships between the outcome and predictor variables, and the statistical 
significance or strength of the relationships, measured by the beta coefficients of 
the independent variables. The hypotheses were as follows: 
Null Hypothesis 1, H01: β1 = β2= β3 = β4 = β5 = β6 = β7 = 0 
Alternative Hypothesis 1, H1: β1 ≠ β2≠ β3 ≠ β4 ≠ β5 ≠ β6 ≠ β7 ≠ 0 
Null Hypothesis 2, H02: β8 = β9= β10 = β11 = β12 = β13 = β14 = 0 
Alternative Hypothesis 2, H2: β8 ≠ β9 ≠ β10 ≠ β11 ≠ β12 ≠ β13 ≠ β14 ≠ 0 
Null Hypothesis 3, H03: β15 = β16= β17 = β18 = β19 = β20 = β21 = 0 
Alternative Hypothesis 3, H3: β15 ≠ β16 ≠ β17 ≠ β18 ≠ β19 ≠ β20 ≠ β21 ≠ 0 
Null Hypothesis 4, H04: β22 = β23= 24 = β25 = β26 = β27 = β28 = 0 
Alternative Hypothesis 4, H4: β22 ≠ β23 ≠ β24 ≠ β25 ≠ β26 ≠ β27≠ β28 ≠ 0 
Null Hypothesis 5, H05: β29 = β30= β31 = β32 = β33 = β34 = β35 = 0 
Alternative Hypothesis 5, H5: β29 ≠ β30 ≠ β31 ≠ β32 ≠ β33 ≠ β34≠ β35 ≠ 0 
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Null Hypothesis 6, H06: β36 = β37 = β38 = β39 = β40 = β41 = β42 = 0 
Alternative Hypothesis 6, H6: β36 ≠ β37 ≠ β38 ≠ β39 ≠ β40 ≠ β41≠ β42 ≠ 0 
Null Hypothesis 7, H07: β43 = β44 = β45 = β46 = β47 = β48 = β49 = 0 
Alternative Hypothesis 7, H7: β43 ≠ β44 ≠ β45 ≠ β46 ≠ β47 ≠ β48≠ β49 ≠ 0 
Null Hypothesis 8, H08: β50 = β51 = β52 = β53 = β54 = β55 = β56 = 0 
Alternative Hypothesis 8, H8: β50 ≠ β51 ≠ β52 ≠ β53 ≠ β54 ≠ β55≠ β56 ≠ 0 
A linear relationship exists between an independent and a dependent variable if the null 
hypothesis is not correct. In other words, a linear relationship does not exist 
between the outcome and the predictor variables if the null hypothesis, H0, is 
correct. If the null hypothesis is rejected, it follows that the alternative hypothesis, 
H1, should be accepted, meaning that a linear relationship exists between the 
variables of interest. According to Field (2013), the assumption is that if the null 
hypothesis is true, there is no effect. One of the best ways to establish whether or 
not a linear relationship exists between the independent and dependent variable is 
by generating a scatterplot, and physically examining whether the data points fall 
on a straight line, even before running the analysis and testing for significance of 
the relationship within the confidence interval initially assumed. 
The Null Hypothesis Statistical Testing (NHST) fits the model to the data and then tests 
the probability that there are no effects (Field, 2013, p.62). Once a linear 
relationship between the independent and the dependent variables has been 
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established, further tests will be conducted to determine the beta coefficients (β, 
μ, λ, η, σ, δ, and π), and evaluate which of them are not equal to zero. I carried out 
several statistical tests to determine the extent to which the variations in the 
outcome variables were explained by the independent and mediating variables. A 
stepwise regression model was used, where independent variables that do not 
have explanatory power were dropped from the model in subsequent analyzes in 
SPSS. 
I have set the significance level at 5% in this study. This means that I will reject the null 
hypothesis if the computed p-value is less than .05 (Field, 2013). In other words, 
the probability of committing a Type 1 error is 5% (Hill & Lewicki, 2006). By 
rejecting the null hypothesis, H0, I will be supporting what I actually believe is the 
real-world situation, which is called a reject-support testing in many fields of 
research (Hill & Lewicki, 2006, p. 408). To determine the strength of the 
relationship between the variables, I ran multiple regression procedures on SPSS, 
where the unadjusted and the adjusted R2 were displayed in the SPSS output. 
While there are no benchmarks against which an effect size would be interpreted, 
Vacha-Haase and Thompson (2004) stated that effect sizes should be interpreted 
in the light of the relationship being studied and by comparing the effect sizes in 
related prior studies rather than a rigid adherence to Cohen’s benchmarks of 
small, medium, and large effect sizes. Cohen’s benchmarks may be more 
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appropriate in new and important studies where there is little or no prior literature 
(Vacha-Haase & Thompson, 2004, p.478). 
Summary 
Chapter 3 outlined the research method used to examine the relationship 
between corporate governance mechanisms and organizational performance in the 
39 sampled nonfinancial companies listed on the NSE. The research design was 
quantitative, using multiple regression analysis to examine the relationship 
between the variables. SPSS software was used to analyze the data. The 
overarching research objective was to determine whether there was a statistically 
significant association between corporate governance mechanisms and 
organizational financial performance. Corporate governance mechanisms used in 
the study were board independence, audit committee independence, board size, 
number of board meetings, and executive compensation. Financial performance 
was measured by ROA, ROCE, and Tobin’s Q. The mediating variables were 
firm size and firm age.  
In chapter 4, I presented the result of my findings. First, I presented the 
descriptive statistical analysis of the sampled firms using mean, median, mode, 
range, and standard deviation. Secondly, I presented detailed statistical descriptive 
analysis of the sampled companies by subsectors. Next, I presented inferential 
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statistical analysis of the sampled companies and the result of the null hypothesis 
statistical testing. Finally, I summarized the results of my findings. 
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Chapter 4: Results  
Introduction 
 In this chapter of the dissertation study, I presented the research 
findings. Descriptive and inferential statistics techniques were used to analyze the 
data. Descriptive statistics were used to simplify, organize, summarize, and group 
together the numerical data of all the sampled companies. The descriptive 
statistics I used included measures of central tendency, comprising the mean, 
median, sum, and mode of the distribution. To have an idea of how the data were 
spread out or clustered, I used the measure of dispersion provided by the SPSS, 
including the range, standard deviation, variance, minimum, and maximum. I 
used inferential statistics, including ANOVA and NHST, to generalize about the 
relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and organizational 
performance in nonfinancial firms quoted on the NSE. In Chapter 5, which is the 
last chapter of the study, I will examine a correlation matrix of the predictor 
variables and the presence of any multicollinearity and unusual cases problems. I 
will also summarize my findings and make recommendations on how corporate 
governance practices could be strengthened in Nigerian companies. 
 In this study, the 39 sampled companies were distributed across 
various market subsectors as follows: agriculture (5.13%), conglomerates 
(7.69%), consumer goods (30.78%), construction/real estate (5.13%), healthcare 
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(7.69%), information and communication technology (2.56%), industrial goods 
(12.82%), natural resources (2.56%), oil and gas (7.69%), and services (17.95%). 
The data for the study were collected for a span of 5 years, from January 1, 2011 
to December 31, 2015, and covered 39 of the 116 nonfinancial companies listed 
on the NSE that met the study’s specified criteria. The data were retrieved from 
the websites of the NSE, Nigerian SEC, and the sampled companies’ 
websites.The search sources, keywords used in the study, and the processes 
adopted for the search are fully explained in Appendix A to this study. Also, the 
search sources included peer-reviewed journals that were retrieved from academic 
research database systems. The scoring methodology is listed in Appendix B. In 
Appendix C, I listed the 39 firms that were sampled for this dissertation study.  
 This chapter of the study is divided into seven sections. In the first 
section, I  focused on descriptive analysis of the 39 sampled firms. In the second 
section, I  presented how I used inferential statistical analysis methods to examine 
the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and ROA. The third 
section of the study  focused on inferential statistical analysis between corporate 
governance mechanisms and ROCE, while in the fourth section I will presented 
inferential statistical analysis between corporate governance mechanisms and 
Tobin’s Q. The fifth section contained the results of my inferential statistical 
analysis that examined whether the age and size of the firms mediates the 
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relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and organizational 
financial performance. In the sixth section, I will presented the result of my 
examination of correlation matrix and multicollinearity and other problems of the 
independent corporate governance variables. In the seventh and last section, I 
presented the conclusion of the chapter.  
Descriptive Statistical Analysis of the Sampled Firms by Variables 
 In the first section of this chapter, I presented the descriptive 
statistics of all the sampled companies using the mean, median, mode, range, and 
standard deviation of ROA, ROCE, and Tobin’s Q in all the 10 subsectors of the 
39 sampled nonfinancial firms quoted on the NSE between 2011 and 2015. The 
descriptive statistics also covered the five corporate governance variables, 
including board independence, audit committee independence, board size, number 
of board meetings, and executive compensation as well as the two mediating 
variables of age and size of the firm.  
 The largest firm in the sample in terms of market capitalization, 
using the average rate of foreign exchange during the 5 years from 2011 to 2015 
of 158 naira to one U.S. dollar, had a mean market value of $6.7 billion. The 
smallest firm in the sample had an average market capitalization of $2.3 million. 
The average market capitalization of all the 39 sampled firms between 2011 and 
2015 was $521 million, with a median of $78 million and standard deviation of 
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$1.3 billion. The average capitalization of all firms in the sample in 2011, 2012, 
2013, 2014, and 2015 was $348 million, $511 million, $691 million, $598 
million, and $458 million respectively.  
Return on Assets (ROA) 
 In 2011, the mean ROA for all the 39 sampled firms was 16%, the 
highest was 47%, and the lowest was 2%. The median ROA for 2011 was 12% 
and the standard deviation was 11%. In 2012, the average ROA was 17% for all 
the 39 sampled firms, the highest was 60% and the lowest 3%. The median ROA 
in 2012 was 11% and standard deviation was 12%. The average ROA in 2013 was 
17% for all the sampled companies while the median was 13% with a standard 
deviation of 12%. The highest and lowest ROA in 2013 were 71% and 6% 
respectively. In 2014, the mean return on assets for all the sampled firms was 
15%, with a median of 13% and a standard deviation of 13%. The highest ROA 
for 2014 was 82% and the lowest was 6%. In 2015, the mean return on assets was 
15% for all the sampled companies, the highest being 78% and the lowest 1%. In 
2015, the median ROA for all the sampled corporations was 12%, and the 
standard deviation was 12%. 
Return on Capital Employed (ROCE) 
 The mean ROCE for all the 39 sampled firms was 37% in 2011, 
37% in 2012, 35% in 2013, 34% in 2014, and 36% in 2015. For the 5 years 
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covered by this study, the mean ROCE was 36%, the median was 24%, and the 
standard deviation 32%. The highest ROCE among the 39 sampled firms in 2011 
was 123%, the lowest was 3%, and the median and standard deviation were 26% 
and 29% respectively. In 2012, the highest ROCE was 155% and the lowest was 
8%. The median return on capital employed was 21% and the standard deviation 
was 32%. The highest and lowest ROCE in 2013 were 171% and 10% 
respectively, the median was 22% and the standard deviation was 33%. In 2014, 
the mean return on assets was 34%, the median was 24%, and the standard 
deviation was 32%. In 2015, the highest ROCE was 230% and the lowest was 
3%, with a median of 24% and standard deviation of 32%. 
Tobin’s Q 
 The mean Tobin’s Q for all the 39 sampled firms between 2011 
and 2015 was 1.65, while in 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015 the average 
Tobin’s Q was 1.51, 1.68, 2.07, 1.76, and 1.23 respectively. The median Tobin’s 
Q between 2011 and 2015 for all the 39 sampled firms was 1.04 and the standard 
deviation was 1.72. The highest Tobin’s Q in 2011 was 12.13 and the lowest -.24, 
with median of 1.02 and standard deviation of 2.07. In 2012, the highest Tobin’s 
Q was 5.42 and the lowest -.74; the median was .89 and the standard deviation 
was 1.82. In 2014 and 2015, the mean Tobin’s Q was 1.76 and 1.23 respectively, 
the highest was 8.12 and 7.8, and the lowest -.28 and -.44 respectively for the 2 
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years. In 2015, the median Tobin’s Q was 1.04 and the standard deviation was 
1.72. 
Board Independence 
 The highest score for board independence was 5, measured on a 5-
point Likert scale where 5 indicates a completely independent board and 1 a 
complete lack of independence. The mean score for board independence for the 5 
years from 2011 to 2015 for all the 39 sampled firms listed on the NSE was 4.97. 
In 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015, the average score of board independence for 
each of these years was 4.97 as well. The highest score in each of the 5 years from 
2011 to 2015 for board independence for the 39 sampled companies was 5 and the 
lowest 4.The median for each of the 5 years was 5, the mode was 5, and the 
standard deviation was also 5.  
Audit Committee Independence 
 The independence of a firm’s audit committee in this study is 
measured on a 5-point Likert scale, where 5 indicates a completely independent 
audit committee and 1 a complete absence of independence. The mean score for 
audit committee independence for all the 39 sampled firms for the 5 years 
between 2011 and 2015 was 4.03. The average score in each of the 5 years was 
also 4.03. The highest score in each of the 5 years was 5 and the lowest score was 
3. The median and mode in all the 5 years was 4 with a standard deviation of .28. 
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Board Size 
 The mean board size in all the 39 sampled corporations listed on 
the NSE between 2011 and 2015 was nine, the median was nine, the mode was 
seven, with a standard deviation of two. In each of the 5 years from 2011 to 2015, 
the average board size was nine in the 39 sampled corporations. The highest board 
size between 2011 and 2015 was 15. The lowest board size in 2011 and 2012 was 
five, and in 2013, 2014, and 2015, it was four. The median board size between 
2011 and 2015 was nine; the mode was nine in 2011 and 2012, seven in 2013, and 
seven and nine in 2014 and 2015 respectively. The standard deviation in the size 
of the board was 2.16 in 2011, 2.35 in 2012, 2.22 in 2013, 2.46 in 2014, and 2.75 
in 2015.  
Number of Board Meetings 
 The mean number of board meetings for the 5 years from 2011 to 
2015 was five, the median was five, and the standard deviation was one. For the 
individual years, all the 39 sampled companies had five board meetings on 
average during 2011 and 2015; a mean of four in 2011 and 2012, and an average 
of five in 2013 and 2015. The mode was four in all the 5 years from 2011 to 2015. 
The highest number of board meetings in 2011 was seven and the lowest two. In 
2012, the highest was number of board meetings was seven in 2012 and the 
lowest was three. In 2013 and 2014, the highest number of board meetings was 
226 
 
 
seven and the lowest was three and four respectively. In 2015, the highest number 
of board meetings in all the 39 sampled firms listed on the NSE was seven and the 
lowest was four. 
Executive Compensation 
 The mean executive compensation in all the 39 sampled firms 
between 2011 and 2015 was $214,378; the median was $144,304; and the mode 
was $31,646 with a standard deviation of $200,583. The mean executive 
compensation in 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015 was $181,110; $195,067; 
$196,527; $265,985; and $233,204 respectively. In 2011, the highest executive 
compensation was $917,722 and the lowest was $31,646. The median executive 
compensation in 2011 was $120,253; the mode was $94,937; with a standard 
deviation of $192,666. The highest executive compensation in 2012 was $886,076 
and the lowest was $31,646. The highest executive compensation in 2013 was 
$917,722; the lowest was $31,646; the median was $126,582; and the mode was 
$31,646 with a standard deviation of $203,947. In 2014 and 2015, the highest 
executive compensation was $949,367 and $974,684 respectively; the median was 
$126,582 in 2014 and $151,899 in 2015; and the mode in 2014 and 2015 was 
$211,519 and $63,291 respectively. The standard deviation of executive 
compensation in the sampled companies in 2014 and 2015 was $319,527 and 
$235,888 respectively. 
227 
 
 
Firm Age 
 The mean age of the 39 sampled firms listed on the NSE between 
2011 and 2015 was 46 years, the median was 48 years, the mode was 54 years 
with a standard deviation of 25 years. In 2011, the mean age of the firms was 44 
years, the median age was 46 years, and the mode was 52 years with a standard 
deviation 25 years. In 2012 and 2013, the mean age of the companies was 45 and 
46 years and the highest age was 133 years and 134 years respectively. The 
lowest firm age in 2012 and 2013 was 7 years and 8 years respectively. In 2014 
and 2015, the average age of the firms was 47 and 48 years and the median was 
49 and 50 years respectively, while the mode was 55 years and 56 years 
respectively, with a standard deviation of 25 years.  
Firm Size 
 The average size of the firms in the 5 years between 2011 and 
2015 was 10 natural logarithms, the mean and mode was 10, and the standard 
deviation was one. The mean size in 2011 was nine natural logarithms and 10 
between 2012 and 2015. The standard deviation in all the 5 years was two, the 
median was nine in 2011 and 10 during 2012 to 2015. The highest and lowest 
sizes of the firms, measured in natural logarithms, in 2011 to 2013 was 12 and six 
respectively. In 2014 and 2015, the highest firm size was 13 and the lowest seven, 
measured in natural logarithms.  
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Descriptive Analysis of the Firms by Sector 
 The 39 sampled companies listed on the NSE were in 10 sectors of 
the economy. Two were in agriculture, three were listed as conglomerates, two 
were in construction and real estate, 12 firms were into the manufacturing of 
consumer goods, three were in healthcare services, one company was in 
information and communications technology, five companies produced industrial 
goods, one produced natural resources, three companies were in the oil and gas 
business, and seven corporations provided various services to their clients. The 
largest subsector was consumer goods with 12 companies, followed by the 
services subsector that had seven companies. The smallest subsectors, that had 
only one company representing the subsector, were information and 
communication technology and natural resource subsectors. 
Agricultural Subsector 
 Two companies were represented in the agricultural subsector out 
of the 39 sampled nonfinancial firms listed on the NSE between 2011 and 2015. 
The companies were grouped into livestock feeds, poultry, and palm oil 
processing and marketing. The larger company in this subsector had a mean 
market value of $173.63 million and the smaller firm had an average market value 
of $25.6 million. The mean market value in this subsector was $99.6 million with 
a standard deviation of $104.70 and a range of $148.03 million. The average ROA 
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for this subsector was 15% with a median of 15% and a standard deviation of 2%. 
The higher ROA was 17% and the smaller ROA was 14% with a range of 3%.  
 The mean ROCE for the agricultural subsector was 33%, with a 
median of 33% and a standard deviation of 18%. The higher ROCE was 46% and 
the smaller was 21%, with a range of 25%. The average Tobin’s Q for this 
subsector was 1.52, the higher Tobin’s Q was 2.22, and the smaller was .81. The 
range of Tobin’s Q for this sub-sector was 1.41 with a standard deviation of 1. 
The average board size for the sub-sector was 9 members. Both companies in this 
subsector had a chairperson different from the CEO, and nonexecutive members 
of the board constituted, on average, 80% of the members in the larger company 
and 71% of the members in the smaller company. The average number of board 
committees in this subsector was three, and these were remuneration, risk and 
governance, and audit committees. The annual report and accounts included 
sections on corporate governance report, statement of directors’ responsibilities, 
report of the directors, and report of the audit committee. The average number of 
statutory audit committee members in this subsector was six; three were 
composed of company executives while the other three were nonexecutive or 
independent directors. 
 The highest paid executive in this subsector received on average 
$97,468 per annum and the least paid received $31,646. The mean total 
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compensation was $64,557 with a standard deviation of $46,544 and a range of 
$65,822. The average age of the firm in the subsector was 36 years with a 
standard deviation of 36 years; the older firm had a mean age of 50 years since 
incorporation and the younger had a mean age of 21 years, with a range of 29 
years. The mean size of firms in this subsector was 9.28, measured with the 
natural logarithm of total assets. The larger firm in the subsector had an average 
size of 10.50, and the smaller firm had a size of 8.06, with a range of 2.44 and a 
standard deviation of 1.73. 
Conglomerates Subsector 
 The conglomerates subsector was represented by three firms. The 
subsector was classified as corporations engaged in various businesses such as 
transportation, consumer goods, industrial machinery and goods, hotels and 
tourism, and manufacturing of consumer staples. The 5-year average market 
capitalization of the companies in the sub-sector was $336 million with standard 
deviation of $271 million. The largest company in this subsector had a mean 
market capitalization of $494 million and the smallest company had an average 
market value of $23.3 million with a range of $470.70 million.  
 The 5-year average ROA for this subsector was 15%, a median of 
14%, with a standard deviation of 8%. The average ROCE for the subsector was 
22% with a median of 22% and a standard deviation of 10%. The 5-year average 
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Tobin’s Q for the subsector was 1.64, the median was 1.65 and the standard 
deviation was 1.3. The largest firm in the subsector had a mean Tobin’s Q of 2.95 
and the smallest a Tobin’s Q of .34, given a range of 2.61. Nonexecutive directors 
in the firms constituted on average 72% of the members of the board of directors. 
The average board size in this subsector was eight directors, and the largest 
company had a mean of nine directors during 2011 to 2015, while the smallest 
had eight as the as the average number of directors during the same period. The 
average number of audit committee members was 6 with a zero standard 
deviation. All the companies in this subsector had on average six members of the 
audit committee, composed of three executive and three nonexecutive directors. 
 The average number of board meetings in this subsector was five 
with a median of four meetings and a standard deviation of 1.6 meetings. The 5-
year average executive compensation was $307,173; the median compensation 
was $202,532 with a standard deviation of $274,862. The highest paid executive 
received on average $618,987 and the lowest received $100,000 with a range of 
$518,987.The average age of the firms in the sub-sector was 73 years. The highest 
age of the oldest firm since incorporation was 134 years and the average age of 
the youngest firm was 9 years old since incorporation. The median age was 73 
years and the standard deviation was 76 years. The average firm size in the 
subsector, measured by the natural logarithm of total assets, was 9.93 with a 
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median age of 9.83 natural logarithms and a standard deviation of .17 natural 
logarithms. 
Construction/Real Estate Subsector 
 The construction/real estate subsector was represented by two 
companies. The subsector had a 5-year average market value of $268.76 million 
with a standard deviation of $185.13 million. The larger firm in this subsector had 
an average market value of $399.69 million and the smaller firm had a mean 
market value of $137.85 million, giving a range of $261.84 million. The mean 
ROA for this subsector was 7%; the median ROA was 7% with a standard 
deviation of 3%. The company with the higher ROA had 9% and the smaller 
company had 5% with a standard deviation of 3%. The 5-year averageROCE was 
58%, the median ROCE was 58% with a standard deviation of 69%. The firm 
with the higher average ROCE had 107% and the one with the lower average 
ROCE had 9%, giving a range of 98%. The mean Tobin’s Q for this sub-sector 
was .46, the median Tobin’s Q was .46, and the standard deviation was .22. The 
company with the higher average Tobin’s Q had .61 and the firm with lower 
average Tobin’s Q had .30.  
 The average size of the board in the subsector was nine members 
with a standard deviation of two members. The larger board had on average 10 
members and the smaller company had seven members. The average proportion 
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of nonexecutive directors on the board of directors was 72% with a standard 
deviation of 1%. The company with the higher proportion of nonexecutives 
directors on the board had an average of 73% of all directors as nonexecutives and 
the other company had 71% of directors as nonexecutives. The average number of 
audit committee members in the subsector was six; three members are executive 
directors while three are nonexecutive or independent directors. 
 The average number of board meetings in the subsector was 5.3 
meetings in a year with a standard deviation of .99 meetings and a median of 5.3 
meetings. The bigger company had on average six meetings in a year while the 
smaller firm had 4.6 meetings on average. The mean executive compensation in 
this subsector was $241,139 with a standard deviation of $147,687 and a median 
of $241,139. The higher paid executive in this sub-sector received on average 
$345,570 in a year while the lower paid executive received $136,709, giving a 
range of $208,861.The average age of the firm since incorporation in the sub-
sector was 32 years with a standard deviation of 22 years. The older firm had a 
mean age of 47 years and the younger company had a mean age of 16 years, with 
a range of 31 years. In this subsector, the mean size of the firms was 11.69, 
measured in natural logarithm of total assets, with a median of 11.69, and a 
standard deviation of .77. 
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Consumer Goods Subsector 
 Twelve companies represented the consumer goods subsector. The 
firms in this subsector engage in the manufacturing, marketing, and distribution of 
fast moving goods such as toiletries, baby foods, chocolates, full cream milk, 
toothpaste, sugar, and foams and mattresses. Others engage in beer and cold 
beverage production, flour, pasta, and cornflakes. The subsector is not the only 
the largest in terms of the number of the companies, it also represented the most 
profitable sector amongst the sampled sectors. The 5-year mean market value of 
this sub-sector was $1.43 billion; the median market value was $673.14 million 
with a standard deviation of $2.045 billion. The mean ROA for the sub-sector was 
19%; the median ROA was 19% with the standard deviation of 10%. The 
company with the highest ROA had 35% and the firm with the smallest ROA 
recorded 9%. The range of ROA in the subsector was 26%. The 5-year average 
return on capital employed (ROCE) was 42%, the median ROA was 35% with a 
standard deviation of 24%. The company with the highest ROCE posted 94% on 
average while the company with the smallest ROCE recorded 16% on average. 
The range of ROCE in the subsector was 78%.  
 The 5-year mean Tobin’s Q for the sub-sector was 2.57 with a 
median of 2.58 and a standard deviation of 1.85. The firm with the highest 
average Tobin’s Q had 6.85 and the one with the lowest had .74, giving a range of 
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6.11. The average size of the board in this sub-sector was 10 members with a 
standard deviation of two members. The company with the largest board had 14 
members on average and the one with the smallest had seven members, giving a 
range of seven members. In this subsector, the proportion of nonexecutive 
directors on the board of directors was on average 69%, with a standard deviation 
of 12%. This means that over two-third of the members of the board of directors 
were nonexecutives. The company with the highest proportion of non-executive 
directors to the total number of directors had 90% of the members as non-
executive directors, while the one with the smallest proportion of nonexecutive 
directors had equal number of executive and nonexecutive directors, giving a 
range of 40%.  
 The average number of audit committee members in this sector 
was 5.87 members with a standard deviation of .30. The firm with the highest 
number of members had six and the one with the lowest number of members had 
on average 5.6; the range was .4. The 5-year mean number of meetings was 4.8 
meetings in a year with a median of 4.8 meetings and a standard deviation of .77. 
The firm that held the highest number of meetings in a year on average had six 
meetings and the company with the lowest number of meetings held four 
meetings on average. The average executive compensation in the 5-year period 
was $322,046; the median executive compensation was $268,354 with a standard 
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deviation of $269,729. The company with the highest paid executive paid 
$929,114 on average and the firm with the lowest paid executive paid on average 
$31,646. The mean age of the firm in this subsector was 49 years with a standard 
deviation of 20 years. The oldest company had a mean age of 63 years since 
incorporation and the youngest firm had a mean age of 8 years, with a range of 55 
years. The 5-year mean firm size, measured with the natural logarithm of total 
assets was 10.78 and the median size was 10.85 with a standard deviation of 1.33. 
The biggest firm in terms of total assets in natural logarithms had 12.54 and the 
smallest firm had 7.91, with a range of 4.63. 
Healthcare Subsector  
 Three firms represented the healthcare sector among the 39 
sampled companies listed on the NSE between 2011 and 2015. The corporations 
are in the business of manufacturing prescription and over-the-counter drugs, 
health drinks, oral hygiene products, intravenous fluids, and table water. The 5-
year mean market value of the sub-sector was $110.55 million with a standard 
deviation of $165.29 million. The biggest firm in the subsector had a mean market 
value of $301.36 million and the smallest company had a mean market 
capitalization of $11.28 million, giving a range of $290.08 million. The 5-year 
mean return on assets (ROA) for the sector was 14% with a standard deviation of 
4% and a median ROA of 14%. The company with the highest mean ROA had 
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18% and the firm while the smallest had average ROA of 10%, with a range of 
8%. The average ROCE for this subsector was 26% with a standard deviation of 
23%. The firm with the highest ROCE had 38% on average and the company with 
the smallest ROCE had 16%, making the range 22%.  
 The 5-year average Tobin’s Q for the sub-sector was 1.06, the 
median was .54 with a standard deviation was 1.06. The company with the highest 
average ROCE had 2.28 and the firm with the average lowest ROCE had .35, 
giving a range of 1.93. The average board size in this subsector was nine  
members, with a standard deviation of one. The highest average board size was 
9.8 and the lowest average board size was 8.60 with a range of 1.20. The 5-year 
average of the proportion of nonexecutive directors to the total board size was 
64% with a standard deviation of 13%. The highest proportion of non-executive 
directors to the total board size was 80% and the smallest proportion was 56% 
with a range of 24%.  
 The 5-year average number of members of the audit committee 
was six with a standard deviation of zero. The largest and smallest number of 
audit committee was six during 2011 to 2015. Executive directors constituted 
50% of the member while nonexecutive and independent directors constituted the 
other half. Different individuals served as chair of the board and company CEO 
during the period; there was a complete absence of CEO duality in the subsector. 
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The average number of meetings held in a year was 4.8 meetings, with a median 
of 4.2 and standard deviation of 1.22. The company with the highest average 
number of meetings held six meetings in a year and the company with the 
smallest number of meetings held four meetings, giving a range of two meetings. 
The highest paid executive in this subsector received on average a compensation 
of $230,380, with the median compensation being $221,519 with a standard 
deviation $15,347. The company with the highest paid executive paid $248,101 
and the least paid executive received $221,519, giving a range $26,582. The mean 
age of the firms in this subsector was 44 years; the median age was 47 years with 
a standard deviation was 27 years. The average age of the oldest firm in the 
subsector was 69 years and the average age of the youngest was 15 years old, 
giving a range of 54 years. The 5-year average firm size, measured in natural 
logarithms of total assets, was 9.51 with a standard deviation of .56. The biggest 
firm size had a total of 10.10 in natural logarithms of total assets and the smallest 
had 8.98 with a range of 1.12. 
Information and Communications Technology Subsector 
 This subsector was represented by only one company. The 
company offers alternative payment channels, mobile banking applications, 
international money transfer, and telephone billing and collection services. The 
average market capitalization for this company and the sector it represented was 
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$88.78 million with a standard deviation of $28.35 million. The highest market 
value in the five years from 2011 to 2015 was $131.32 million and the lowest was 
$61.67 million, giving a range of $69.65 million. The mean ROA for the five 
years was 10% with a standard deviation of 17%. The highest ROA was 18% and 
the lowest was 5% with a range of 13%. The average ROCE was 19% with a 
standard deviation of 12%. The highest ROCE in the period was 31% and the 
lowest was 3% with a range of 28%. The 5-year mean for Tobin’s Q was 3.81 
with a standard deviation of 4.76. The highest Tobin’s Q for this subsector was 
12.13 and the lowest was .11 with a range of 11.92.  
 The average board size for this sector was seven members with a 
standard deviation of two members. The highest number of the members of the 
board during the period was nine and the lowest was five, giving a range of four 
members. In this sector, nonexecutive directors constituted 77% of the members 
of the board on a 5-year average; the highest percentage of non-executive 
directors to the total board size during the period was 86% and the lowest was 
67%, giving a range of 19%. There was no CEO duality in this sector, as different 
individuals served as chair of the board and the company’s CEO. The average size 
of the audit committee was six members with a standard deviation of .89. The 
highest average number of audit committee members during the period was six 
and the lowest was four members with a range of two members. During the 
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period, the average number of board meetings held in the firm was five with a 
standard deviation of .84. The highest number of meetings was six and the lowest 
four. 
 The highest paid director in this subsector earned an average 
compensation of $126,582. The highest and lowest compensation paid was 
$126,582. The average age of the firm in the subsector was 10 years with a 
standard deviation of 2 years. The highest number of years since incorporation 
was 12 years and the lowest 8 years. The mean firm size, measured in the natural 
logarithm of total assets was 8.62 with a standard deviation of 1.11. The largest 
size was 10.41 and smallest size was 7.39. 
Industrial Goods Subsector 
 The industrial goods subsector was represented by five companies 
and it the third largest sub-sector in the 10 subsectors of the 39 sampled 
nonfinancial firms listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange between 2011 and 2015. 
The companies are into the manufacturing of aluminum doors and windows; 
industrial, household, and marine paints and coatings; industrial packaging; and 
other materials. The average market value for the subsector was $34.19 million 
with a standard deviation of $60.65 million. The largest company in the sub-
sector had an average market capitalization of $142.37 million and the smallest 
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company had a mean market value of $2.34 million, giving a range of $140.03 
million.  
 The 5-year average ROA for this subsector was 21% with a 
median ROA of 9% and a standard deviation of 27%. The highest average ROA 
was 68% and the smallest was 4%, giving a range of 64%. The mean ROCE for 
the sub-sector was 48% with a standard deviation of 78% and a median of 18%. 
The highest average ROCE was 169% and the lowest was 10%, giving a range of 
159%. The 5-year average Tobin’s Q for this subsector was 2.06 with a standard 
deviation of 2.99 and a mean of .78. The highest average Tobin’s Q was 7.37 and 
the smallest was .6 with a range of 6.77.  
 The 5-year average board size was seven with a standard deviation 
of two. The company with the largest average board size had 10 members and the 
smallest had five members. All the companies had the positions of the chair of the 
board and CEO held by different directors, meaning that there was absence of 
CEO duality in all the firms. Non-executive directors constituted on average 75% 
of the total number of board members with a standard deviation of 145. The 
highest proportion of non-executive directors was 85% and the lowest was 55%. 
The average number of audit committee members was 6 with a standard deviation 
of .27. The members were equally divided among the executive and non-
executive directors. The highest and lowest number of audit committee members 
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was 6. The average number of board meetings held in the subsector was six with a 
standard deviation of 1.51. The highest number of meetings held was seven and 
the lowest was three, giving a range of four meetings. 
 The 5-year average executive compensation for the subsector was 
$59,494 with a standard deviation of $15,163. The highest paid executive in this 
subsector received $83,544 and the lowest paid executive received $51,899, 
giving a range of $31,645. The average age of the firms in this sub-sector was 63 
years with a standard deviation of 12 years. The oldest firm was 80 years old 
since incorporation and the youngest firm was 54 years old, with a range of 26 
years. The average size of the companies in this sub-sector, measured by the 
natural logarithm of total assets, was 8.02 with a standard deviation of .94 and a 
median of 8.20. The largest firm had a total of 9.07 on average while the smallest 
firm had a total of 6.05 on average with a range of 3.02, measured in natural 
logarithms of total assets. 
Natural Resources Subsector 
 The natural resources subsector was represented by only one 
company. The firm manufactures industrial gases, gas mixtures, and liquefied 
petroleum gas. The 5-year average market value for this sector was $15.74 million 
with a standard deviation of $3.24 million. The highest market value was $17.55 
million and the lowest was $9.99 million with a range of $7.56 million. The 
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average ROA was 21% with a standard deviation of 8%. The highest ROA was 
32% and the lowest was 13%, with a range of 19%. The average ROCE was 34% 
with a standard deviation of 14%. The highest ROCE was 54% and the lowest 
was 19%. The 5-year average Tobin’s Q was .81 with a standard deviation of .31. 
The highest Tobin’s Q was 1.25 and the lowest was .48.  
 The average board size for this subsector was six members with a 
standard deviation of zero; the size of the board was maintained at six members 
throughout 2011 to 2015. The chairperson of the board was different from the 
CEO, indicating absence of CEO duality in the subsector. More than two thirds of 
the board was composed of nonexecutive directors; and this proportion was 
maintained throughout 2011 and 2015. The average number of the members of 
the audit committee was four between 2011 and 2015 with a standard deviation of 
zero; half of the members of the committee were composed of executive directors 
and the other half were made up of nonexecutive or independent directors.  
 The average number of board meetings held in the subsector was 
five with a standard deviation of one; the highest number of meetings was six and 
the lowest four. The 5-year average executive compensation was $206,329 with a 
standard deviation of $97.497. The highest executive pay was $215,190 and the 
lowest was $126,582 with a range of $88,608. The average age of the firm was 54 
years with a standard deviation of 2 years. The average firm size, measured in the 
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natural logarithm of total assets, was 7.95 with a standard deviation of .17. The 
largest average size was 8.14 and the smallest average size was 7.71; making the 
range .43. 
Oil and Gas subsector 
 The oil and gas sub-sector was represented by three companies. 
Two of the companies are in downstream oil sector where they engage in the 
marketing and sale of premium motor spirits and vehicle lubricants. The other 
company combines downstream operations with the manufacture and sale of 
lubricants and upstream activities. The 5-year average market value for the sub-
sector was $154.42 million with a standard deviation of $164.45 million. The 
largest company in this sector had an average market capitalization of $142.37 
million and the smallest had an average market capitalization of $42.46 million 
with a range of $99.91 million. The average ROA was 10% with a standard 
deviation of 4%. The company with the highest average ROA had a return on 
assets of 14% and the company with the smallest ROA had 6%; giving a range of 
8%. The 5-year average ROCE was 43% with a standard deviation of 37%. The 
largest average ROCE was 85% and the smallest was 20% giving a range of 60%.  
 The 5-year average Tobin’s Q for this subsector was .94 with a 
standard deviation of .53. The highest average Tobin’s Q was 1.26 and the 
smallest was .33 with a range of .93. The average board size for the sector was 
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seven directors with a standard deviation of three directors. The highest average 
board size was 10 directors and the smallest was three directors with a range of 
five directors. Seventy-seven percent of the total number of directors in this 
subsector was composed of non-executive directors with a standard deviation of 
.05. The highest proportion of nonexecutive directors to the total board size was 
80% and the smallest was 71% with a range of 9%. None of the companies in this 
sub-sector had a chairperson who was also the CEO: There was an absence of 
CEO duality in the subsector.  
 The average number of audit committee members in the subsector 
was five with a standard deviation of .92. The highest average number of audit 
committee members was six and the smallest was four with a range of 2.The 5-
year average number of board meetings was four with a standard deviation of .42. 
The highest average number of meetings was five and the smallest was four. The 
5-year average executive compensation in the sub-sector was $186,076 with a 
standard deviation of $197,468. The highest paid executive received on average 
$325,316 and the least paid received $35,443. The average firm age was 42 years 
with a standard deviation of 17 years. The oldest firm was on average 57 years 
and the youngest was 24 years with a range of 33 years. The average size of the 
firms, measured with the natural logarithm of total assets was 10.61 with a 
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standard deviation of .97. The largest firm had a size of 11.26 and the smallest 
had a size of 9.5 with a range of 1.76. 
The Services Subsector 
 The services subsector was represented by seven firms and it was 
the second largest sector among the 10 sectors of the 39 sampled nonfinancial 
companies listed on the NSE. The firms in this sector represented businesses in 
airline services and logistics, vehicle and heavy equipment leasing, hotel and 
tourism services, courier and mail delivery services, and aviation logistics 
provision. Others are in the business of large format printing and advertisement 
services. The 5-year average market value in this sector was $54.51 million with a 
standard deviation of $84.89 million. The largest firm had a mean market 
capitalization of $242.21 million and the smallest company had an average market 
capitalization of $5.38 million with a range of $236.83 million. 
 The average ROA for this sub-sector was 12% with a standard 
deviation of 4% and a median of 11%. The firm with the highest average ROA 
had 19% and the company with the smallest ROA had 6% with a range of 13%. 
The average ROCE was 21% with a standard deviation of 7% and a median of 
20%. The highest average ROCE was 33% and the smallest ROCE was 13%, 
giving a range of 20%. The 5-year mean Tobin’s Q for the subsector was .53 with 
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a standard deviation of .46. The firm with the average highest Tobin’s Q had 1.04 
and the smallest was .35, giving a range of .69. The median Tobin’s Q was .53. 
 The average size of the board of directors in this subsector was 
nine with a standard deviation of two. The biggest size was 12 members of the 
board on average and the smallest size was six members, giving a range of six 
members. All the firms in this subsector had separate chair of the board and CEO. 
On average, 80% of the members of the board were composed of nonexecutive 
directors with a standard deviation of .07. The highest proportion of nonexecutive 
directors to the total board size averaged .89 and the lowest was .71, giving a 
range of .18.  
 The average number of audit committee members was six with a 
standard deviation of .76. The highest number of audit committee was six and the 
smallest was four with a range of two. The audit committee was composed of 
equal number of executive and nonexecutive directors. The average number of 
board meetings was five with a standard deviation of four. The highest number of 
board meetings held was  five and the smallest was four with a range of one. The 
average executive compensation for the subsector was $152,260 with a standard 
deviation of $154,672 and a median of $69,620. The highest paid executive in the 
subsector received $462,025 on average and the least paid executive received 
average compensation of $31,646 with a range of $430,379. The average age of 
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the firms in this subsector was 29 years with a standard deviation of 10.46 years 
and a median of 29 years. The oldest firm was 48 years old and the youngest was 
aged 17 years, giving a range of 31 years. The average firm size, measured as the 
natural logarithm of total assets, was 8.64 with a standard deviation of .93 and a 
median of 8.83. The biggest firm had a size of 9.83 and the smallest had 7.27, 
measured in natural logarithm of total assets, with a range of 2.56. 
In Table 1, I summarized the descriptive statistics of the sampled sub-
sectors and their performance. The performance indicators were the average 
ROA, average ROCE, and average Tobin’s Q values. The performances of firms 
in the sub-sectors were classified as followed: For ROA, 15% was classified as 
below average performance, 15% to 20% was classified as average, and above 
20% was classified as above average. For ROCE, below 20% was classified as 
below average performance, 20% to 25% was classified as average performance, 
and above 25% was classified as above average performance. Tobin’s Q below 1 
was classified as below average performance, between 1 and 1.50 was classified 
as average performance, and above 1.50 was classified as above average 
performance. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics of Samples Sub-sectors Descriptive Statistics of Samples Sub-
sectors 
Sub-sector  Mean ROA (%) Mean ROCE (%) Mean Tobin’s Q Performance 
Agriculture  15  33  1.52  Above average  
Conglomerates  15  22  1.64  Above average 
Construction    7  58    .46  Below average 
Consumer goods  19  42  2.57  Above average 
Healthcare  14  26  1.06  Above average 
Info. Technology  10  19  3.81  Average 
Industrial goods  21  48  2.06  Above average 
Natural resources  21  34     .81  Average 
Oil and gas  10  43     .94  Average 
Services   12  21     .53  Average 
Note. The higher the ROA, the more efficient is the firm in utilizing its resources and the better its financial performance. 
A higher ROCE means a firm performs better than the one with a lower ROCE, and a Tobin’s Q > 1.00 indicates the 
company has better growth prospects than one with Tobin’s Q ratio < 1.00. 
Info. Technology refers to the information and communications technology subsector and construction refers to the 
companies in the construction/real estate sub-sector. 
During 2011 to 2015, the industrial goods and natural resources subsectors 
had the highest ROA of 21%, followed by the consumer goods subsector with 
average ROA of 19%, and the agriculture and conglomerates sub-sector that had 
an average ROA of 15%. The healthcare sub-sector had an average ROA of 14%, 
followed by the services sub-sector with ROA of 12%, and the information and 
communications technology and oil and gas sub-sectors that had ROA of 10% 
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each. The construction/real estate sub-sector had the smallest ROA of 7%. It is 
clear from the study that the companies with the highest ROA did not necessarily 
have the highest ROCE or highest Tobin’s Q. Return on assets (ROA) indicates a 
high profit margin, efficient and effective use of the corporations’ assets, and 
efficient management of liquidity.  
 The construction/real estate sub-sector had the highest return on 
capital employed (ROCE) of 58% followed by the industrial goods sub-sector that 
had a ROCE of 48%. The oil and gas sub-sector had ROCE of 43% and consumer 
goods sub-sector had a ROCE of 42% followed by the natural resources sub-
sector with ROCE of 34%. The average ROCE of the agriculture sub-sector was 
33%, that of the healthcare sub-sector was 26%, and the conglomerates and 
services sub-sectors had a ROCE of 22% and 21% respectively. The information 
and communications sub-sector had the least ROCE of 19%. Return on capital 
employed indicates how effective a firm is in using its shareholders’ funds and 
long-term debt to make profit. If the corporate governance of a firm is weak, it is 
unlikely that it will be able to borrow at the most advantageous terms and hence 
its cost of funds will be high and profitability lower. 
 The highest Tobin’s Q of 3.81 was had by the company in the 
information and communications technology sub-sector followed by the consumer 
goods subsector with 2.57 and 2.06 for the industrial goods subsector. The 
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conglomerates subsector had a Tobin’s Q of 1.64 while the agricultural and the 
healthcare sub-sector had a Tobin’s Q of 1.52 and 1.06 respectively. The 
companies that had a Tobin’s Q less than one were four in number. The oil and 
gas subsector had a Tobin’s Q of .94  followed by the natural resources sub-sector 
with a Tobin’s Q of .81 and the services subsector had a Tobin’s Q of .53. The 
least average Tobin’s Q of .46 belonged to the construction subsector. A Tobin’s 
Q greater than 1 indicates that the company is overvalued and that it is earning a 
rate that is higher than the replacement cost of its assets. Overvaluation of a 
company’s stock will attract other competitors to the market and reduce the firm’s 
profit and its market value; which will eventually lead to a lower Tobin’s Q. A 
Tobin’s Q ratio less than 1 indicates undervaluation of a company’s stock. An 
undervaluation will attract corporate raiders and other purchasers to the company. 
Increased interest in the company may increase its market value, thereby 
increasing its Tobin’s Q. From the result, it seemed either that many companies 
are overvalued or that the market is not efficient in pricing the stocks. 
 In Table 2, I tabulated the summary descriptive statistics of the 
sampled firms by using the mean, median, mode, and standard deviation of the 
variables. The mean, median, and mode are measures of central tendency, they 
measure the same things, and are thus related; the relationship depends, to some 
extent, on the shape of the frequency distribution. The standard deviation, on the 
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other hand, measures the variability of the data points from the mean by using the 
mean of the distribution as a reference point.  
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics of Organizational Financial Performance and Corporate 
Governance (n=39) 
   Mean  Median  Mode  Standard deviation 
ROA   20.19%  15.40%  n/a  16.03% 
ROCE   35.83%  23.69%  n/a  31.92% 
Tobin’s Q`    8.27    5.24  n/a     8.6 
Board Ind.    4.97    5.00  5.00        .16 
Audit Comm Ind.    4.03     4.00  4.00      .28 
Board Size    9      9  7     2.19 
Number of Meetings   4.86      4.60  4.00        .92 
Executive Comp.  $214,378.45 144,303.80 31,645.47 200,583.25 
Firm age      45.72 years    48                54       25.31 
Firm Size          9.68        9.50  n/a          1.48 
Note: ROA is the return on assets and ROE is the return on capital employed. Audit comm. Ind. Is the score on the 
independence of audit committee and executive comp is the dollar amount of the highest paid executive. The mean 
represents the sum of all the observations divided by the number of observations. The median is the middle score that 
divides the distribution in half while the mode is the score that has the greatest frequency. The standard deviation is a 
measure of the variation of the observations it is an indication of the variability of the sets of scores (Kerlinger & 
Pedhazur, 1973). 
. 
 The mean ROA for the 39 sampled nonfinancial firms listed on the 
NSE between 2011 and 2015 was 20.19% and the median was 15.40%n with a 
standard deviation of 16.03%. There was no mode for this distribution. The mean, 
median, and mode of a perfectly symmetrical distribution are the same. But an 
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imperfect and roughly symmetrical distribution will have the mean and median at 
the center of the distribution in close proximity to each other. A highly skewed 
distribution tends to have different values for the mean, median, and the mode. In 
a positively-skewed distribution, the mode has the smallest value, followed by the 
median, and the mean has the largest value. In a negatively-skewed distribution, 
however, the mean is the smallest, followed by the median, and the mode takes 
the largest value. The ROA in this study is thus positively skewed, with a few 
corporations earning very high returns and many others earning extremely low 
returns. A high ROA is an indication of the efficiency and effectiveness with 
which the firm utilizes its assets, both physical, financial, and human. An 
extremely low ROA in many firms indicates the inefficiency with which assets 
are deployed. It may also be as sign of a conservative investment culture and risk 
taking, where firms prefer to hold on to what is sure and known, with reluctance 
to venture into new and more risky, but much more profitable business. 
 The mean ROA was 35.83%; the median was 23.69% with a 
standard deviation of 31.92%. There was no mode for ROCE. The ROCE is 
positively skewed, with many firms having lower value than the market average. 
A high ROCE indicates that the firm gets a high return on capital it has invested 
into the business while a low return on capital indicates the company is not 
getting enough returns on shareholders’ funds and long-term borrowing. 
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Particularly in Nigeria where the cost of funds exceeds 25% per annum on 
borrowings, a low ROCE indicates inability of the funds to make enough profit to 
cover the cost of borrowing. 
 The mean Tobin’s Q ratio for the 39 sampled firms quoted on the 
NSE was 8.27; the median was 5.24 with a standard deviation of 8.60. There was 
no mode for the Tobin’s Q ratio. The ratio was positively skewed indicating that a 
few firms had high values while many companies had low ratios. A high Tobin’s 
Q indicates that a firm’s stock is overvalued and the company is profitable. High 
profitability would attract other competitors to the business, thus lowering 
average profitability and Tobin’s Q ratio. A low Tobin’s Q ratio indicates that a 
firm is undervalued. Undervaluation would attract corporate raiders and other 
purchasers to the business, thereby improving the fortunes of the business and 
raising its Tobin’s Q. A Tobin’s Q ratio of 1 is a state of equilibrium, indicating 
neither over- nor undervaluation, but market forces may take it above or below 1. 
In a perfectly competitive market, any over- or undervaluation will be eliminated 
quickly by market forces. The Nigerian capital market, it seemed from the result 
of the findings, is not as efficient as it should be as many companies’ Tobin’s Q 
ratio remained below or above 1 for considerable periods of time. 
 The mean market capitalization of equity was $520.98 million and 
the median was $77.58 million with a standard deviation of $1.27 billion. There 
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was no mode for market value. The market value appeared to be positively 
skewed with many firms in the sample having extremely low market values and 
few companies having very large market capitalization. For example, eight firms, 
all in the consumer goods sub-sector had an average market capitalization of $2.1 
billion and the biggest company had a market value of $6.75 billion. Board 
independence had a mean of 4.97, a median of 5, and a mode of 5 with a standard 
deviation of .16. The distribution is almost a perfect normal symmetrical. This is 
because in the Nigerian SEC codes of corporate governance, companies are 
required to separate the positions of the chair from those of the CEO and all the 
39 sampled companies complied with this minimum standard. Audit 
independence also had an almost perfect normal symmetrical distribution with a 
mean of 4.97, median of 5, and a mode of 5 with standard deviation of .16. Again, 
like the board independence where the SEC’s corporate governance codes require 
the separation of CEO from the board’s chair, the Nigeria’s Companies and Allied 
Matter Act, 1990 made mandatory a minimum of six members in the audit 
committee, three executive directors and three non-executive or independent 
directors. 
 The board size had a mean of 8.83, a median of 9.0, and a mode of 
7 with a standard deviation of 7.0. The distribution is positively skewed. The 
number of board meetings had a mean of 4.86, a median of 4.6, and a mode of 
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four with a standard deviation of .92. The distribution was positively skewed with 
few extreme scores to the right. The Nigerian SEC code of corporate governance 
requires a minimum of four board meetings in a year. Most companies complied 
strictly with this minimum standard, sometimes regardless of the firm’s business 
circumstances demanding more or less board meetings. Executive compensation 
had a positive distribution with some extreme scores to the right; the mean was 
$214,378.45, the median was $144,303.80, and the mode was $31,645.47 with a 
standard deviation of $200,583.25. The result for executive compensation 
suggested that some companies paid excessive compensation to their employees 
far above the average in the market, especially among the foreign-owned 
businesses who had to align executive compensation with global standards. 
Compensation in the form of bonuses and stock options are not common in 
Nigeria. The company size had a mean of 9.68 and a median of 9.50; there was no 
mode and the standard deviation was 1.48. The age of firm had a mean of 45.75 
years, a median of 48 years, and a mode of 54 years with a standard deviation of 
25.31 years. The distribution is positively skewed and there were few extreme 
scores to the right. 
 I also used descriptive statistics to summarize the corporate 
governance mechanisms of the 39 sampled non-financial companies listed on the 
NSE between 2011 and 2015. Table 3 tabulated these statistics using frequency 
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distribution to summarize the percentage of firms that exhibited the specified 
corporate governance characteristics selected for the study. 
Table 3 
Frequency distribution Table Showing the Characteristics of Corporate Governance (CG) of Sampled Firms (n=39) 
Corporate Governance (CG)     Percentage (%) of 
Mechanisms       Companies exhibiting  
        Specified Corporate  
         Governance Features 
Board Size ≥ 4       100% 
≥ 50% of the members of the board 
were composed of non-executive directors    100% 
 
Strict compliance with SEC’s code 
of corporate governance practices     92%  
 
Audit committees  ≥ 6 members     79%    
 
At least 50% or more of audit committee 
members were non-executive directors     100% 
 
CEO-Chair separation      100% 
 
Number of board meetings ≥ 4      100% 
 
Executive compensation ≥ $100,000     61.54% 
 
Note. CG means corporate governance, SEC refers to the Nigerian Securities and Exchange Commission, 
CEO refers to the firms’ chief executive officers 
 
 Although section 246 of the Nigerian CAMA, the main company 
legislation in Nigeria, requires a limited liability company to have at least two 
directors, most listed companies invariably have more than two. The size of the 
corporation depends on many factors, such as business conditions, the complexity 
of the firm’s operations, and the firm’s performance. All the sampled companies 
had more than four directors on the board. Another feature of the board that 
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emerged from the study was that non-executive directors constituted more than 
50% of the of the board size. This is largely in compliance with the SEC’s code of 
corporate governance that requires the majority of the board of directors be 
composed of nonexecutive and independent directors. Similarly, almost all the 
sampled firms comply with SEC’s code of corporate governance especially as 
regards board composition, audit committee composition, and absence of CEO 
duality.  
 The 92% compliance with corporate governance principles and 
codes enables the firms to have independent board, independent audit committees, 
regular board meetings, and financial statements that are true and fair and comply 
with IFRS. The compliance has been aided by company legislations in Nigeria, 
the NSE listing requirements, the SEC’s compliance enforcement activities, the 
appointment of internationally-reputed accounting firms as external auditors by 
most of the companies, and the recent establishment of the FRC of Nigeria with 
special enforcement powers in relation to accounts and audit of public companies. 
An independent director is one who has no material relationship with the 
company, either directly or indirectly, as officer of the firm, stockholder, debt 
holder, supplier, or consultant. Also, an independent director will not be a former 
employee, auditor, or consultant to the company. An independent director will 
also not be related with a director or a major shareholder or present or past auditor 
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of the firm. In Nigeria, virtually all the companies quoted on the NSE avoids CEO 
duality, as both the SEC, the FRC, and the listing requirements of the NSE 
discourage companies from combining the positions of the CEO and chair. The 
compliance with CEO duality rule meant that all the sampled companies had the 
same score on this mechanism of corporate governance. 
 Another corporate governance characteristic that emerged from the study was that 
most of the sampled companies had six members in the audit committee, divided equally 
between executive directors (three members) and nonexecutive directors (three 
members). Seventy-nine percent of the sampled firmed had an average of six members of 
the audit committee. This is also a reflection of legislation in Nigeria. Section 359 
Subsection 3 of the CAMA established the audit committee for public companies. In 
Subsection 4 of section 359, the Act stipulated a maximum number of six members for 
audit committee. Most public companies in Nigeria just adopted the maximum number. It 
seemed the Act was not concerned with the committee’s independence, as it requires 
equal number of company executives and shareholders’ representatives to be on the 
committee. A bill for an Act to repeal CAMA of 1990 and enact the CAMA of 2016 is 
currently going through the Nigerian National Assembly, and the expectation is that 
when the bill becomes law, the National Assembly will have repealed this provision. 
The number of board meetings indicates the level of board activity and members’ 
involvement in the firm. In all the sampled companies, the average number of board 
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meeting was four during 2011 and 2015. Again, the minimum number of board meetings 
in a listed company is put at four by the SEC’s corporate governance code. Most 
companies strictly complied with this stipulation although some held more than four 
meetings during this period. Meetings above the stipulated minimum became necessary 
either because of business exigencies or because there was an urgent matter that could not 
wait for the next quarter, although most companies stuck to the quarterly meetings 
regardless of the circumstances. Of the 39 sampled companies, 61.54% paid their 
executives an average of $100,000 per year. Stock options and bonuses as compensation 
to executives are not common in Nigeria. But what are common are provisions of car and 
driver for the executive, generous and expensive paid holidays, private security, 
telephone and other utility bills, and subsidized children education for the top executives. 
These benefits-in-kind are difficult to monetize and are not disclosed in the financial 
statements. 
Inferential Statistics of Sampled Companies 
 In this section of the dissertation study, I present inferential statistics of the 39 
sampled firms using multiple regression techniques. This section starts with the analysis 
of the linear relationship between ROA and corporate governance mechanisms and then 
the presentation of regression results and ANOVA tables.  
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The Relationship between Corporate Governance and ROA 
The multiple regression equation for the model with ROA as the corporate 
governance mechanisms as the independent or predictor variables is as follows: 
ROA = α0 + β1BodInd + β2AuditCommInd + β3BodSize + β4BodMtgs +  
β5ExecComp + β6FirmAge + β7FirmSize + ε  
Where 
ROA = return on assets 
α0 = the intercept of the regression equation, 
BodInd = board independence, 
AuditCommInd = audit committee independence, 
BodSize = board size,  
BodMtgs = number of board meetings,  
 ExecComp = executive compensation,  
FirmAge = firm age,  
FirmSize = firm size,  
 β1, β2, β3, β4, β5, β6, and β7 are the beta coefficients of the regression model, and ε = 
random error 
 The ability of the corporate governance mechanisms to explain 
ROA was tested using t distribution test and ANOVA at the alpha level of .05 or 
5%. The null and alternative hypotheses are as follows: 
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H0: β1 = β2, β3 = β4 = β5 = β6 = β7 = 0 
H1: Not all the βi (i=1….7) are zero 
I performed the analysis using SPSS. The multiple regression analysis 
results and ANOVA table for the test are presented in Table 4 and Table 5. The 
overall multiple regression equation with return on assets (ROA) as the dependent 
variables is presented as follows: 
ROA = -.473 + .051*BodInd + .052*AuditCommInd + .003*BodSize + 
.03*BodMgts + .000000016*ExecComp + .00*FirmAge + .002*FirmSize + ε 
 A multiple regression analysis was conducted to predict ROA 
(outcome variable) from board independence, audit committee independence, 
board size, number of board meetings, executive compensation (independent 
variables), and the firms’ size and age (mediating variables). The result of the 
regression analysis showed that board independence, audit committee 
independence, board size, number of board meetings, executive compensation, 
and the firms’ size and age did not account for a significant amount of the 
variability in ROA, R2 = .077, F(7, 31) =.368, p = .91. The adjusted R2 of 
 -.132 indicated that about 13.2 % of the variability in ROA was explained 
by the selected corporate governance mechanisms. The decision is, therefore, to 
accept the null hypothesis that all the coefficients are zero and reject the 
alternative hypothesis that not all the coefficients are zero. There is thus little 
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evidence to support the statement that there exists a statistically significant 
relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and ROA. The results of 
the regression were tabulated in Table 4 below. The ANOVA result was displayed 
in Table 5 below. 
Table 4 
Multiple Regression Results for Independent Variables (n = 39), y = Return on 
Assets (ROA) 
Intercept    BodInd    AuditCommInd    BodSize      BodMtgs          ExecComp            FirmAge        FirmSize 
    b        -.473      .051        .052                       .003             .030           .00000001632                     .000             -.002  
s(b)         .736      .128        .074                       .012             .022                            .000                     .003             .017       
   t           -.642        .401      .695                       .229           1.371                            .049                     .108              -
.106 
p-value  .526 .691 .492              .820              .180                             .961                    .915             .916    
 
 
 
 
Table 5 
ANOVA Table for the Multiple Regression of Independent Variables (n = 39), y 
=ROA 
  Sum of    Mean  
Source  Squares  df Square  F FCritical p-value 
 
Regression .038  7 .005  .368 2.32 .914 
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Error  .462               31 .015   
Total  .501               38   
     R2  .077                   Adjusted R2  -.132 
Predictors: (Constant). Board independence, Audit committee independence, Board size, Board meetings, 
Executive compensation, Firm size, Firm age 
 
Dependent Variable: ROA 
By testing the hypothesis for each variable of the regression model, I was 
able to determine if any of the coefficients was different from zero. A t test will 
explain the variation in ROA and the variable that has no explanatory power will 
be eliminated from the regression model. 
 In regard to board independence, the hypothesis to be tested is: 
H0: β1 = 0 
H1:  β1≠ 0 
 
The regression results in Table 4 showed the p value for board 
independence (BodInd) was .691, which is greater than 5% alpha level of 
significance. Using a two-tailed test, the critical points of t distribution with 31 
degrees of freedom at α =.05 is 2.021. The rejected area at 95% confidence 
interval indicates that the calculated t statistic value of absolute 0.401 is < the 
critical value of t of 2.04; I cannot reject the null hypothesis that β1 = 0. I conclude 
that board independence is statistically not significant and cannot be a predictor of 
or used to explain the variations in ROA. 
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 An independent audit committee is one of the systems of controls 
that the agency theory predicts is expected to improve financial performance. 
Independence is assured by having knowledgeable and independent external and 
independent directors on the committee. In Nigeria, the composition of audit 
committee is legislated by the CAMA, stipulating six members divided equally 
between executive and nonexecutive directors. For independence of audit 
committee, the hypothesis is: 
H0: β2 = 0 
H1: β2 ≠ 0 
Using a two-tailed test, the critical points of t distribution with 31 degrees 
of freedom at α =.05 is 2.021. The rejected area at 95% confidence interval 
indicates that the calculated t statistic value of absolute 0.695 is < the critical 
value of t of 2.04, so the null hypothesis that β1= 0 cannot be rejected. I conclude 
that audit committee independence is statistically not significant and cannot be 
used to explain and predict the variations in ROA.  
 The size of the board could give a firm a competitive edge, 
especially when the members are experienced, devote time and resources to the 
company, and use their industry and business connections to further the objective 
of the corporation. When the size of the board is too big, critical decisions may be 
delayed, infighting may become the norm rather than the exception, and the cost 
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of maintaining a large board may be financially unjustifiable. If the size of the 
board is too small on the other hand, the firm may miss many business 
opportunities or make poor business and strategic decision that have not been 
well-considered because of the absence of high-caliber business leaders on the 
board of directors. It is expected that a fairly large board will improve 
organizational financial performance. For the board size, the hypothesis is:  
H0: β3 = 0 
H1: β3 < 0 
Using a one-tailed test, the critical points of t distribution with 31 degrees 
of freedom at α = .05 is 1.684. The computed t statistic in Table 4 is .229, which 
is less than the value of the t distribution of 1.684. The p value of .820 is > the .05 
significance level and for this reason I cannot reject the null hypothesis, H0, that 
the beta coefficient is zero. The coefficient of board size is statistically not 
significant, and cannot be used to explain and predict the variations in the value of 
ROA.  
 It is during board meetings that critical financial and other 
decisions and policies are made. The number of board meetings indicates the level 
of involvement of directors in the business and the attention paid to critical 
elements of controls and monitoring, such as financial and credit controls, risk 
management, executive compensation, personnel issues, and legal and regulatory 
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matters. The number of board meetings, all things being equal, ought to improve 
organizational financial performance, especially if the members of the board 
devote quality time and attention to critical issues affecting the corporation. The 
number of board meetings, like the composition of audit committee, is legislated 
in Nigeria, as the Company Acts stipulate at least four meetings in a year, on a 
quarterly basis. Most companies just hold four meetings whether the business 
exigencies demand it or not. I believe the number of board meetings should 
improve corporate financial performance. For the number of board meetings, the 
hypothesis is as follows: 
H0: β4 = 0 
H1: β4 < 0 
Using a one-tailed test, the critical point of t distribution with 31 degrees of freedom at α 
= .05 is 1.684. The computed t statistic in Table 4 of absolute 1.371 is less than the 
critical value of t of 1.684, and the p-value of .180 is > than the .05 alpha level of 
significance. Thus the number of board meetings is statistically not significant and cannot 
be used to explain or predict the values of ROA. I accept the null hypothesis, H0 and 
reject the alternative hypothesis, H1. 
 Researchers have extensively studied the impact of executive 
compensation on the financial performance of organizations in many economies, 
but the impact in the Nigerian economic landscape is not clearly known. 
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Adequate executive compensation ought to attract the best talent to the 
organization and improve organizational financial performance. Some other 
researchers believe that the greater the executive compensation the lower the 
firm’s financial performance. I take the view that higher executive compensation 
lead to better performance. The hypothesis to test the impact of executive 
compensation on organizational performance is as follows: 
H0: β5 = 0 
H1: β5 ≠ 0 
Using a two-tailed test, the critical points of t distribution with 31 degrees 
of freedom at α =.05 is 2.021. The rejected area at 95% confidence interval 
indicates that the calculated t statistic value of absolute 0.049 is < the critical 
value of t of 2.04, and the computer alpha value is .961, so the null hypothesis that 
β5= 0 cannot be rejected. I conclude that, among Nigerian nonfinancial firms, 
executive compensation is not statistically significant and cannot be used to 
explain and predict ROA. 
The age of the firm may set limits to the changes that it can make to its operations 
in confronting competition, economic shocks, and technological disruptions in its 
industry. The age of the corporation may be an asset or a constraint on the actions of the 
firm. I take the view that age and experience are critical for a robust implementation of 
corporate governance practices and improvement in organizational performance. The 
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hypothesis to test the age of the firm as a component of corporate governance 
mechanisms are as follows: 
H0: β6 = 0 
H1: β6 < 0 
Using a one-tailed test, the critical point of t distribution with 31 degrees 
of freedom at α = .05 is 1.684. The computed t statistic in Table 4 of absolute .108 
is less than the critical value of t of 1.684; and the p-value of .915 is > than the .05 
alpha level of significance. Thus, the coefficient of executive compensation is 
statistically not significant and cannot be used to explain or predict the values of 
ROA. I accept the null hypothesis, H0, and reject the alternative hypothesis, H1. 
 The size of a firm affords it many opportunities in the market 
place: Research and development opportunities, ability to attract the best talents to 
the firm, and capacity to benefit from the advantages conferred when companies 
are large enough to dictate to suppliers and finance providers. For the size of the 
firm, the hypothesis is: 
H0: β7 = 0 
H1: β7 < 0 
Using a one-tailed test, the critical points of t distribution with 31 degrees 
of freedom at α = .05 is 1.684. The computed t statistic in Table 4 is -.106. The p 
value of .916 is greater than the .05 significance level; and for this reason I cannot 
270 
 
 
reject the null hypothesis, H0, that the beta coefficient is zero. Firm size is 
statistically not significant, and cannot be used to explain and predict the 
variations in the value of ROA.  
Return on Assets (ROA) and Corporate Governance Mechanisms. Past 
research indicated that board and audit committee independence has a statistically 
significant association with organizational performance (Al-Najjar, 2014; Ioana & 
Mariana, 2014; Malthotra, Poteau, & Fritz, 2013). The BRT and the Cadbury 
Committee recommended an independent board and audit committee as good 
corporate governance practices. The SOX  made the independence of the board 
and audit committees as the main goal of a desirable corporate governance 
practice. The independence of audit and board committees has thus been 
recognized as significant predictors of organizational performance. To determine 
the relationship between ROA and the chosen corporate governance mechanisms, 
I used a hierarchical regression in SPSS and entered the variables in three blocks, 
each block representing a step in the hierarchy. 
 Based on past research, I selected and entered board independence 
and audit committee independence in the first model as most significant 
predictors of organizational performance. In the second model, I selected board 
size, board meetings, and executive compensation as the next most significant 
predictors of company financial performance. I used forced entry as the method of 
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entering the variables in the models. Finally, in the third model, I entered the age 
and size of the firm as the mediating variables. The results of the hierarchical 
regression was displayed in Table 6 below, indicating that the model was 
improved when all the five predictor and two mediating variables were included 
in the model (Model 3).. Board independence had a positive but not significant 
relationship with return on assets ROA and audit committee independence also 
has a positive but not significant association with ROA. In Model 2, board size, 
the number of board meetings, and executive compensation were shown to have 
positive but not significant association with ROA. The summary results displayed 
in Table 6 show that the adjusted R2 in model 1 with board independence and 
audit committee independence as the independent variables was -.043. In Model 
2, the addition of board size, number of board meetings, and executive 
compensation increased the adjusted R2 to -.064, showing that board size, number 
of board meetings, and executive compensation improved the model by -.021. The 
adjusted R2 in Model 3 was -.132 when the age and size of the firm were added to 
the model; an addition of -.068. The improvement in the model when the 
mediating variables of age and size of the firm were added was over 100%. The 
improvement in the model brought by adding age and size of the firm to the 
model indicated an improvement to the model over and above the predictive 
power of the five corporate governance mechanisms, indicating that the age and 
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size of the firm did improve the model and are mediators in the relationship 
between corporate governance mechanisms and organizational performance 
measured by ROA. R2 
increased with each addition of independent and mediating variables, and 
the adjusted R2 was maximized at -.132 (Model 3 in Table 6) when all the 
variables were included in the model.  
 Board independence and audit committee independence accounted 
for 4.3% of the variations in ROA but board independence, audit committee 
independence, board size, number of board meetings, and executive compensation 
accounted for 6.4%, an improvement of 49% between Model 1 and Model 2. The 
change in R 2 between Model 2 and Model 3 was .068, showing that the age and 
size of the firm significantly mediate the relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms and ROA. The two mediating variables accounted for 
6.8% of the variations in ROA with the minimum standard error estimate of 
.12212, whereas the five corporate governance mechanisms were only able to 
explain 6.4% of the variations in ROA. 
 These findings were unexpected because board independence is 
supposed to enable the board to control, monitor, and advice the managers to 
efficiently organize the firm’s resources. Board and audit committee 
independence have been conceptualized by both the regulators and researchers as 
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important components of corporate governance practice that enhance corporate 
performance (Arora & Sharma, 2015; Sahu & Manna, 2014; Zona, 2016). 
Although both the board and audit committee independence are positively related 
to ROA, the association is not significant and the power of explanation of the 
variables is extremely weak. It seems that the Nigerian corporation is a victim of 
overregulation. The number and composition of audit committee members are 
dictated by Nigerian company law and corporate governance codes. What many 
firms do is follow the letter of the law and not what the law is trying to achieve; 
and this is why the scoring on the independence of audit committee was virtually 
the same for all firms. Also in all firms, there was absence of CEO duality. This is 
because the Nigerian SEC corporate governance codes stipulate that the chair of 
the board cannot be the CEO at the same time. All companies complied with this 
directive from the SEC regardless of the different circumstances of the 
organizations.  
 Similarly, the number of directors on the board should be the right 
size for the complexity of the organization and its operations. But what is 
important is the mix of expertise among the members not the absolute size per se. 
I found a positive but not significant association between the size of the board and 
ROA but its explanatory power is weak. The number of meetings shows the level 
of board involvement in the affairs of the firm, so it is expected that the number of 
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board meetings should be positively associated with organizational performance. 
Again, as in audit committee and board composition, the number of board 
meetings is a subject that legislation affects in part in Nigeria. Public companies 
are required to hold a minimum of four board meetings in a year. Most companies 
comply with the numbers of meetings dictated by the regulators regardless of 
specific circumstances of their firm. I found a positive but not significant 
relationship between the number of meetings and ROA.  
 Adequate executive compensation ought to motivate executives to 
perform better. Appropriate executive compensation should also attract competent 
workers to the firm. I found the beta coefficient of executive compensation was 
near zero; indicating that executive compensation was not associated with ROA. 
Firm age had no relationship with ROA and it cannot predict any variations in the 
outcome variable. The age of the firm could be an impediment to growth in an era 
when businesses must innovate and be swift to market. However, the size of the 
firm could be equally of a tremendous advantage and a liability. The result of the 
regression showed a negative but statistically not significant association between 
firm size and ROA. 
Table 6  
Model Summary of Hierarchical Regression Results 
Model  R  R Square Adjusted R  Std. Error of 
      Square   the Estimate 
1  .108  .012  -.043   .11724 
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2  .276  .076  -.064   .11840   
3  .277  .077  -.132   .12212  
Model 1: Predictors: (Constant), Audit Committee Independence, Board Independence 
Model 2: Predictors: (Constant), Audit Committee Independence, Board Independence, Board Size, 
 Board Meetings, Executive Compensation 
Model 3: Predictors: (Constant), Audit Committee Independence, Board Independence, Board Size, 
Board Meetings, Executive Compensation, Firm Age, Firm Size 
 
In Table 7 and Table 8, I presented the regression and ANOVA Tables of 
the results respectively. The regression equation for the hierarchical regression 
model with the highest predictive power (Model 3) and ROA as the dependent 
variable is as follows: 
ROA = -.473 + .051β1 + .052β2 + .003β3 + .030 β4 -.002 β7 + ε. Executive 
compensation and firm age were removed from the equation because the result of 
the hierarchical regression indicated that there was no relationship between 
executive compensation and firm age and ROA. 
 
Table 7 
Hierarchical Regression Result for Independent Variables vs. ROA (n = 39)  
                Intercept      BOD         AUDIT     BOD      BOD          EXEC                      FIRM          
FIRM 
                        IND        COMMIND            SIZE    MGTS       COMP    AGE          
SIZE 
  b    -.473   .051       .052     .003     .030      .00000001632       .000          -
.002 
std. Error  .736        .128      .074     .012          .022      .000        .003             
.017 
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s(b)   .0000  .072      .126     .052     .241           .029                         .063           -
.024 
      t -.642  .401      .695     .229         1.371      .049                          .108         -
.106 
p-value  .526  .691      .492     .820           .180       .961                .915          .916     
  
      
Table 8 
 
ANOVA Table for Hierarchical Regression Results- Independent Variable vs. 
ROA (n =39) 
 
   Sum of   Mean  F p-value  
 Source  Squares  df squares 
 
 Regn.  .038  7 .005  .368 .914 s   .12212 
 Error  .462  31 .015    Adjusted 
 Total  .501  38   R2   .077            R2   
-.132 
 
 
With the hierarchical regression method, I developed a parsimonious 
regression equation with board independence (BODIND), audit committee 
independence (AUDCOMMIND), board size (BODSIZE), number of board 
meetings (BODMGTS), and firm size (FIRMSIZE) as the predictor variables. The 
results of the hierarchical regression showed that board independent, audit 
committee independence, board size, number of board meetings, and firm size 
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were the explanatory variables, but executive compensation and the age of the 
firm have no relationship with ROA and have been removed from the equation. 
All the five explanatory variables used in the equation, except firm size 
(FIRMSIZE), were positively associated with ROA. Firm size was found to be 
negatively related to ROA. The regression results showed that there was no 
relationship between ROA and executive compensation and there was also no 
relationship between the age of a firm and organizational performance measured 
by return on assets (ROA). 
Relationship between Corporate Governance and ROCE 
 The multiple regression equation for the model with ROCE as the 
explanatory variable and corporate governance as the independent variable is: 
ROCE = α0 + β8BdInd + β9AuditCommInd + β10BodSize + β11BodMtgs +  
Β12ExecComp + β13FirmAge + β14FirmSize + ε  
Where 
ROCE = return on capital employed 
α0 = the intercept of the regression equation, 
BodInd = board independence, 
AuditCommInd = audit committee independence, 
BodSize = board size,  
BodMtgs = number of board meetings,  
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 ExecComp = executive compensation,  
FirmAge = firm age,  
FirmSize = firm size,  
 Β8, β9, β10, β11, β12, β13, and β14 are the beta coefficients of the regression model, and ε = 
random error 
 The null and alternative hypotheses to test for the existence of a linear 
relationship between ROE and any of the independent variables are stated as 
follows: 
 H0: β8 = β9 = β10 = β11 = β12 = β13 = β14= 0 
 H1: Not all the βi (i= 8….14) are zero 
To test the null hypothesis that the regression beta coefficients are all zero, 
I used the t distribution test and ANOVA at the 5% confidence level of statistical 
significance. In Table 9, I present the overall multiple regression results with 
ROCE as the predictor variable and in Table 10 I tabulated the ANOVA 
computed with SPSS. To find a linear relationship between ROCE and corporate 
governance mechanisms, I used the hierarchical regression with forced entry. The 
multiple regression equation for the relationship between ROCE and corporate 
governance mechanisms is as follows: 
ROCE = -2.245 + .188β8 + .269β9 - .009β10 + .033β11 + .0000005671β12 
+.005β13 +.044β14 + ε 
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Table 9 
Multiple Regression Results of Independent Variables and Return on Capital Employed 
(ROCE) (n=39) 
 
                Intercept      BOD         AUDIT     BOD      BOD          EXEC                      FIRM          
FIRM 
                        IND        COMMIND            SIZE    MGTS       COMP    AGE          
SIZE 
  b    -2.245    .188       .269     -.009     .033      .0000005671       .005          .044 
std. Error  2.004        .350       .202      .032         .059      .000        .007            .047 
s(b)          .0000   .094             .236                      -.065     .095         -.357                          .374           .204                      
t              -1.120    538     1.333                   -.292          .550    -.624                           .653          .519 
p-value  .271   .595      .192     .772          .586     .537                 .519          .358      
 VIF         1.079    1.096   1.729        1.034 11.418     11.504        1.668 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10 
 
ANOVA Table for the Multiple Regression (n= 39), y = ROCE 
 
  Sum of    Mean of 
Source  Squares  df Squares  F FCritical                     p-
value 
 
Regression         .439               7 .063  .568 2.32                     .776 
Error            3.427  31 .111              Adjusted 
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Total               3.867  38     R2  .114                       R2  -.086 
 
Predictors: (Constant), Audit Committee Independence, Board Independence, Board Size, Board Meetings, 
Executive 
 Compensation, Firm Age, Firm Size 
 
Dependent Variable: ROCE 
 
The ƒ statistic of .568, p value of .776, and adjusted R2 of -.086 were 
indications of a weak association between corporate governance and ROCE. I 
conducted statistical hypothesis tests for the individual predictor variables to 
determine the beta coefficients that are different from zero. I also conducted t test 
to provide explanation of the variations in ROE and to identify the variables that 
had weak or no explanatory power so as to remove them from the regression 
model.  
 The impact of board independence on ROCE as the metric of 
financial performance is positive but not significant. The hypothesis for board 
independence is as follows: 
Ho: β8 = 0 
H1: β8 ≠ 0 
 
The multiple regression results in Table 9 show that board independence 
has a p value of .595, which is > the .05 significance level. Using a two-tailed test, 
the critical point of t distribution with 31 degrees of freedom at α = .05 is 2.021. 
At 95% level of confidence, the rejection region indicates that the computed t test 
281 
 
 
statistics of absolute 0.538 is less than the critical t of 2.021. I cannot reject the 
null hypothesis that β8 is 0. The independence of the board is not statistically 
significant and cannot predict and explain the variations in ROCE. 
 It is expected that if the audit committee is independent, it will 
increase the financial performance of the firm through an effective control on 
reporting and the quality of financial statement of the firm. For audit committee 
independence, the hypothesis is: 
H0: β9 = 0 
H1:β9 > 1 
 
Using one-tailed test, the critical points of t distribution with 31 degrees of 
freedom at α = .05 is 1.684. The computed t statistic of 1.333 is < the critical t of 
1.684. The p value of .192 is also > the .05 significance level, I cannot reject the 
null hypothesis, H0, that the beta coefficient is zero in favor of H1. The coefficient 
of audit committee independence is statistically not significant and cannot be used 
to explain or predict ROCE. 
 I hypothesized that the larger the board size, the more expertise 
and value are brought to the firm and the better the financial performance. For 
board size, the hypothesis is: 
H0:β10 = 0 
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H1: β10 > 0 
Using one-tailed test, the critical points of t distribution with 31 degrees of 
freedom at α = .05 is 1.684. The computed t statistic of -.292 is < the critical t of 
1.684. The p value of .772 is also > the .05 significance level, so I cannot reject 
the null hypothesis, H0, that the beta coefficient is zero in favor of H1 that the beta 
coefficient is greater than zero . I conclude that the coefficient of board size is 
statistically not significant and cannot be used to explain the variations or changes 
in ROCE. 
 The impact of the number of board meetings on a firm’s 
performance is not clearly known, but can be either positive or negative. When 
meetings are well-organized and purposeful, the impact can be high and vice 
versa. The hypothesis for the number of board meetings is: 
 H0: β11 = 0 
H1: β11 ≠ 0 
 
Using two-tailed test, the critical points of t distribution with 31 degrees of 
freedom at α = .05 is 2.021. The computed t statistic of .550 is < the critical t of 
2.021. The p value of .586 is > the .05 significance level, so I cannot reject the 
null hypothesis, H0, that the beta coefficient is zero in favor of H1 that the beta 
coefficient is greater than zero . Thus the coefficient of the number of meetings is 
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statistically not significant and cannot be used to explain the variations or changes 
in ROCE. 
 I believe executive compensation serves as motivations to 
executives and other staff to improve corporate financial performance, especially 
if part of executive compensation is linked to firm performance. For executive 
compensation, the hypothesis is as follows: 
H0: β12 = 0 
H1:: β12 > 0 
Using one-tailed test, the critical points of t distribution with 31 degrees of 
freedom at α = .05 is 1.684. The computed t statistic of -.624 is < the critical t of 
1.684. The p value of .537 is > the .05 significance level, so I cannot reject the 
null hypothesis, H0, that the beta coefficient is zero in favor of H12 that the beta 
coefficient is greater than zero. I conclude that the coefficient of executive 
compensation is statistically not significant and cannot be used to explain the 
variations or changes in ROCE. 
 I believe that the age of the firm can be equated to experience. 
With experience comes the ability to avoid costly mistakes. I hypothesized that 
the age of the firm improves financial performance. The hypothesis is: 
H0: β13 = 0 
H1: β13 ≠ 0 
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Using two-tailed test, the critical point of t distribution with 31 degrees of 
freedom at α = .05 is 2.021. The computed t statistic of .653 is < the critical t of 
2.021. The p value of .519 is > the .05 significance level, so I cannot reject the 
null hypothesis, H0, that the beta coefficient is zero in favor of H1 that the beta 
coefficient is greater than zero. Thus the coefficient of firm age is statistically not 
significant and cannot be used to explain the variations or changes in ROCE. 
 My hypothesis is that the size of the firm confers certain benefits 
on it such as buying in bulk, ability to negotiate contracts with suppliers and get a 
fairer deal than smaller firms get, and obtaining cheaper funding rates from 
financial institutions. For the size of the firm, the hypothesis is: 
 H0: β14 = 0 
 H1: β14 > 0 
Using one-tailed test, the critical point of t distribution with 31 degrees of 
freedom at α = .05 is 1.684. The computed t statistic of .933 is < the critical t of 
1.684, and the p value of .358 is > the .05 significance level. So I cannot reject the 
null hypothesis, H0, that the beta coefficient is zero in favor of H14 that the beta 
coefficient is greater than zero. I conclude that the coefficient of firm age is 
statistically not significant and cannot be used to explain the variations or changes 
in ROCE. 
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 The statistical results showed that all the independent variables 
except board size and executive compensation were positively but not 
significantly associated with ROCE. Board size was negative and not statistically 
and significantly related to ROCE. On the other hand, executive compensation 
was found to be not related to ROCE. In other words, none of the independent 
variables can be used to explain the variations in the outcome variable, ROCE.  
 The model summary in Table 11 shows the result of the 
hierarchical regression that displays the change in R2 as more variables were 
added to the model. The first model (Model 1) used board independence and audit 
committee independence as the most important predictors of ROCE. The adjusted 
R2 in Model 1 was .002. In Model 2, I added board size, number of board 
meetings, and executive compensation to the model. In Model 2, R2  increased to 
.076 from .054 in the previous model, a change of .022. The adjusted R2 increased 
to -.064 from .002 in Model 1, a change of .086. This means that adding board 
size, number of board meetings, and executive compensation improved the model 
but in the other direction.  
 The R2 in Model 3 was .114 and the adjusted R2 was -.086. Firm 
age and firm size were added to the model in Model 3 and the improvement 
(change) in R2  and adjusted  R2 was .038 and .022 respectively. The adjusted R2 
was maximized at -.086 when all the five independent and two mediating 
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variables were added to the model in a hierarchical regression using the forced 
entry method. Board independence (BODIND), audit committee independence 
(AUDCOMMIND), board size (BODSIZE), number of board meetings 
(BOGMGTS), executive compensation (EXECOMP), firm age (FIRMAGE), and 
firm size (FIRM SIZE) were the variables with the most explanatory power with 
adjusted R2 of -.086. Together, the five corporate governance mechanisms and 
two mediating variables in the multiple regression model explained 8.6% of the 
variations in ROCE. 
 The multiple regression results tabulated in Table 12 showed that 
board independence was positively but not significantly associated with ROCE. 
Similarly, audit committee independence, number of board meetings, firm age, 
and firm size were all positively related to ROCE. Board size and executive 
compensation were negatively related to ROCE but the coefficient of executive 
compensation was very close to zero, indicating that this variable was not related 
to ROCE. These findings were, again, not expected because these independent 
variables were expected to be good predictors of ROCE, but the evidence did not 
support my expectation. One of the reasons may be because of the over legislation 
and firms’ wholesale and uncritical implementation of corporate governance 
codes that was referred to earlier. The other reason may be because of so many 
imperfections is this market, such as pricing of shares, inadequate disclosure in 
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financial statements, and problems of the macro-economic situation in the 
country. 
Table 11 
Model Summary of Hierarchical Regression Results Dependent Variable ROCE 
(n = 39) 
 
      Adjusted R  Std. Error of the  
Model  R  R Square       Square           Estimate 
1  .233  .054  .002   .31869 
2  .276  .076  -.064   .32905 
3  .337  .114  -.086   .33250 
Model 1: Predictors: (Constant), Audit Committee Independence, Board Independence 
Model 2: Predictors: (Constant): Audit Committee Independence, Board Independence, Board Size, Board 
Meetings, 
 Executive Compensation 
Model 3: Predictors: (Constant): Audit Committee Independence, Board Independence, Board Size, Board 
Meetings 
 Executive Compensation, Firm Age, Firm Size 
Independent Variable: ROCE 
 
 
The multiple regression results and ANOVA Table of the hierarchical 
method are displayed in Table 12 and Table 13 respectively. The hierarchical 
multiple regression equation, which was parsimoniously determined from the 
results of the regression conducted is: 
ROCE = -2.245 + .188*BODIND + .269*AUDCOMMIND - 
.009*BODSIZE + .033*BODMTGS + .005*FIRMAGE + .044*FIRMSIZE 
 
Table 12 
 
Multiple Regression Results of Independent Variables and Return on Capital Employed 
(ROCE) (n=39) 
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                Intercept      BOD         AUDIT     BOD      BOD          EXEC                      FIRM          
FIRM 
                        IND        COMMIND            SIZE    MGTS       COMP    AGE          
SIZE 
  b    -2.245   .188       .269     -.009     .033      .0000005671       .005          .044 
std. Error 2.004        .350      .202     .032        .059      .000       .007            .047 
s(b)          .0000 .094              .236                     -.065   .095           -.357                        .374           .204                      
t              -1.120 .538     1.333                  -.292       .550      -.624                       .653        .519 
p-value  .271 .595      .192    .772        .586       .537                 .519         .358      
 
 
Table 13 
 
ANOVA Table for Multiple Regression Results- Independent Variables vs. ROCE 
  Sum of    Mean of 
Source  Squares  df Squares  F FCritical                     p-
value 
 
Regression       .439 7 .063  .568 2.32                     .776 
Error            3.427  31 .111              Adjusted 
Total            3.867  38     R2  .114                       R2  -.086 
 
With the hierarchical regression, the most parsimonious regression 
equation includes all the variables except executive compensation, which are 
board independence (BODIND), audit committee independence 
(AUDCOMMIND), board size (BODSIZE), number of meetings (BODMGTGS), 
firm age (FIRMAGE), and firm size (FIRSIZE). The multiple regression results 
showed that three independent (board independence, audit committee 
independence, and number of board meetings) and two mediating variables (firm 
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age and firm size) were positively related to ROCE, one independent variable 
(board size) was negatively but not significantly associated with the ROCE. 
Executive compensation was not related to ROCE. 
The Relationship between Corporate Governance and Tobin’s Q 
 The multiple regression equation for the model with Tobin’s Q as 
the outcome variable and the corporate governance mechanisms as the predictor 
variables is: 
Tobin’s Q = α0 + β15BdInd + β16AuditCommInd + β17BodSize + β18BodMtgs +  
Β19ExecComp + β20FirmAge + β21FirmSize + ε  
Where 
Tobin’s Q = ratio of the firm’s value to the replacement of its assets 
α0 = the intercept of the regression equation, 
BodInd = board independence, 
AuditCommInd = audit committee independence, 
BodSize = board size,  
BodMtgs = number of board meetings,  
 ExecComp = executive compensation,  
FirmAge = firm age,  
FirmSize = firm size,  
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 Β15, β16, β17, β18, β19, β20, and β21 are the beta coefficients of the regression model, and ε 
= random error 
The hypothesis to test the linear relationship between Tobin’s Q ratio and the 
independent variables is stated as: 
H0: Β15 = β16 = β17 = β18 = β19 = β20 = β21 = 0 
 H1: Not all the βi (i=15…21) are zero 
The multiple regression results and computed ANOVA Table to test the relationship is 
presented in Table 14 and Table 15. The overall multiple regression equation with 
Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable and corporate governance mechanisms as the 
independent variables is: 
Tobin’s Q = -8.538 - 3.699*BODIND + 5.745*AUDCOMMIND - .332*BODSIZE + 
1.434*BODMTGS - .000009859*EXECOMP + .039*FIRMAGE + 
.866*FIRMSIZE + ε 
 
 
Table 14 
 
Multiple Regression Results of Independent Variables and Tobin’s Q (n=39) 
 
                Intercept      BOD         AUDIT     BOD      BOD          EXEC                      FIRM          
FIRM 
                        IND        COMMIND            SIZE    MGTS       COMP    AGE          
SIZE 
  b    -8.538   -3.699       5.745     -.332     1.434      -.000009859       .039          .866 
std. Error 54.237        9.469      5.463     .876        1.609        .000         .191           
1.273 
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s(b)               .0000      -.069         .187                     -.085     .154         -2.30                           .118             
.149                      t                   -.157       -.391     1.052                   -.379          .891      -.401                           
.205             .681 
p-value       .876        .699       .301     .708          .380        .691                  .839             
.501     
 VIF       1.079    1.096   1.729   1.034    11.418       11.504          
1.668 
 
 
Table 15 
 
ANOVA Table for Multiple Regression Results for the Independent Variables and 
Tobin’s Q (n = 39) 
 
  Sum of    Mean of 
Source  Squares  df Squares  F FCritical                     p-
value 
 
Regression       299.343 7 42.763  .528 2.32                        .807 
Error         2510.953  31 80.998              Adjusted 
Total         2810.296  38     R2  .107                       R2  -.095 
 
Predictors: (Constant), Audit Committee Independence, Board Independence, Board Size, Board 
Meetings,  
 Executive Compensation, Firm Age, Firm Size 
Dependent Variables: Tobin’s Q 
 
Table 15 displays the ƒ value (7, 31) of .528 which is < than ƒ critical of 2.32, the p value 
of .807 is > than the alpha level of significance 0f .05 with R2 of .107 and the 
adjusted R2 of -.095. The adjusted R2 of .095 indicated that only 9.5% of the 
variation in Tobin’s Q was explained by the corporate governance mechanisms. 
With the p value of .807, the decision is to accept the null hypothesis that all the 
coefficients are zero and to reject the alternative hypothesis that some of the 
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coefficients are different from zero. There is not enough statistical evidence to 
support a statistically significant relationship between at least one of the corporate 
governance mechanisms and Tobin’s Q. 
 I used statistical hypothesis test to examine which of the individual variable’s 
slopes are different from zero. A t test was conducted to determine the variables 
that can help predict the variations in Tobin’s Q. 
 The influence of board independence on Tobin’s Q was negative. The hypothesis 
is: 
H0: β15 = 0  
H1: β15 ≠ 0  
The multiple regression result in Table 14 showed the p value for board independence 
(BOIDIND) is .699, which is greater than the alpha level of significance of .05. 
Using two-tailed test, the critical point of t distribution with 31 degrees of 
freedom at α = .05 is 2.021. The rejection region at 95% significance level 
indicated that the computed t test statistic of absolute value of -.391 was less than 
the critical t of 2.021 so I cannot reject the null hypothesis that β15 was 0. Thus, 
board size is statistically not significant and cannot be used as a predictor of 
Tobin’s Q. 
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 It is expected that an independent audit committee will increase 
organizational value. The hypothesis to test the relationship between Tobin’s Q 
and audit committee independence is: 
H0: β16 = 0 H1: β16 ≠ 0  
The multiple regression result in Table 14 shows the p value for audit committee 
independence (AUDCOMMIND) is .301, which is greater than the alpha level of 
significance of .05. Using a two-tailed test, the critical point of t distribution with 
31 degrees of freedom at α = .05 is 2.021. The rejection region at 95% 
significance level indicated that the computed t test statistic of absolute value of 
1.052 was less than the critical t of 2.021 so I cannot reject the null hypothesis 
that β16 was 0. Thus, the independence of audit committee was statistically not 
significant and cannot be used to explain and predict variations of Tobin’s Q. 
 I believe that the size of the board can positively contribute to the 
company’s value by increasing the level of board members’ deliberation and 
diversity of opinion in the business of the firm. For board size, the hypothesis is: 
  
H0: β17 = 0  
 H1: β17 > 0  
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Using one-tailed test, the critical point of t distribution with 31 degrees of 
freedom at α = .05 is 1.684. The computed t statistic of -.379 is < the critical t of 
1.684. The p value of .708 is > the .05 significance level, so I cannot reject the 
null hypothesis, H0, that the beta coefficient of β17 was zero. I conclude that the 
coefficient of board size was statistically not significant and cannot be used to 
explain the variations or changes in Tobin’s Q. 
 It is expected that the number of board meetings will increase 
board involvement and through this the firm’s value. The hypothesis for the 
number of board meetings is: 
H0: β18 = 0  
H1: β18 > 0  
 
Using one-tailed test, the critical point of t distribution with 31 degrees of 
freedom at α = .05 is 1.684. The computed t statistic of .891 is < the critical t of 
1.684. The p value of .380 is > the .05 significance level, so I cannot reject the 
null hypothesis, H0, that the beta coefficient of β18 is zero. I conclude that the 
coefficient of the number of board meetings was statistically not significant and 
cannot be used to explain variations in Tobin’s Q. 
 Adequate financial compensation to executives will motive them to 
perform better and increase the firm’s value, especially if the total emolument 
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includes a portion that is linked to the company’s performance. The hypothesis 
for executive compensation is: 
H0: β19 = 0  
H1: β19 > 0 
Using one-tailed test, the critical point of t distribution with 31 degrees of 
freedom at α = .05 is 1.684. The computed t statistic of -.401 was < the critical t 
of 1.684. The p value of .691 was > the .05 significance level, so I cannot reject 
the null hypothesis, H0, that the beta coefficient of β19 is zero. I conclude that the 
coefficient of the number of executive compensation is statistically not significant 
and cannot be used to explain Tobin’s Q. 
 The age of the firm is a proxy for experience, which insulates a 
company from costly strategic mistakes and errors that could easily cause 
problems for an inexperienced company. I hypothesized that firm age was 
positive and statistically associated with Tobin’s Q. The hypothesis for the age of 
the firm is: 
 
H0: β20 = 0  
H1: β20 ≠ 0  
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The multiple regression result in Table 14 shows the p value for the age of the firm was 
.839, which was greater than the alpha level of significance of .05. Using a two-
tailed test, the critical point of t distribution with 31 degrees of freedom at α = .05 
was 2.021. The rejection region at 95% significance level indicated that the 
computed t test statistic of absolute value of .205 was less than the critical t of 
2.021, so I cannot reject the null hypothesis that β20 was 0. Thus, the age of the 
firm was statistically not significant and cannot be used to explain and predict 
Tobin’s Q. 
 The size of a company indicates the volume of the transaction it can do, its 
negotiating power, and the level and amount of business risks it can assume. 
Because risks and returns are closely related, the size of a company should 
increase its financial performance. The hypothesis for firm size is: 
 H0: β21 = 0  
 H1: β21 ≠ 0  
 
The multiple regression result in Table 14 shows that the p value for the size of the firm 
was .501, which was greater than the alpha level of significance of .05. Using a 
two-tailed test, the critical point of t distribution with 31 degrees of freedom at α 
= .05 was 2.021. The rejection region at 95% significance level indicated that the 
computed t test statistic of absolute value of .681 is less than the critical t of 
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2.021, so I cannot reject the null hypothesis that β21 is 0. Thus, the size of the firm 
was statistically not significant and cannot be used to explain and predict Tobin’s 
Q. 
 In Table 16, I provide a summary of the result of a hierarchical regression 
conducted to show which of the variables have the most explanatory power. In 
Model 1, board independence and audit committee independence were forced into 
the model as the two most powerful corporate governance mechanisms that 
predict and explain variations in Tobin’s Q from the review of the literature. The 
adjusted R2 with board independence and audit committee independence as the 
only two independent variables was -.008 while R2 was .045. Thus board 
independence and audit committee independence explained .8% of the variations 
in Tobin’s Q. When board size, the number of board meetings, and executive 
compensation were added to board independence and audit committee 
independence in the model, R2 and adjusted R2 increased to .092 and -.046 
respectively (Model 2). This indicates that board size, the number of board 
meetings, and executive compensation improved the model and increased its 
explanatory power by .038.  
In Model 3, I added firm age and firm size to the hierarchical model by 
forced entry. The R2 increased to .107 and adjusted R2 increased to -.095. This 
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indicates that firm age and firm size increased the explanatory power of the model 
by .049, which was over and above Model 2 by more than 100%.  
 This indicated that the age and size of the firm moderated the 
relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and organizational 
performance measured by Tobin’s Q. The result of the multiple regression 
showed that both R2  and adjusted R2  increased with each subsequent addition of 
independent variables and the adjusted R2  was maximized in Model 3 at -.095 
when board independence (BODIND), audit committee independence 
(AUDCOMMIND), board size (BODSIZE), number of board meetings 
(BODMGTS), executive compensation (EXECOMP), age of the firm 
(FIRMAGE), and the size of the firm (FIRMSIZE) were all added to and retained 
in the model. The combination of all these variables explains 9.5% of the 
variations in Tobin’s Q. It can be inferred from these results that the combination 
of board independence and audit committee independence explained .8% of the 
variation in Tobin’s Q, the independent variables of board size, number of board 
meetings, and executive compensation explained 3.8% of the variation in Tobin’s 
Q, and firm age and firm size explain 4.9% of the variations in Tobin’s Q. I 
conclude that the age and size of the firm mediated the relationship between the 
five corporate governance mechanisms and Tobin’s Q. 
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Table 16 
Model Summary of Hierarchical Regression Results 
      Adjusted  Std. Error 
Model  R  R Square R Square  of the Mean 
1  .212  .045  -.008   8.63530 
2  .303  .092  -.046   8.79448 
3  .326  .107  -.095   8.99992 
Model 1 : Predictors: (Constant), Audit Committee Independence, Board Independence 
Model 2:  Predictors: (Constant), Audit Committee Independence, Board Independence, Board Size, Board 
Meetings,  
Executive Compensation 
Model 3: Predictors: (Constant), Audit Committee Independence, Board Independence, Board Size, Board 
Meetings, 
 Executive Compensation, Firm Age, Firm Size 
 
Dependent Variable: Tobin’s Q 
 
The parsimonious hierarchical regression model with the highest explanatory power with 
Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable is: 
Tobin’s Q = -8.538 – 3.699*BODIND + 5.745*AUDCOMMIND - .332*BODSIZE + 
1.434*BODMTGS +.039*FIRMAGE + .866*FIRMSIZE + ε 
 
 
 
Table 17 
 
Hierarchical Regression Results of Independent Variables vs. Tobin’s Q (n=39) 
 
                Intercept      BOD         AUDIT     BOD      BOD          EXEC                      FIRM          
FIRM 
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                        IND        COMMIND            SIZE    MGTS       COMP    AGE          
SIZE 
  b    -8.538   -3.699       5.745     -.332     1.434      -.000009859       .039          .866 
s(b)               .0000      -.069         .187                     -.085     .154         -2.30                           .118             
.149                      t                   -.157       -.391     1.052                   -.379          .891      -.401                           
.205             .681 
p-value       .876        .699       .301     .708          .380        .691                  .839             
.501     
 VIF       1.079    1.096   1.729   1.034    11.418       11.504          
1.668 
 
 
Table 18 
 
ANOVA Table for Hierarchical Regression Results 
 
  Sum of    Mean of 
Source  Squares  df Squares  F FCritical                     p-
value 
 
Regression       299.343 7 42.763  .528 2.32                        .807 
Error         2510.953  31 80.998               
 Adjusted 
Total         2810.296  38     R2  .107                       R2  -.095 
 
  
The results showed that board independence (BODIND) and board size 
(BODSIZE) have a negative but not significant association with Tobin’s Q while 
audit committee independence (AUDCOMMIND), number of board meetings 
(BODMTGS). Firm age (FIRMAGE), and firm size (FIRMSIZE) were positively 
but not significantly related to Tobin’s Q. Executive compensation was not related 
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to Tobin’s Q. These findings were not expected. It was expected that board and 
audit committee independence would be a good predictor of corporate 
performance and value. Also, the frequency of board meetings should indicate the 
level of involvement of the directors in both strategy and operations and should 
improve organizational performance. 
 Similarly, a large board size would include diversity of opinions 
and many experts that will positively contribute to the firm’s prestige and 
financial performance. I also expected executive compensation to attract the 
smartest people to the organization and improve its performance. The age of the 
firm should signal stability and dependability to investors and I expected this to 
increase the firm’s value, which was not so in this case. The relationship between 
the size of the firm and Tobin’s Q was also not expected. Size ought to give 
certain financial advantage to the firm, from the ability to buy raw materials in 
bulk, get lower interest rate from the financial institutions, win concessions from 
the government, and leverage on locations in countries where labor and raw 
materials are cheapest. It seems these advantages do not have a great influence on 
the non-financial companies listed on the NSE. 
 The weak relationship between organizational financial 
performance and corporate governance mechanisms as indicated by the adjusted 
R-squares suggested that there are other significant independent variables with 
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more explanatory power not considered in the present study. Executive 
compensation has the least explanatory power as the beta coefficient was too 
small to indicate any relationship between it and organizational performance. 
Also, executive compensation may be less useful in corporate governance studies 
although a lot of research attention is devoted to its relationship with 
organizational financial performance in the literature. 
Dealing with Multicollinearity and Other Regression Problems 
Multicollinearity 
 In Table 19, I displayed the correlation matrix of all the predictor 
variables for the multiple regression models to check for multicollinearity among 
them. The correlation matrix showed that there may be collinearity problem in the 
study. The highest pairwise correlation was 95.2% between executive 
compensation and firm age and the next highest pairwise correlation was 61.3% 
between firm size and board size. The pairwise correlations among the other 
variables were less than 25%. For example, the pairwise correlation between 
board independence and board size was 23.8%, the pairwise correlation between 
firm age and audit committee independence was 23.1%, and the pairwise 
correlation between board meetings and board independence was 23.0%. 
Similarly, the pairwise correlation between executive compensation and firm size 
was 22%. The pairwise correlation among the remaining independent variables 
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ranged between .3% and 20%. The correlation matrix indicates the presence of 
multicollinearity in the model. 
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Table 19 
Correlation Matrix of Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
   BOD  AUDCO BOD BOD    EXEC       FIRM           FIRM 
   IND  MMIND SIZE MTGS    COMP      AGE            SIZE 
BODIND  1.00                           
AUDCOMMIND  .015 1.00 
BODSIZE  -.238 -.044  1.00 
BODMTGS  -.023 -.089                 -.003 1.00 
EXECCOMP  .119 -.177  -.204 .008 1.00 
FIRMAGE  .131 -.231  -.154 .033  .952 1.00 
FIRMSIZE  -.127   .036    .613 .103         -.220 -.182 
 1.00 
 
 I also considered the Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) values of the 
regression result to check for the presence of multicollinearity problem in the 
models. According to Field (2014), if the largest VIF value is greater than 10, 
there is a cause for concern; and if the average VIF is substantially greater than 1, 
the regression may be biased. The highest VIF value in the model was 11.504 for 
firm age and 11.418 for executive compensation. The average VIF for the 
independent variables was 4.2171, which was substantially greater than 1. Thus 
the model seems to be biased. Field (2014) also recommended that the offending 
variables could be removed, one at a time and compared with the main model. 
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The offending variables in this case are executive compensation and firm age, 
which had VIF values greater than 10.  
 Table 20 shows the model summary for ROA and corporate 
governance when the first two offending variables (executive compensation and 
firm age) were removed from the model. R2 was .069 and the adjusted R2 was -
.072. The Model summary when all the variables were present in Table 6 had R2 
and adjusted R2 of .077 and -.132 respectively. With the two variables removed, 
there was no improvement in the model. When executive compensation was the 
only variable removed from the model, R2 and adjusted R2 were .077 and -.097 
respectively, and removing firm age only, the R2 and adjusted R2 were .076 and -
.097 respectively. These results were the same. I conclude that removing 
executive compensation and firm age or both from the model does not increase 
the combined explanatory power of the independent variables. 
 
Table 20 
Model Summary of Regression Results of Independent Variables vs. ROA (n=39) when 
Executive Compensation and Firm Age were Removed from the Model 
   
       Std. Error of 
Model               R                 R Square            Adjusted R Square  
 Estimation 
1           .263   .069        -.072     .11883   
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Table 21 
Model Summary of Regression Results of Independent Variables vs. ROA  (n=39) when only Executive 
Compensation was Removed from the Model 
       Std. Error of 
Model               R                 R Square            Adjusted R Square  
 Estimation 
1           .277   .077        -.097                  .12020   
 
Table 22 
Model Summary of Regression Results of Independent Variables vs. ROA (n=39) when Firm Age 
was Removed from the Model 
 
       Std. Error of 
Model               R                 R Square            Adjusted R Square  
 Estimation 
1           .276   .076        -.097   .12022   
 
 
To further examine whether removing executive compensation and the age of the firm 
from the model will improve the predictive power of the model in explaining the 
variations in ROCE. I performed three regression analyzes. First, I removed both 
variables from the model and compared it with the main model. Secondly I 
removed each of the two models one after the other and compared the resulting R2 
and adjusted R2 with the main analysis. 
 In Table 23, I removed both the age of the firm (FIRMAGE) and executive 
compensation (EXECOMP) from the model. The model summary shows that R2 
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was .101 and adjusted R2 was -.035. Compared with the regression results in 
Table 10 when all the independent variable were included in the model and R2  
and adjusted R2 were .114 and -.086 respectively, there was no improvement in 
the model and the power of the independent variables without executive 
compensation and firm age to explain the variations in ROCE was less.  
 Table 24 showed the model summary of the regression results when executive 
compensation (EXECOMP) alone was removed from the model. The R2 and 
adjusted R2 R2  in the new model were .103 and -.066 respectively and it can be 
concluded that the power of the new model to predict the variations in ROCE was 
less than when all the independent variables were included.  
 Table 25 shows the model summary when only firm age 
(FIRMAGE) was removed from the model. R2 and adjusted R 2 were .101 and -
.067 respectively in the new model. This model has less power to predict 
variations in ROCE than the model that included all the independent variables. 
Table 23 
Model Summary of Regression Results of Independent Variables vs. ROCE (n=39) when Executive 
Compensation and Firm Age was Removed from the Model 
 
       Std. Error of 
Model               R                 R Square            Adjusted R Square  
 Estimation 
1           .319   .101        -.035   .32447  
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Table 24 
Model Summary of Regression Results of Independent Variables vs. ROCE (n=39) when Executive 
Compensation only was Removed from the Model 
 
       Std. Error of 
Model               R                 R Square            Adjusted R Square  
 Estimation 
1           .320   .103        -.066   .32931 
 
 
Table 25 
 
Model Summary of Regression Results of Independent Variables vs. ROCE (n=39) when Firm Age 
Only was Removed from the Model 
 
      Std. Error of 
Model               R                 R Square            Adjusted R Square  
 Estimation 
1           .319   .101        -.067   .32950 
 
 With regards to Tobin’s Q, I conducted the same multiple 
regression tests. When executive compensation (EXECOMP) and firm age 
(FIRMAGE) were removed from the model, the result of the regression in Table 
26 shows that R2 and adjusted R2  were .093 and -.045 respectively. Compared 
with the original model with all the variables included where adjusted R2 was -
.086, the model with the firm age removed had less power to predict and explain 
the variations in Tobin’s Q. 
 By removing executive compensation from the original model that 
included all the independent variables, the regression result in Table 26 shows 
that the adjusted R2 decreased to -.067 from -.086. This result indicated that the 
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explanatory power of the model without executive compensation was less than the 
predictive power of the variables when executive compensation was included.  
 Firm age was also removed from the model to assess whether there 
will be an improvement in the model’s predictive power in relation to Tobin’s Q. 
Table 27 displays the regression result without firm age (FIRMAGE) in the 
model. The R2 and adjusted R2 were .105 and -.062 respectively. Compared with 
the original model with R2 of -.086, the model without the firm age included in it 
had a weaker explanatory power of Tobin’s Q. 
 In addition to the fact that the removal of executive compensation 
and firm age did not improve the explanatory power of the models, it was 
observed that when either of the variables was removed, the VIF values for all the 
other six independent variables became less than absolute value of 2. For 
example, when executive compensation was removed from the model, the highest 
VIF values were 1.664, 1.668, and 1.664 when ROA, ROCE, and Tobin’s Q were 
the outcome variables respectively. Also when firm age was removed from the 
model, the highest VIF values were 1.669, 1.668, and 1.668 respectively for 
ROA, ROCE, and Tobin’s Q as dependent variables. This indicates that executive 
compensation and firm age were measuring the same things and removal of any 
of the variables will remove the problem of multicollinerarity. 
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 From the results of the multiple regressions, it was concluded that 
executive compensation had no relationship with ROA, ROCE, and Tobin’s Q. 
The conclusion is that since executive compensation was not related to 
organizational performance in non-financial companies listed on the Nigerian 
Stock Exchange, it should not be added to the model and the problem of 
multicollinearity will be solved. In none of the three equations for ROA, ROCE, 
and Tobin’s Q computed above was executive compensation one of the 
explanatory variables as it had no relationship with any of the organizational 
performance measures. Multicollineraity problem in the models has thus been 
resolved as executive compensation was not one of the explanatory variables. 
 
Table 26 
 
Model Summary of Regression Results of Independent Variables vs. Tobin’s (n=39) when 
Executive Compensation and Firm Age was Removed from the Model 
 
      Std. Error of 
Model               R                 R Square            Adjusted R Square 
 Estimation 
1           .304   .093        -.045  8.79021 
 
 
Table 27 
Model Summary of Regression Results of Independent Variables vs. Tobin’s (n=39) when 
Executive Compensation only was Removed from the Model 
 
      Std. Error of 
Model               R                 R Square            Adjusted R Square 
 Estimation 
1           .319   .102        -.067  8.88111 
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Table 28 
 
Model Summary of Regression Results of Independent Variables vs. Tobin’s (n=39) when Firm 
Age only was Removed from the Model 
 
      Std. Error of 
Model               R                 R Square            Adjusted R Square 
 Estimation 
1           .324   .105        -.067  8.86420 
 
Unusual Cases 
 I also examined whether unusual cases biased the regression 
model. I ran three regression models with ROA, ROCE, and Tobin’s Q as 
independent variables, using Cook’s distance to examine the effect of an unusual 
case on the model. For ROA, the minimum Cook’s distance was .000, the 
maximum was .341, and the average was .028. For ROCE, the minimum Cook’s 
distance was .000, the maximum was .343, and the mean was .028. Tobin’s Q had 
a minimum Cook’s distance of .000, the maximum was .246, and the average was 
.028. According to Field (2014), values of Cook’s distance  
greater than 1 may be cause for concern. None of the values was close to 
1. I thus conclude that there was not a single case that exerted undue influence on 
the model. 
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Summary of Findings 
The summary of the findings of the study in respect of the impact of 
corporate governance mechanisms on ROA, ROCE, and Tobin’s Q are displayed 
in Tables 29, 30, and 31 respectively. 
Table 29 
Regression Summary: ROA and Corporate Governance 
Regression results    Computed values 
F value       .368 
F critical                2.320 
Significance level      .05 
P value       .914 
R2         .077 
Adjusted R2        .132 
The relationship between ROA and corporate governance was weak as 
evidenced by the adjusted R2 of .132. Because the hierarchical regression results 
showed a less ƒ value of .368 than ƒ critical value of 2.320, I cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that there is no significant statistical association between corporate 
governance and return on assets (ROA). The p value of .914, which was greater 
than the significance level of .05, confirmed this conclusion. Thus, the 
relationship between ROA and corporate governance in non-financial companies 
listed on the NSE was found to be statistically not significant. The relationships 
found in the study between ROA and corporate governance mechanisms were as 
follows: 
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There was a positive but statistically not significant relationship between 
board independence and ROA. 
The relationship between audit committee independence and ROA was 
found to be positive but not statistically significant. 
There was a positive and statistically not significant association between 
board size and ROA. 
A not statistically significant positive relationship was found between the 
number of board meetings and ROA.  
There was no relationship between executive compensation and ROA. 
No significant relationship was found to exist between firm age and ROA.  
A negative relationship was found to exist between firm size and ROA but 
the relationship was statistically not significant. 
Table 30 
Regression Summary: ROCE and Corporate Governance 
Regression results    Computed values 
F value       .568 
F critical                2.320 
Significance level      .05 
P value       .776 
R2         .114 
Adjusted R2       - .086 
The association between ROCE and corporate governance was weak as 
the adjusted R2 was -.086. The computed ƒ value of the hierarchical regression 
314 
 
 
was .568, which was less than the ƒ critical point of 2.320 and the p-value of .776 
was greater than the significance level of .05. I cannot reject the null hypothesis 
that there was no significant statistical relationship between all the corporate 
governance mechanisms and ROCE. I found the following relationships in the 
study: 
The relationship between board independence and ROCE was found to be 
positive but not statistically significant. 
The association between audit committee independence and ROCE was 
positive but not statistically significantly. 
Board size was found to be negatively related to ROCE but the association 
was not statistically significant. 
The relationship between the number of board meetings and ROCE was 
found to be positive but not statistically significant. 
There was no relationship between executive compensation and ROCE. 
There was a positive but not statistically significant relationship between 
firm age and ROCE. 
The relationship between firm size and ROCE was positive but not 
statistically significant. 
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Table 31 
Regression Summary: Tobin’s Q and Corporate Governance 
Regression results    Computed values 
 F value       .528 
 F critical                2.320 
Significance level      .05 
P value       .807 
R2         .107 
Adjusted R2       - .095 
 
 The .107 value of R2 indicated a weak relationship between 
corporate governance and Tobin’s Q in non-financial companies quoted on the 
Nigerian Stock Exchange. The ƒ value of .528 was less than ƒ critical of 2.320 
and the p-value of .807 was greater α, the significance level of .05. The null 
hypothesis that the beta coefficients of all the independent variables were not 
significantly different from zero cannot be rejected. I conclude that there was no 
statistically significant relationship between corporate governance mechanisms 
and Tobin’s Q. I found the following relationships in the study: 
The relationship between board independence and Tobin’s Q was found to 
be negative but not significant. 
The association between audit committee independence was positive but 
not statistically significant. 
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The relationship between board size and Tobin’s Q was found negative 
but not statistically significant. 
There was a positive relationship between the number of board meetings 
and Tobin’s Q but the association was not statistically significant. 
No relationship was found to exist between executive compensation and 
Tobin’s Q. 
The association between firm age and Tobin’s Q was found to be positive 
but not statistically significant. 
The size of the firm was found to be positively associated with Tobin’s Q 
but the relationship was not statistically significant. 
 The results of the study showed that corporate governance 
mechanisms have an impact on ROA, ROCE, and Tobin’s, but none of the 
relationships was found statistically significant. The reasons for the unexpected 
results, as explained above, may be because corporate governance codes in 
Nigeria prescribe strict rules for companies to follow and most corporations 
follow the letter of the rules superficially, without realizing that a strict adherence 
to the rules brings tremendous benefits and improvement to corporate 
performance. I hope this study will go a long way to convince managers of the 
need to overhaul their firms’ corporate governance practice. Another reason may 
be that there are many imperfections in the pricing of the stocks on the stock 
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exchange and the share price may not reflect the business and economic 
fundamentals in the firms and the macro-economic environment in the country. 
This will affect the relationship between organizational performance and Tobin’s 
Q. 
 I have presented the results of the research findings in this chapter. 
The summary of the findings was that corporate governance mechanisms such as 
board independence, independence of the audit committee, board size, and the 
frequency of board meetings were found to be associated with firm performance, 
but the relationship was not statistically significant, Executive compensation was 
found to be unrelated to organizational performance using all the three measures 
of performance in this study, i.e. ROA, ROCE, and Tobin’s Q. Firm age and firm 
size were found to be mediators in the relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms and organizational performance. 
 In the next and final chapter of the study, I summarized the 
conclusion of the research findings and offered recommendations to corporate 
managers and regulators alike. Also, I mentioned some of the limitations of the 
study, which included challenges arising from the use of secondary data and 
modeling problems. The chapter also included recommendations for further 
research and potential contribution to positive social change.  
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
Introduction 
 The theory of agency holds that the separation of ownership from 
control in large, public corporations causes agency problems where managers are 
more likely to pursue self-interest more than the long-term interest of the 
stockholders (Appuchami & Bhuyan, 2015; Liu et al., 2016). Agency theory 
predicts a conflict of interest between the managers and shareholders, which is a 
result of their different interests (Berle & Means, 1932). A conflict of interest 
between managers and shareholders prevents the stockholders from maximizing 
their wealth as managers use their knowledge in the firm to appropriate value to 
themselves (Palmrose, 2013). A number of corporate scandals and financial 
distress in recent times seem to confirm the theory of agency. Researchers have 
proposed that the best tool against shareholder-manager conflict of interest, 
immoral corporate management behavior, irresponsible risk-taking, and financial 
underperformance is a good system of corporate governance practices (Conyon & 
He, 2013). 
 The agency theory focuses its attention on the wealth 
maximization objective of the shareholder as the main and primary objective that 
the corporation ought to pursue (El-Faitouri, 2014). In contrast to the agency 
theory, the stakeholders’ theory posits that the firm should pursue an objective 
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that takes account of the interests of all the stakeholders in the firm (Miletkov et 
al.,2014). The stakeholders are numerous, but the key ones that the organization 
should take into consideration in formulating strategies and policies include 
employees, suppliers, customers, finance providers, the host community, the 
government, and members of the general public (Haβ et al., 2016). By considering 
and maximizing the interests of all stakeholders, the stakeholder’s theory argues 
that conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders and its adverse 
consequences, like immoral corporate management behavior and financial 
underperformance, will be reduced if not completely eliminated  (Arenas & 
Rodrigo, 2016). 
 The stewardship theory is an antithesis of the agency theory. While 
the agency theory assumes that managers are motivated to pursue self-interest, the 
stewardship theory sees managers as essentially responsible and motivated to 
pursue the shareholders’ interest of profit maximization (Hiebl, 2013). When 
managers focus on establishing good relationships within the organization, they 
foster collaboration among corporate actors (Dah, 2016). The stewardship theory 
predicts that pro-organizational trustworthy behavior in managers allows them to 
act in the long-term interest of the stockholders instead of the short-term self-
interest behavior the agency theory assumes (Fama, 1980). 
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 In this study I examined the impact of corporate governance on 
organizational financial performance. I compared and contrasted three theories of 
corporate governance and explored corporate governance practices in 
nonfinancial firms listed on the NSE. The corporate governance structure in 
Nigeria is based on the Nigeria’s SEC code of corporate governance adopted in 
2003 (SEC, 2003). The code requires separation of the chairperson’s position 
from that of the CEO, an independent board, an independent audit committee, a 
minimum number of directors on the board, the presence of other committees of 
the board, disclosure of executive compensation, and the minimum number of 
board meetings in a year (SEC, 2003). The adoption of these corporate 
governance mechanisms could help monitor managers’ activities in the firm and 
align their interests to those of the stockholders, promote disciple in the 
organization, and enhance organizational performance. 
 I adopted a two-stage sampling process to select 39 nonfinancial 
companies listed on the NSE between 2011 and 2015 for the study. In the first 
process, I separated financial companies from nonfinancial companies. Out of the 
171 companies listed on the exchange as at December 31, 2015, 116 were 
nonfinancial companies and the remaining 54 firms were in the financial services 
industry. In the second stage of the two-stage sampling process, I used 
convenience sampling strategy to select the 39 firms based on certain criteria, 
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including a minimum of $1 million market value, minimum of at least four 
directors, no financial losses in all the 5 years under consideration, a minimum of 
3 years trading history prior to 2011, and availability of financial statements that 
provided information on corporate governance mechanisms and financial 
performance. The 39 companies comprised firms in different sectors of the 
economy: agriculture, conglomerates, construction/real estate, consumer goods, 
healthcare, information and communications technology, industrial goods, natural 
resources, oil and gas, and services. I constructed a series of indices and ratios on 
a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet to measure corporate governance mechanisms 
because there is yet to be a generally accepted corporate governance models.  
 I used the equal-waiting approach of assigning scores to the 
corporate governance variables following Bebchuck et al. (2003), Brown and 
Caylor (2004), and Gompers et al. (2003). For example, I assigned four points to a 
company having four directors and five points for five directors. Similarly, four 
points were assigned to a firm that had four meetings in a year and five points if 
the company had five meetings. I measured board independence using a 5-point 
Likert scale where 1 denoted minimum board independence and 5 indicated 
maximum board independence. Also, audit committee independence was 
measured using a 5-point Likert scale of 1 to 5, where 1 indicated minimum 
independence and 5 denoted maximum independence. The size of the board was 
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also measured by assigning one point to each member of the board of directors in 
a firm. The number of board meetings was similarly measured by assigning one 
point to each meeting the firm had in a year. Executive compensation was 
measured by the dollar amount the highest paid executive received in the firm. 
The age of the firm was measured as the number of years since incorporation, and 
the size of the company was measured by the natural logarithm of total assets. 
 Financial performance was measured by three ratios. The first was 
the ROA, which is the ratio of EBITDA and total assets. The second measure of 
financial performance was ROCE, which is the ratio of EBITDA and capital 
employed; capital employed is the total sum of equity and long-term debt. The 
third measure of financial performance was Tobin’s Q. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of 
the firm’s market value to the cost of replacement of its assets.  
 The results of the study showed that the relationship between ROA 
and board independence, audit committee independence, board size, number of 
board meetings, and firm age was positive but not statistically significant. There 
was no relationship between ROA and executive compensation. As concerning 
the relationship between ROA and firm size, the study indicated that the 
association between firm size and ROA was negative but not significant. 
 Concerning the relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms and ROCE, the results of the study showed there was no significant 
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relationship between executive compensation and ROCE. The result also showed 
that there was a positive but not statistically significant relationship between 
board independence, audit committee independence, and the number of board 
meetings and ROCE. The relationship between firm age and firm size was also 
positive but statistically not significant. 
 Board independence and board size were negatively related to 
Tobin’s Q, but the association was not statistically significant. The relationship 
between audit committee independence, the number of board meetings, firm age, 
and firm size and Tobin’s Q were positive but not statistically significant. There 
was no relationship between executive compensation and Tobin’s Q.  
Interpretation of Findings 
 The purpose of this study was to find answers to the eight RQs I 
developed. The RQs were as follows: 
RQ1: Is there a statistically significant association between corporate governance and 
financial performance of publicly quoted companies in Nigeria? 
RQ2: Is there a statistically significant association between board  
independence and financial performance of publicly quoted companies in Nigeria? 
RQ3: Is there a statistically significant association between audit committee 
independence and financial performance of publicly quoted companies in 
Nigeria? 
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RQ4: Is there a statistically significant association between executive compensation and 
financial performance of publicly quoted companies in Nigeria? 
RQ5: Is there a statistically significant association between the number of board meetings 
and financial performance of publicly quoted companies in Nigeria? 
RQ6: Is there a statistically significant association between board size and financial 
performance of publicly quoted companies in Nigeria? 
RQ7: Does the size of the firm mediate the relationship between corporate governance 
and financial performance of publicly quoted companies in Nigeria? 
RQ8: Does the age of the firm mediate the relationship between corporate governance 
and financial performance of publicly quoted companies in  
Nigeria? 
To test these relationships, I used a theoretical framework based on agency, stakeholder, 
and stewardship theories to link the five mechanisms of corporate governance 
with the three measures of financial performance: ROA, ROCE, and Tobin’s Q. I 
performed several global ƒ tests to establish a linear relationship between the 
financial performance dependent variables and corporate governance mechanisms 
independent variables. I also performed individual t tests to examine the 
relationship between individual corporate governance mechanisms and financial 
performance metrics. To test for the presence of multicollinearity problem in the 
model, I used correlation matrix of the individual variables and VIF values. The 
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results of the tests showed that multicollinearity was present in the model, caused 
by either firm age or executive compensation. When any of the two independent 
variables was removed; however, multicollinearity problem disappeared. When 
executive compensation was removed from all the equations, since it had no 
relationship with any of the three measures of organizational financial 
performance, the multicollinearity problem in the regression model was resolved. 
In the next section, I explained the research findings of the study.  
Corporate Governance and Organizational Performance 
 RQ1 asked whether there was a statistically significant association between 
corporate governance and organizational performance. The statistical results in 
Chapter 4 indicated there was a relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms and organizational performance, measured by ROA, ROCE, and 
Tobin’s Q. The ƒ test, and p values, R2, and adjusted R2 tabulated in Table 10 
provided some support of a relationship, but not all the associations were positive 
and none was statistically significant. Board independence was measured by the 
proportion of directors that was nonexecutive and whether there was the presence 
of CEO duality in the firm. The BRT’s principles of corporate governance, the 
SOX, and findings from my review of the literature suggested that an independent 
board and absence of CEO duality ensure a good corporate governance practice 
and strong organizational performance. The assumption is that better economic 
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and financial decisions are made in a firm with an independent board, which leads 
to improved financial performance (Al-Matar et al.,2014). 
 Of all the corporate governance mechanisms, only firm size was negatively 
related to ROA. Executive compensation and firm age had no association with 
ROA and all the others, although positively associated with the outcome variable, 
were statistically not significant. Board independence, audit committee 
independence, board size, and the number of board meetings were positively 
related to ROA but the relationship was not statistically significant. Board 
independence, audit committee independence, number of board meetings, firm 
age, and firm size had a positive but not statistically significant relationship with 
ROCE while the relationship between board size and ROCE was negative but not 
statistically significant. Executive compensation was not associated with ROCE. 
 The relationship between Tobin’s Q and corporate governance mechanisms was 
negative but statistically not significant. Board independence and board size were 
negatively related to Tobin’s Q but the association was statistically not 
significant. The relationship between audit committee independence, number of 
board meetings, firm age, and firm size and Tobin’s Q was positive but 
statistically not significant. There was no relationship between executive 
compensation and Tobin’s Q. 
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Corporate Governance and Return on Assets (ROA) 
RQ 2 was whether there was a statistically significant relationship between board 
independence and organizational performance, measured by ROA. The impact of 
board independence on organizational performance in the literature was mixed. 
For example, Wu and Li (2014) found board independence reduces fraud in 
Chinese companies. On the other hand, Benjamin and Zain (2015) found the 
relationship between board independence and dividend payout negative and 
statistically significant. Greater board independence and absence of CEO duality 
will guarantee a much more fruitful discussion on the board and an objective 
assessment of CEO performance. But when CEO duality is present and there is no 
lead director to serve as a bulwark on the power of the CEO, the tendency of the 
CEO to seek self-interest is greater. According to the agency theory, the pursuit of 
managers’ self-interest leads to organizational underperformance.  
Thus, a positive relationship between board independence and ROA was expected; what 
was not expected was a statistically not significant association. One possible 
explanation is that in Nigeria, the Nigerian SEC code of corporate governance 
prescribes that no company should have CEO duality and the majority of the 
members of the board of directors must be composed of nonexecutive and 
independent directors. Inevitably, all companies have nonexecutive chair and the 
majority of the board is composed, seemingly, of independent directors. This 
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uniformity may have contributed to the result. Another reason may be that most of 
those directors identified as independent may not be without some remote ties 
with the company in actual practice. The directors may just be putting their 
cronies on the board just to satisfy the requirements of SEC’s code of corporate 
governance. 
RQ 3 was: Is there a statistically significant relationship between audit committee 
independence and organizational performance measured by ROA? The SOX 
made independence audit committee mandatory, following the financial collapse 
of Enron, Inc. together with its external auditors, Arthur Andersen. The close 
relationship between the directors of Enron and the partners of Arthur Andersen 
and due the significant amount of other services rendered to the company by the 
auditor was blamed for the unhealthy cooperation between auditor and client. To 
prevent a situation where an auditor is less than objective because of the 
relationship with his or her client’s directors, an audit committee is required to be 
composed of independent directors with knowledge of finance and accounting. 
SOX also set up the PCAOB to supervise and discipline errant auditors. In the 
present study, the association between audit committee independence and ROA 
was positive but not statistically significance. I expected a statistically significant 
association because the independence of the members engenders objective and 
professional atmosphere in the firm’s accounting and control systems. One 
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possible explanation for the not significant relationship is likely to be that 
directors put their cronies on the committee to satisfy Nigerian SEC’s codes, who 
have the appearance of independent persons, but who are in fact stooges of the 
executive directors. Another reason is that the code was not specific as to the 
qualifications of members of the audit committee. The requirement should be that 
at least the chairman and another member should have expertise in accounting or 
finance.   
The audit committee offers advisory and support services to the management and the 
board. The committee looks at the audit report, calls for clarifications of certain 
figures and balances, and also examines the work of the chief internal auditor to 
offer ensure the financial and operational controls are strong and working 
properly. A system where a strong and independent committee is in operation, 
composed by experienced and knowledgeable individuals with integrity, ought to 
improve financial and risk management controls and organizational performance. 
Although the relationship between audit committee and organizational 
performance is yet to be exhaustively dealt with in the literature, Hassan and 
Ahmed (2014) found a positive and significant relationship between audit 
committee and ROA. In the present study, the association between audit 
committee independence and ROA was found positive but not statistically 
significant. In Nigeria, the CAMA requires that all public have at least six 
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members of the audit committee, three members are to be composed of the 
members of the executive directors and three members from shareholders’ 
representatives. What all companies do is to strictly abide by this provision, which 
is less than ideal as corporate governance principles require all members of the 
audit committee to be, ideally, independent. Of all the 39 companies that were 
sampled, only one had an audit committee structure that is more independent. The 
uniformity with which the law’s provision is being applied may also have 
accounted for the statistically not significant association between audit committee 
independence and ROA. 
RQ 4 was whether there is a significant association between board size and 
organizational performance measured by ROA. There is disagreement in the 
literature whether the size of the board is good or bad for company performance. 
Cao, Leung, Feroz, and Davalos (2015) and Adewuyi and  Olowookere (2013) 
reported a positive and significant relationship between smaller board and 
corporate performance. On the other hand, Xie and Fukumoto (2013) and Kouki 
and Gani (2015) found that the bigger the board the better is organizational 
performance. Board size can be a source of competitive advantage especially if 
the board is diverse in terms of the competencies of the members, their 
connections in the industry, and the synergy of their skills-set. But bigger boards 
could also cause rivalry among members and bureaucracy that lead to poor 
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organizational performance. I expected board size to be significantly association 
with ROA. The result of the study showed that although board size was positive, 
it was not significantly related to ROA. The CAMA stipulated a minimum of two 
board members and the SEC code of corporate governance made provision for a 
minimum of four members. The result of the study may be because many boards 
in Nigeria are composed of friends and family members and appointment to the 
board are seen by many as a big favor to reward loyalty; merit is rarely considered 
in many cases.  
For RQ 5 was whether there is a significant association between organizational 
performance, measured by ROA, and the number of board meetings. According to 
Alves, Couto, and Francisco (2016) and Jermias and Gani (2014) the board 
meetings is where board power is exercised. The frequency of meetings also 
indicates board involvement in the organization’s affairs and ought to positively 
impact organizational financial performance (Mishra & Mihanty, 2013). The 
frequency of board meetings have been found by some researchers to be 
negatively and significantly related to firm performance. In this research study, 
the number of meetings was positive but not significantly related to financial 
performance.  
RQ 6 was whether executive compensation has a significant association with 
organizational performance measured by ROA. Although the result showed that 
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there was no relationship as the beta coefficient of executive compensation was 
closer to zero, some researchers have found that the higher the executive pay, the 
higher the book value of assets and the lower the ROA (Alves et al., 2016). The 
result of the present study was surprising as I had expected executive pay to be a 
great motivator to employees to do more for the organization and increase its 
profitability and value. One reason for the lack of relationship between ROA and 
executive compensation may be because organizations in Nigeria rarely disclose 
the true executive compensation on the face of financial statements and there are 
as yet no oversight regulators that enforce the disclosure. Again, the practice of 
giving benefits-in-kind to executives instead of cash is common in Nigeria and 
monitoring and monetizing these benefits may be near impossible. 
RQ 7 asked whether the relationship between firm age and organizational performance, 
measured by ROA is statistically significant. The age of the firm, measured by the 
number of years since incorporation, could be an asset or liability. Age is a proxy 
for experience and may guide a company from making costly strategic error. On 
the other hand, old companies tend to be complacent, the last to discover that their 
customers’ taste and lifestyles have changed for them to adapt their products and 
services accordingly, and the last to change their business model in an age where 
mobility is everything. I expected a significant relationship between the age of the 
firm and organizational performance. The surprising thing here is that there was 
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no relationship at all. The result may be because many of the sampled companies 
were very old. The mean age was 45 years and the maximum exceeded 100 years. 
Only one company is in information technology and one also in natural resources, 
the business sector of now and the future. All these points considered, companies 
in Nigeria are very old and new ventures are not being set up, not in the sectors 
and size that matter. This may be why age does not have any association with 
ROA. 
In RQ 8, I asked whether the size of the firm and organizational performance, measured 
by ROA, was statistically significant. Size confers many advantages on the firm: 
Much better ability to negotiate contracts than smaller firms, better able to 
withstand economic shocks, and ability to buy in bulk to gain substantial 
discounts. All things considered, the size of the firm should be positively and 
significantly related to organizational performance. The result of this study 
showed that the relationship between the size of the firm, measured by natural 
logarithm of total assets, and ROA was negative and not significant. This is 
surprising. Again, the result may be because most firms get by in Nigeria through 
crony capitalism, not because of efficiency, innovation, merit, or superior 
management skill. 
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Corporate Governance and Return on Capital Employed (ROCE) 
 RQ 1examined the relationship between corporate governance and 
organizational performance, measured by ROCE. The findings in Table 13 
showed that there was some relationship between corporate governance and 
ROCE. Board independence (BODIND), audit committee independence 
(AUDCOMMIND), number of board meetings (BODMTGS), firm age 
(FIRMAGE), and firm size (FIRMSIZE) were all positively related to ROCE. The 
relationship is weak giving that the adjusted R2 was 
 -.086. There was no relationship between executive compensation and 
ROCE because the beta coefficient is very close to zero. Board size was 
negatively associated with ROCE.  
 RQ 2 the relationship between board independence and ROCE, 
whether there was a statistically significant relationship between the two 
variables. Board independence was measured by the proportion of independent 
directors to the number of directors and whether there was separation between the 
chair and the CEO. ROCE was measured by the ratio of EBITDA and capital 
employed. Capital employed is the total sum of equity and long-term debt. There 
was some evidence in the literature that ROCE is positively and significantly 
associated with board independence (Kouki & Gani, 2015; Sun et al. 2014). I 
expected a positive and significant relationship between board independence and 
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ROCE, but the result showed that the relationship was not statistically significant; 
the association between board independence and ROCE was found positive but 
not significant. The beta coefficient of .188 showed that board independence 
could explain 19% of the variations in ROCE.  
 The RQ 3 was whether the relationship between audit committee 
independence and organizational performance, measured by ROCE, was 
statistically significant. Audit committee independence was measured by the 
proportion of independent members on the committee to the total number of 
members and whether the members can communicate directly with the chief 
internal auditor. Generally, the committee has access to the internal auditors who 
may be asked to appear to explain certain issues as the case may be. Whether the 
committee’s chair and other members know what questions to ask and whether 
they are equipped to understand the answers is a different matter, which depends 
on the competence of the committee. I expected a positive and significant 
relationship between audit committee independence and ROCE. Audit committee 
monitors the work of the external and internal auditors and if it does its work well, 
management’s tendency to misstate accounting information or give out false 
reports will be minimized, and financial statements will be more accurate and 
firm value enhanced. The result was unexpected as the relationship between audit 
committee independence and ROCE was positive but not significant. The reason, 
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as stated when the relationship between ROA and audit committee independence 
was examined may be because company legislation in Nigeria assigns equal 
numbers of members to the committee comprising representatives of the 
shareholders and the company. Most companies follow this practice which does 
not give the committee real independence as defined in the BRT principles of 
corporate governance. 
 The RQ 4 in relation to ROCE was whether there was a significant 
relationship between board size and organizational performance, measured by 
ROCE. The size of the board is the absolute number of the members on the board. 
A large board will have room for diversity, a complement of skills, and other 
board directorships that may benefit the firm. Thus I expected board size to be 
positive and significantly related to ROCE. The result was unexpected. The 
relationship between board size and ROCE was negative and not statistically 
significant. The result may be because appointments to the boards of corporations 
in Nigeria are not without the old practice of using family connections where 
merit and skill take a second place. The complementary skills-set that should help 
a firm achieve superior performance may be absence even in a large board in 
corporations in Nigeria. 
 RQ 5 was in relation to the association between the number of 
board meetings and organizational performance measured by ROCE and whether 
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a statistical and significant relationship existed between the two variables. The 
board exercises board and corporate power at the board meetings where important 
and far reaching decisions that affect the present and future performance of the 
firm are taken. The number of board meetings has been found in the literature to 
be negative and significantly associated with dividend payout policy (Benjamin & 
Zain, 2015). Dividend payout policy is a proxy for performance as dividend 
relates to profitability. In the present study, the relationship between the number 
of board meetings and ROCE was positive but not significant. The positive 
relationship is also weak, with beta coefficient of 0.033. The reason for this 
unexpected result may be because, as stated above, board appointments in Nigeria 
are not based on merit, and knowledgeable and objective discussion of strategy 
and policy in meetings may be generally absent at the meetings, and could be 
more of re-echoing the position of a powerful chairperson. This may be more so if 
the directors have been hand-picked by the CEO or a powerful chair. 
 As regards RQ 6 whether the relationship between executive 
compensation and corporate governance is statistically significant, the result 
indicated that there was no relationship between ROCE and executive 
compensation. The beta coefficient is nearly zero, at .0000005671. The result was 
unexpected. Executive compensation was measured by the dollar amount paid to 
the highest paid executive as disclosed in the financial statements. Some research 
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findings have found positive and significant association between executive pay 
and corporate performance (Basory, Gleason, & Kannan, 2014). Other research 
findings showed a negative relationship between executive compensation and 
corporate performance (Alves et al., 2016). Although the research findings are not 
conclusive, I expected a positive and significant relationship between executive 
compensation and ROCE. Higher pay signals to the executives that hard work and 
innovation are recognized in the firm and it also serves as an attraction to 
qualified professionals to seek employment in the company. The result was 
unexpected; the negative relationship between executive compensation and ROCE 
was extremely weak as the beta coefficient was virtually zero. I conclude that 
there was no relationship between executive compensation and ROCE. The 
reason for this result may be because firms in Nigeria may not be disclosing all 
the executives’ emoluments, and what is not disclosed is different from one firm 
to the other. Another reason may be that the compensation to executives is far and 
above the value they give to the companies, in other words, the executives are 
seriously overpaid.  
 RQ 7 in relation to organizational performance measured by 
ROCE is whether the age of the firm mediated or explained the relationship 
between corporate governance and financial performance. A mediating variable 
affects the relationship between the independent and dependent variables. In the 
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main model, R2 was .114 and adjusted R2 was -.086. When firm age was removed 
from the model, R2 reduced to .101 and adjusted R2 became -.067. The difference 
in the adjusted R2 was 22.09%. From this result, I conclude that the age of the 
firm mediated the relationship between corporate governance and ROCE. The age 
of the firm can be an impediment to growth and profitability due to reluctance to 
change with changes in the business landscape and lack of motivation to stick to 
the tried and tested way of doing things. 
 As to RQ 8  whether the size of the firm mediated the relationship 
between corporate governance and ROCE, the adjusted R2 computed without the 
size of the firm in the main model was -.082 and the adjusted R2 with all the 
variables included was -.086. Firm age caused the R2 to change by .004 or 4.65%, 
which seems to suggest that the size of the firm does not affect or mediate the 
relationship between corporate governance and ROCE. Although I started by 
assuming that size mattered in corporate governance, the power of the size of the 
firm to explain the relationship between corporate governance and firm 
performance measured by ROCE was limited. 
Corporate Governance and Tobin’s Q 
 In relation to RQ 2  and Tobin’s Q, the question was whether the 
relationship between board independence and financial performance, measured by 
Tobin’s Q, was statistically significant. The statistical results in Chapter 4 
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indicated that there was some relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms and organizational performance, measured by Tobin’s Q. In Table 
14, the relationship between board independence and Tobin’s Q was negative but 
not statistically significant. Tobin’s Q measures the market value of the firm and 
board independence is valued by investors and financial analysts and should 
enhance the value of the firm. The result was not expected as research in the 
literature seemed to suggest that board effectiveness leads to enhanced market 
value (Baulkaran, 2014; Bhagat & Bolton, 2013; Mishra & Mohanty, 2013). The 
reason may be the many imperfections in the pricing of equities in the market. For 
example, insider trading in firms’ stocks is rarely detected and punished, and it is 
not unknown for companies to buy their own shares through covert purchases 
contracts with brokers to increase their share price, especially prior to a rights 
issue or public offering. 
 RQ 3 was whether the relationship between audit independence 
and company financial performance, measured by Tobin’s Q, was statistically 
significant. The statistical regression results showed that audit committee 
independence was positively associated with Tobin’s Q, but the relationship was 
statistically not significant, as the p value of .301 was greater than the .05 level of 
significance. Like board independence, audit committee independence should 
signal to the investment community the accuracy of financial information in the 
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company’s accounts. The reliance on the report of the audit committee by the 
investment community should enhance the firm’s share price and market value. 
The result was not expected. Like appointment to the board, members of the 
committee are rarely selected on merit and appropriate qualifications. Also the 
requirement of law in the country that half of the members of the committee 
should be composed of executive directors is a serious cause for concern and may 
have caused the near irrelevancy of audit committee work in Nigeria.  
RQ 4 was whether the relationship between board size and corporate performance, 
measured by Tobin’s Q was statistically significant. The board of directors is the 
organ of the firm. The quality and size of the board matter because the board 
represents the shareholders and its members’ vision, competence, and the quality 
of its decisions affect the company’s financial fortunes. While there is no single 
metric to determine the appropriate board size as it depends on the organizational 
context, the complexity of the company’s operations, the number of subsidiaries, 
and the need for proper coordination and control (Lucas-Perez et al., 2014; 
Knockeart et al., 2015).. Although, board size may not be sensitive to the benefits 
and costs of monitoring and advising the management of the firm, I expected a 
large board size (beyond the minimum of two directors prescribed by law) to 
positively and significantly affect firm value, measured by Tobin’s Q. The result 
indicated that the relationship was not statistically significant. As mentioned 
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above, the reason may be the way board appointments are made in Nigeria: More 
through family connections and friendship networks, and less by merit, skills, and 
verifiable and cognate experience (Adewuyi & Olowookere, 2013).  
  RQ 5 in relation to Tobin’s Q was whether the relationship 
between organizational performance, measured by Tobin’s Q, and the number of 
board meetings was statistically significant. Board meetings take place in the 
boardroom. The board room is where corporate power is exercised. Issues 
affecting the firm’s business, strategy, competition, research and development, 
risk management, foreign subsidiary, mergers and acquisitions, divestment, 
personnel issues, and other matters are discussed during board meetings. The 
frequency of board meetings is therefore crucial to the growth and progress of the 
firm (Benjamin & Zain, 2015). I expected a positive and statistically significant 
association between Tobin’s Q and the number of board meetings. Even though 
the relationship between the frequency of meetings and Tobin’s Q was positive, it 
was not statistically significant as the p value of .380 exceeded the alpha criterion 
of .05. The reason may be that most meetings do not address the critical issues 
affecting the business of the corporation as the recruitment of directors to the 
board was faulty from the onset. In this situation, the powerful CEO sets the 
agenda and directs the procedures at the meetings. The chair and other members 
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merely commend the CEO for a job well done without any attempt at a critical 
and objective appraisal of the CEO’s and other executives’ presentations. 
 RQ 6 concerned the association between corporate governance, 
measured by executive compensation, and organizational performance, measured 
by Tobin’s Q was statistically significant. The result of the regression showed that 
there was no relationship between executive compensation and Tobin’s Q, as the 
beta coefficient was virtually zero. The result was not what I expected. The 
information effect of executive compensation can be a very powerful motivator of 
employee loyalty, commitment, and dedication (Basory et al., 2014). The result 
could also be that not all emoluments are disclosed in the financial statements. It 
could also be that executive compensation does not serve as a motivator, either 
because they are too low or badly packaged. For example, stock options and pay-
for-performance are rarely part of executive compensation in Nigeria. Nigerian 
companies may have been overpaying its managers because rarely is executives’ 
pay linked to company performance. 
 RQ 7 asked whether firm age mediated the relationship between 
corporate governance mechanisms and organizational performance, measured by 
Tobin’s Q. The result of the regression showed that the adjusted R2 was -.046 
when none of the two mediating variables was in the regression model. Including 
the age of the firm in the model improved the model as the adjusted R2 became -
344 
 
 
.077. Before the mediating variable, firm age, was added into the model, the 
independent variables were able to explain 4.6% of the variations in Tobin’s Q, 
by adding firm age, the independent variables were able to explain 7.7% of the 
variations in Tobin’s Q. I conclude that the age of the firm mediates the 
relationship between Tobin’s Q and board independence, audit committee 
independence, number of board meetings, and board size. 
 RQ 8 asked whether the size of the firm mediated the relationship 
between corporate governance and organizational performance, measured by 
Tobin’s Q. The size of the firm was measured by the natural logarithm of total 
assets. The size of the firm should confer some positive advantages on the 
company and enhance its market value, measured by Tobin’s Q. The power to 
negotiate a contract, lobby the government for favorable treatment, get cheap 
finance from the financial institutions, and trade credit from suppliers more often 
than not is a function of corporate size. The size of the firm, all things equal, 
should enhance its market value, measured by Tobin’s Q. The result of the 
regression showed that when the regression model contained only the corporate 
governance variables, the adjusted R2 was -.046. When the size of the firm was 
added to the model as the only mediating variable, the adjusted  R2 increased to -
.097. The addition of firm size to the model increased the explanatory power of 
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the independent variables by more than 100%. The conclusion is that size is a 
mediator between corporate governance mechanisms and Tobin’s Q. 
Recommendations 
 The UNDP and the BRT principles of corporate governance 
advocated an independent board, independent audit committee, and a 
nonexecutive chair for the board of directors of publicly listed companies. The 
United Kingdom’s Cadbury Committee on the financial aspects of corporate 
governance (The Cadbury Committee) recommended the presence of a lead 
director when the chair of the board is also the CEO of the firm. Some researchers 
in corporate governance have stated that an independent board, smaller board 
sizes, a non-executive chair, adequate compensation to executives, and more 
frequent board meetings were the means to ensure efficiency in business 
organizations and to minimize conflict of interests in large public corporations.  
 The regulators in many countries have also recommended an 
independent board, independent audit and other committees, and regular 
attendance at board meetings as a way to increase the directors’ involvement in 
public companies and eliminate self-interests of executives to enhance 
organizational performance and shareholders’ wealth. Many of these 
recommendations are in line with corporate governance principles advocated by 
the UNDP, the Cadbury Committee, and the BRT. The research findings of this 
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study have shown evidence that was contrary to these principles and codes of 
corporate governance practice.  
 The results of this study indicated that executive compensation and 
age of the firm have little direct relationship with ROA in nonfinancial companies 
listed on the NSE. Board independence, audit committee independence, board 
size, and the number of board meetings have a direct positive association with 
ROA in the sampled companies but the relationship was found to be statistically 
not significant. 
 Executive compensation serves to motivate employees to be loyal 
and dedicated to the objectives of the organization, and also to aspire to positions 
of authority and therefore stay with the firm for a long time. The results of the 
study showed that the disclosure of executive compensation in the financial 
statements was not uniform. While some companies disclosed only basic salaries, 
others disclosed allowances, benefits-in-kind, and other compensation. Apart 
from the loss of information effect of the disclosure that serves to motivate staff 
and encourage outsiders in dealing with the firm, comparability among companies 
was difficult. The result of the study also showed that executive compensation 
was not related to return on capital employed. The negative beta coefficient was 
almost zero. Executive compensation also had no relationship with Tobin’s Q. 
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 I recommend that the financial statements should contain a full 
disclosure of executive compensation, including the monetary value of car and 
driver, company housing provided to the executive, paid annual leave, education 
allowance for the executive’s children, wardrobe and furniture allowance, security 
allowance, paid utility bills, and employer’s portion of contributory pension. 
Additionally, a sort of pay-for-performance should become a standard part of the 
whole package of executive compensation. In Nigeria, executive pay is rarely 
linked to corporate performance and the notion of stock options is foreign to 
Nigerian executives. If executive compensation is to have a significant impact on 
organizational performance, part of the compensation should be linked to the 
firms’ performance. 
 The age of the firm is a proxy for experience. Experience gives the 
advantage of avoiding costly mistakes and strategic error. The result of the study 
showed that age had no relationship at all with organizational performance, 
measured by ROA. As regards ROCE, the relationship between age and corporate 
governance mechanism was weak. However, the relationship between age and 
Tobin’s Q, a measure of market value was the strongest. This means that investors 
value older companies more as they believe the firms provide more stability, 
experience, and dependability. I recommend that companies emphasize their age 
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and experience in their marketing and other corporate communication as this will 
positively impact the company’s business and share price. 
 Board independence is seen as the most important components of 
corporate governance practices that could ensure reduction in the directors’ self-
interest and prevent weak organizational performance by the SOX and the 
principles of corporate governance in the Cadbury Committee, the UNDP, and the 
BRT. Independence of the board makes possible a corporate environment where 
merit and objectivity are valued. Independence of the majority of the board 
members will also ensure that business dealings with the firms are free of insider 
abuse, financial manipulation, and false reporting. The result of the study 
indicated that board independence was positive but not statistically significant in 
relation to ROA and ROCE. Board independent, on the other hand, was 
negatively related to Tobin’s Q, which is a measure of the firm’s market value. 
Both ROA and ROCE measured a firm’s profitability. It appears that in non-
financial firms in Nigeria, boards of directors are not perceived as truly 
independent. This is because the process of recruitment of members to the board 
may be faulty, as many of the positions are given to family members and old 
friends.  
 The negative relationship between the Tobin’s Q and board 
independence may be because the market and the investing public see members as 
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mercenaries; being on the board to further their self-interest without adding value 
to the firm. My recommendations are that the recruitment of members to the 
board of directors should be open and transparent. The process should be free of 
bias and the selected candidates should be respected members of the society with 
required qualifications and skills-set that is appropriate and can add value to the 
company. Additionally, the current practice of appointing a former CEO as chair 
and auditor as one of the directors should be discouraged to allow for a cooling 
period of at least 10 years before making those appointments. Directors should 
also be appointment after thorough investigation of both their professional and 
business life to ensure only men and women of integrity are appointed to the 
board. 
 Audit committee independence is crucial if financial statements are 
to be true and fair and free of errors and manipulations. An independent 
committee will be able to ensure that the external auditors are professional and 
objective in their work and that internal auditors display diligence, integrity, 
objectivity, and an independent attitude to their work. The SOX and many 
corporate governance codes emphasize the importance of an independent audit 
committee as the bulwark against corporate financial abuse. The result showed a 
positive relationship between the independence of audit committee and ROCE, 
but the association was not significant. It is worrisome that the CAMA prescribed 
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six members of the audit committee, three executive directors and three 
representatives of the shareholders. All companies followed this minimum 
standard, which is less than the principles recommended. I recommend that the 
structure of the audit committee should be changed. All members of the audit 
committee should be independent for an objective appraisal of a firm’s accounting 
policies, audit process, auditor’s assessment, and assessment of the quality of 
financial information.  
 From the results, I discovered that many members selected for the 
audit committee assignment were not qualified for the job. Many do not have 
accounting, finance, and audit qualifications; neither do the majority of the 
members have industry experience. What became plainly obvious was that the 
recruitment to the committee follows a similar process like recruitment to the 
board of directors. I recommend further that only those with requisite 
qualifications should be recruited to the audit committee and the committee 
should be composed entirely of independent members.  
 Many researchers hold the view that the smaller the size of the 
board, the more the profitability and financial performance. Yet, a prescription of 
the number of directors on a board is conceptually and practically difficult and 
may bring about inefficiency and weak organizational financial performance. 
What ought to be emphasized are the qualities and integrity of the members of the 
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board, their experience, skills-set, and industry connections. A large board size 
has the potential of containing several men and women with different skills and 
industry experience. It is also possible for a large board to have diversity, which 
researchers have linked to superior organizational performance. The result of the 
research indicated that the relationship between board size and organizational 
financial performance, measured by ROA, was positive but the association was 
weak and not statistically significant. But board size was negatively related to 
ROCE and Tobin’s Q.  
 Although, as stated above, a large board size can be an advantage 
by introducing diversity and experience to the firm, it could also be a liability. A 
large board size may increase rivalry and unhealthy competitiveness among the 
directors. It may also increase red tape and bureaucracy. The optimum board size 
should depend on the complexity of the organization and the need to have 
different skills and experiences at the disposal of the firm. I recommend that, in 
defining the optimum number of directors on the board, it must be ensured that 
enough members are recruited to carry on the business of the firm and ensure that 
the members can introduce diversity and be enough to form the various 
committees that are essential to the business of the company. 
 The result of this study for the number of board meetings indicated 
that the relationship between the frequency meetings and ROA was positive but 
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not significant. The relationship between the number of board meetings and 
ROCE and Tobin’s Q was negative but not significant. Board meetings are where 
major decisions concerning the present and future performance of the firm take 
place. The board meetings are also where corporate power is exercised. The 
frequency and quality of the meetings, all things being equal, should have a 
positive impact on organizational performance. 
 The reason for the negative relationship between the number of 
board meetings and ROCE and Tobin’s Q in this study may be because in many 
meetings, the discussions may be far from being objective, but many may be just 
to rubber-stamp a powerful CEO’s propositions. Investors may not believe in the 
quality of decisions in the boardroom if the directors are seen as weak and 
unqualified. I recommend that the board of directors should set up meetings 
where the agenda is known prior to the meetings, to seek advice from subject 
experts on a technical matter before the meeting, and to ensure that members 
receive early notification of the meetings. The board should also send all papers 
and issues to be considered in advance to all members and encourage them to 
attend all meetings and make objective contributions to the debate. 
 Executive compensation was found to have no relationship with 
ROA, ROCE, and Tobin’s Q. In Nigeria, the only information available regarding 
executive compensation is the disclosure in the financial statements of the 
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emoluments of the chairperson and the highest paid director. This is a requirement 
of the law and not a code of corporate governance practice. However, the 
disclosure is not uniformly applied by the listed companies. Some companies only 
disclose basic salaries and omit allowances and benefits-in-kind. It is thus difficult 
to determine, using an objective standard, the completeness of the disclosure of 
executive compensation in the non-financial companies listed on the NSE.  
 Another challenge is that Nigerian firms usually provide executive 
with car and driver, paid annual leave, security details, housemaids and other 
servants, and allowances such as wardrobe, education, furniture, and housing. 
Many of these benefits-in-kind were not captured in the disclosure of executive 
compensation in the financial statements. The results also indicated that in 
Nigeria, many executives are not rewarded with a portion of the firms profit; 
rarely do companies link executive pay to the firm’s performance. Yet researchers 
have stated that it is a good policy to link part of executive compensation to the 
financial fortunes of the company. I recommend that companies should fully 
disclose all executive emoluments in the financial statements and for the rule to 
be applied among all the listed firms on the NSE. I also recommend that efforts 
should be made to link part of the executive compensation to the performance of 
the company as it gives executive and staff motivation to perform better.  
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 I have been extremely careful in my data gathering and analysis of 
the result of this study, nevertheless the study has some limitations. This study 
examined the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and 
organizational performance in non-financial companies listed on the NSE that met 
certain predetermined criteria. The findings in the study cannot be generalized to 
all listed corporations in the world. Some of the limitations of the study include 
the use of secondary data, lack of information in some organizations, non-
uniformity in the implementation of IFRS, and modeling problems. The use of 
secondary data and the criteria set for inclusion of corporations in the sample 
limited the data available for the study. First, the financial statements of all firms 
were prepared under the historical cost convention. Between 2011 and 2012, all 
companies adopted the Nigerian Generally Accepted Accounting Principles but a 
switch was made to IFRS in 2012 which necessitated a restatement of the 2011 
and 2012 balances and profit and loss figures. 
 Secondly, given the possibility of the presence of financial and 
accounting manipulations and accounting balances misstatements that are 
common in companies, I would have made appropriate adjustments to balance 
sheet figures at the end of the year and the profit and loss statements for the year 
to get an accurate figure to use in my analysis. Thirdly, it is impossible to 
determine whether the adjustments made by the companies to the financial 
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statements of 2011 and 2012 and prior period to conform to IFRS was uniformly 
and correctly applied in all corporations in the sample. Lastly, account balances 
and income and expenses figures are subject to accounting conventions, 
accounting bases, and individual firm’s accounting policies. It is not practicable to 
know whether all the firms in the sample prepared their financial statement by 
adhering to the most useful conventions and accounting policies, from the 
investors’ point of view, that allow the financial statements to show a true and fair 
view, given that there are more than one policy a company can adopt to reflect its 
financial transactions in the accounting records.  
 If information were available, I would have made necessary and 
comprehensive adjustments to the financial statements to recalculate items in the 
financial statements, such as EBITDA, book value of equity, long-term debt, 
current assets, current liabilities, total assets, net working capital, book value of 
preferred stock, gross and net sales, net income, capital employed, and inventory. 
The recalculation to adjust the accounting figures to what is true and fair and 
accurate could have produced different items in the annual reports and accounts 
and may have resulted in different findings and conclusions. The consequence of 
the lack of adequate information has necessitated that the accounting figures in 
the financial statements were taken at face value and used as presented in the 
corporations’ annual reports without any adjustment. 
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 Another limitation of the study is that the sampled companies were 
drawn from all non-financial companies listed on the stock exchange between 
2011 and 2015 that met the prescribed criteria for inclusion. These firms operated 
in different sectors of the economy. A more accurate sampling method would 
have been the stratified sampling method to select a significant number of 
companies from each subsector to avoid over- or underrepresentation of some 
subsectors. Another limitation is that the Nigerian economy has been facing 
serious problems since 2012 when international oil prices dropped to an all time 
low, forcing many companies to apply to the stock exchange for delisting, and 
many others relocating to other countries while some are making accounting 
losses. The poor macro-economic situation in the country limited the number of 
non-financial companies that qualified to be included in the sample. Yet another 
limitation is that some sectors are represented by only a few companies. For 
example, information and communications technology subsector had six firms but 
only two were not making losses out of which one had incomplete financial 
statements. The other four were either not operating or making losses. The natural 
resources subsector had only two companies in the sector, one of which was 
making losses. 
 The modeling problems in the study arose from the fact that only 
five corporate governance mechanisms were considered in the study. These five 
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corporate governance mechanisms have been considered in the literature 
generally and by the Nigerian researchers in particular and have been enshrined in 
the Nigeria’s SEC code of corporate governance. Other corporate governance 
mechanisms such as board diversity, dividend policy, number of members of 
audit committee, frequency of audit committee meetings, auditor’s fees, directors’ 
shareholding, executive share ownership, quality of financial statements, 
directors’ qualifications, shareholders’ rights, family share ownership, treatment 
of minority shareholders, and takeover defenses were not considered in the 
modeling. These other corporate governance mechanisms were not considered in 
the modeling not because they are not relevant and important, but because they 
have not received much attention from corporate governance. By using primary 
data, stratified sampling method to ensure a more fairly representation of each 
sector, making necessary adjustments to the accounting data and information, and 
including many more corporate governance mechanisms may have brought out 
different research findings. 
 Future studies can build on these research findings by collecting 
primary data based on surveys and interviews. Some form of primary data can 
also be used as a supplement to the secondary data. Some of the restrictions used 
may also be relaxed, such as including all companies that published its financial 
statements, using only financial statements from 2013 when all companies have 
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published financial statements using IFRS, and using data that covered 3 years 
instead of the 5 years used in the study. I used Tobin’s Q as a market-based 
financial performance metric, future studies could use other measures of company 
value such as economic value added, price per share to earnings per share, market 
value added, ROE, and the dollar amount spent on research and development. 
These measures can be used over multiperiod timeframes. 
 Future studies can also use longitudinal design instead of cross-
sectional design to study the relationship between corporate governance and 
organizational financial performance over a period of time. The design is useful to 
study changes that have occurred over an extended period of time using trend 
analysis. Future researchers can also compare the financial performance of a 
group of firms in a subsector of the economy that has adopted and applied 
corporate governance practices to another group in the same subsector that has not 
adopted good corporate governance practices. A study such as this will show 
whether corporate governance practices are responsible for the differences in 
performance if significant. Future researchers can also use repeated-measures 
design to compare the differences in financial performance of companies between 
one event and the other (i.e., the ROA or Tobin’s Q before and after the adoption 
of corporate governance practices). 
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Conclusion 
 I  conclude this study by saying that good corporate governance 
practices are crucial to the long-term financial performance of a corporation. 
Corporate governance practices assure present and potential investors and other 
members of the public that a firm’s affairs will be conducted in a fair and orderly 
manner and that the financial statements can be relied upon in making investment 
decisions. Good corporate governance practices are also good for the economy as 
private companies are the main generators of employment and a source of 
innovation and economic growth. 
 However, firms must consider and implement corporate 
governance systems in areas that have the greatest impact on their financial 
performance. I consider board independence, board experience and members’ 
qualification, adequate executive compensation, independence of audit 
committee, linking executive pay to company performance, appropriate board size 
that ensures diversity and with the right skills-set and experience, frequent 
attendance at board and audit committee meetings, and a focus on stakeholders’ 
rights as essential. Poor corporate governance practices should be avoided, such 
as ownership concentration, appointment of directors through family connections, 
retention of auditors beyond a 10-year period, excessive leverage, concentrating 
board power on the chair/CEO, excessive compensation to unproductive 
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executives, poor CEO accountability, inaccurate information in the financial 
statements, and self-dealing by the directors.  
 Based on my findings, I recommend a more independent board of 
directors composed of knowledgeable and experienced individuals, a more 
independent audit committee composed of independent directors only, and a more 
frequent and agenda-driven board meetings. I also recommend that executives 
should be paid adequately and a portion of the total payment should be a function 
of the firm’s profitability. The total emoluments of highest paid executives should 
be disclosed in the financial statements. All firms should avoid CEO duality, but 
if it is unavoidable, a qualified and experienced leader director should be 
appointed to serve as a counterweight to the chairperson/CEO. For effectiveness, 
the nonexecutive chairman should be as qualified and experienced as the CEO, if 
not more. The size of the board should be that which is adequate to ensure that the 
board is in a position to exercise board power effectively, and what is the right 
size should be based on the complexity of the company and the competitive 
environment.  
 This study provides information that is useful to investors, 
shareholders, regulators, and other researchers on how to ensure effective and 
efficiency of operations in organizations, enhance firm value and profitability, and 
minimize corporate failures. The findings can help investors arrange their 
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portfolio of investments in corporations with strong corporate governance 
practices. The findings can be useful to regulators, especially in Nigeria, by 
showing why some of the provisions in the extant law and corporate governance 
codes are actually hampering good corporate governance practices. Companies 
that are careless and dysfunctional in their corporate governance practices are 
likely to alter their practices to embrace a more proactive and beneficial system of 
governing their firms. By embracing a strong corporate governance system, firms 
may be able to avoid weak organizational performance, lack of investor 
confidence, and the risk of financial distress. A strong corporate governance 
practice benefits the company in other ways by lowering its cost of funds as the 
financial markets and analysts perceive a more disciplined and professionally-run 
business organization. 
 This study has implications for positive social change. If the 
study’s recommendations are implemented, corporations and their shareholders 
may benefit from improved profitability and market value. A good corporate 
governance practice builds confidence in the financial markets, which could be of 
a great benefit to the firms by being able to borrow from the market at the prime 
rates, thus lowering the cost of funds. Present and potential shareholders may 
benefit from improved firm profitability through increased dividend payouts and 
capital appreciation. Employees could reap the benefits of good corporate 
362 
 
 
governance practices through job security and enhanced emoluments that come 
from increased efficiency and effectiveness of their firms. Good corporate 
governance practices may also minimize company collapses, which will be of 
great benefits to investors, employees, the government, and members of the 
general public. 
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Appendix A: Search Sources, Search Processes, and Keywords Used in the Study 
 In this appendix, I describe in detail the sources of information used in the 
research, the keywords I used in searching for data, and the processes of search. I used 
the websites of the listed companies, analysts’ websites, and the database of the Nigerian 
Stock Exchange. I also made extensive use of academic research databases as key sources 
of data for the research study.  
Search Sources 
Nigerian companies’ websites 
Nigerian companies’ websites provided information on the history of the 
firms, corporate governance policies and procedures, the board of directors, and 
information on each director including their resumes, other directorships held, and 
share ownership. The Investor Relations section on the websites contains 
operational, financial, and governance information. Data obtained from the 
financial statements included the frequency of board meetings held in the 
financial year, the number of audit committee members and their relationship with 
the company, the number of directors and their affiliation with the corporation, 
the number of independent directors, executive compensation, the size of the 
board, the size of the audit committee, and the age of the and the name of the 
firm. 
The database of the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) 
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I obtained online the data on all public companies’ filings from the 
database of the NSE. The data retrieved from the website included the annual 
reports and accounts of all sampled companies mandatorily filed with the 
exchange and corporate actions including reports on mergers and acquisitions, 
declaration of dividends, and key appointment of auditors, members of the audit 
committee, and directors. The annual reports and accounts contained information 
on corporate profile, corporate governance reports, complaints management 
policy, and notice of the annual general meeting. The financial statements also 
contained the chairperson’s statement, chief executive’s report, the report of the 
directors, statement of directors’ responsibilities, audit committee report, and 
external auditor’s opinion on the financial statements. The website also contained 
information on stock prices, trading volume for all equities, dividend declared, 
and notice of annual general meetings. 
 The Nigerian Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) website 
The Nigerian Securities and Exchange Commission is the capital market 
regulator. The website contained information on the corporate governance code 
that guide all capital market operators. The website also contained code of 
corporate governance for shareholders’ associations and code of conduct for 
rating agencies operating in the country. 
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Analysts’ websites 
I used analysts’ websites in the study including those belonging to the 
Financial Times of London, Meristem Securities, and the Bloomberg L.P. 
Company. The Financial Times website provided information on the companies’ 
historical stock prices, income and cash flow statements, balance sheet, and 
various metrics such as earnings per share (EPS), total debt to total capital, gross 
margin, return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), and return on investment 
(ROI). Meristem Securities website contained a full appraisal of selected 
companies financial performance, including computations of fundamental metrics 
such as book value per share, ROA market capitalization, asset turnover, and 
leverage. In the Bloomberg L.P. website, I accessed information on companies’ 
outstanding shares, number of directors, price quotes, share volume turnover, 
market capitalization, price per earnings (P/E) ratio, and enterprise value. 
Academic Databases 
 I obtained the description of key research variables, concepts, and 
theoretical frameworks from several academic research databases. The databases 
accessed for the purpose of this study were as follows: 
1. Business Source Complete 
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Business Source Complete database provided very useful full-text, peer-
reviewed academic journal in various field of management, such as business, 
finance, and general  management. The database contained thousands of case 
studies, financial data, and SWOT analyses. 
2. ABI/INFORM Collection 
ABI/INFORM database provided peer-reviewed journals, reports, working 
papers, management theory and practices, trends in business, and business 
competition and strategy. 
3. ScienceDirect 
The ScienceDirect database contained several unique peerreviewed 
journals with special focus on management, information technology, and 
psychology. Many of the journals may not be available in any other databases. 
4. Accounting & Tax 
Accounting & Tax database contained scholarly journals that addressed 
current issues in accounting, finance, and taxation. The database included key 
resources for a quick location of news, current topics, and trends and history that 
influence accounting, finance, and tax issues. 
5. Academic Search Complete 
Academic Search Complete database provided very useful and 
comprehensive multidisciplinary peer-reviewed journals  conference papers, and 
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other resources. Full text research articles were available in corporate finance, 
business  management, accounting, and the social sciences disciplines. 
6. Social Science Research Network (SSRN) 
The Social Science Research Network provided very good information in 
many social sciences area. I extracted information from the database using full-
length articles and abstracts. 
7. ProQuest Central 
The ProQuest Central database provided a large selection of scholarly and 
peer-reviewed academic journals. The database has other unique materials such as 
newspapers, dissertations, and information on business, management, and finance. 
8. Emerald Management 
Emerald Management database provided several management research for 
the scholar as well as the practitioner. The peer-reviewed journals covered diverse 
subject areas such as auditing, accounting, finance, economics, organizational 
behavior, and general management. 
9. Sage Premier 
The Sage Premier database provided 56 peer-reviewed management 
journals. Some of the research content are very unique to the database. 
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10. Google Scholar 
The Google Scholar contained peer-reviewed journals and database provided access to 
some of the journals used in the study. The site was linked to Walden University library 
and also provided links to other sites such as Science Direct, which is one of the largest 
databases consisting of a collection of research in social, physical, and health sciences.  
 
Keywords 
The keyword search terms I used in this study were: accounting, 
amortization, asset turnover, audit committee, audit committee independence, 
audit committee report, auditing, agency cost, agency problems, agency theory, 
bad governance change, balance sheet, board of directors, board meetings, board 
secretary, board size, board structure, book values, book value per share, Business 
Roundtable, capital employed, cash flow, CEO duality, chairperson’s statement, 
code of ethics, code of conduct, code of corporate governance, Companies and 
Allied Matters Act, conflicts of interest, corporate collapses, corporate 
governance principles, corporate governance report, corporate information, 
corporate misbehavior, corporate scandals, corporate social responsibility, current 
assets, current liabilities depreciation, directors report, Directors’ responsibility, 
dividends, dysfunctional management, earned value added, earnings, earnings per 
share, economic value added, emission standards cheating, enterprise value, 
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equity prices, executive compensation, external auditing, financial performance, 
Financial Reporting Council of Nigeria, financial ratios, financial risks, financial 
structure, firm age, firm size,  fraud and irregularities, good governance change, 
golden parachute, Gov.-score, governance committee, gross domestic product, 
gross margin, income statement, independent director, information asymmetry, 
International Financial Reporting Standards, institutional investors, internal 
auditing, leverage, long-term debt, long-term financial performance, management 
entrenchment, market capitalization, market value, Meristem Securities Limited, 
misappropriation, moral hazard, net assets, Nigerian Securities and Exchange 
Commission, Nigerian Stock Exchange, notice of annual general meeting, , 
number of directors, Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, poison pill, 
Ponzi scheme, Public Companies Accounting Oversight Board, Price/Earnings 
ratio, price metrics, proxy statements, quality of earnings, non-executive director, 
organizational performance, ownership structure, return on assets, return on 
capital employed, return on equity, return on investment, risk management, sales 
turnover, Sarbanes-Oxley Act, separation of ownership and control, stakeholders, 
stakeholders’ theory, stewardship theory, shareholders’ association, shareholders’ 
wealth, stock prices, take-over defense, theory of the firm, Tobin’s Q, total assets, 
transparency, United Nations Development Program, and volume of trading. 
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Search Process 
In this section, I will describe the process used to obtain data from 
websites and academic research database systems: 
The process used to obtain data from the Nigerian Stock Exchange 
website was as follows: 
           1.        Access www.nse.com.ng 
2.  Look for issuers 
3.  Select listed companies 
3.  Enter the company’s name and ticker symbol 
4.  Select financials 
5.  Select the year of interest (e.g., 12/31/2015) 
6.  Select financial statement  
7. Select full and supplementary income and cash flow statements 
and the statements of financial position 
8. Select market data and access trading statistics such as volume, 
value, deals, and market capitalization 
9.  Download Daily Trading Statistics of listed securities and obtain 
closing stock prices, weekly report of equities, top gainers, and the Daily Official 
List for equities 
10.  Select corporate actions 
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11.  Select press releases. 
The following steps were used to search the companies’ websites and 
extract data from the accessed financial statements and annual reports. 
Access company website (e.g., www.nestle-cwa.com) 
Select investors 
Select download company business principles 
Select download annual account and reports 
Search for financial statements and supplementary data 
Select Notice of Annual General Meeting 
Select Company Profile 
Search for Chairman’s Statement 
Search for Chief Executive Report 
Search for Directors’ Report, including Board Structure, Board Com 
position, Number of Directors, Number of Independent/Non-executive Directors, 
Board Meetings held in the year, attendance at the meetings, and directors’ 
resumes and company affiliation 
Search for Corporate Governance Report for the year addressed to 
members of the company 
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Search for the composition of Audit Committee, attendance at the 
committee meetings, and the signed report of the committee addressed to 
shareholders 
Search for Companies’ Officers, Directors, and Advisers 
Search for Annual proxy statements 
Search for Statement of Directors’ Responsibilities 
Search for the Independent Auditors’ Report 
Select the Statement of Financial Position and compute total assets, 
current liabilities, current assets, inventory, book value of equity, long-term 
liabilities, number of outstanding shares, and paid-up capital 
Select statement of comprehensive income and compute earnings before 
interest, taxation, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA). 
Search for Executive Compensation. 
Select Share Information and compute the number of ordinary shares in 
existence at the end of the year. 
Select other National Disclosures and access Five-year Financial 
Summary and Value-added Statements. 
The process I used to search for data on the website of the Nigerian 
Securities and Exchange Commission was as follows: 
Access www.sec.gov.ng 
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Select regulation 
Select rules and codes 
Select Code of Conduct for Rating Agencies 
Select Code of Corporate Governance for Shareholders’ associations 
Select Code of Corporate Governance for Public Companies. 
I used the same process that was employed while searching data on 
companies’ websites to access data on the analysts’ websites. On the website of 
Meristem Securities Limited, I accessed data as follows: 
Access www.meristemng.com 
Select Research Hub 
Select Investor Services/Market Intelligence 
Select equity market update 
Select equity research reports 
Select the desired listed equity 
Search for market capitalization, share price, dividend per share, and 
earnings per share. 
On the website of Bloomberg L.P., I followed the following process to 
access data: 
Access www.bloomberg.com 
Select Markets 
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Select Stocks 
Select EMEA 
Select Africa 
Select Nigeria 
Select NGSE/INDX:IND Nigeria 
Go to stock exchange Main Board 
Lookup total members, day range, 52-week range, year-to-date return, and 
previous close for equity prices. 
The following process was used  to access data on Financial Times 
website: 
Access www.markets.ft.com 
Select Markets 
Select Market data 
Select equities 
Type name of company in “find a company” dialog box 
Search summary, price, and shares traded 
Select financials and search income statement, cash flow statement, and 
balance sheet 
Search directors and dealings 
Search historical prices. 
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I used the same process to get data from various websites, even though the 
details and organization of data varied from website to website. On a company’s 
website, I collected information from the Investors’ Relations portion of the 
website. Publicly listed companies in Nigeria upload their financial reports and 
other data in the Investors’ Relations of the website. Another feature of the 
investment climate in Nigeria is that the consolidated financial statements have 
extensive details on the board composition, the history of the firm, audit 
committee composition, number and portfolio held by executive directors, full 
resume of all directors and the relationship with the firm. The financial reports 
and accounts also contained sections for the Chairman’s Statement, The Report of 
the Chief Executive, the Report of the Audit Committee, the Statement of 
Directors’ Responsibilities, the number of board and Audit Committee meetings 
held in the year, and the number of meetings each director attended.  
The consolidated financial statements also included sections for various 
committee reports, such as operations committee, risk management committee, 
executive compensation committee, finance and general purposes committee, and 
establishment committee. The number of board committees vary from company to 
company, depending on the size, history, and the sector. From the financial 
statements, I collected data on net sales; EBITDA; executive compensation; total 
assets; current assets; current liabilities; and net working capital. I also collected 
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data from the financial statement on capital employed, long-term liabilities, 
shareholders’ funds, the number of shares outstanding, and long-term debt. The 
Corporate Governance Report section of the financial statements and reports 
provided data on corporate governance variables, such as the number of executive 
and non-executive directors, whether the chair is also the chief executive, the 
number of board meetings held during the year, the size of the board, number of 
committees, external and independent directors, and the directors full resume. The 
Audit Committee Report section of the financial statements contained the number 
of the committee, the interest each of them represented, a report of their findings, 
and the number of times they met during the year. 
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Appendix B: Index Scoring Methodology 
I entered the data collected on Microsoft Excel spreadsheet to calculate the 
mean, median, mode, and standard deviation. Tobin’s Q was also calculated using 
the excel spreadsheet with the following formula: Market value of equity + book 
value of preference shares + inventory + current liabilities – current assets / total 
assets (Dharmadasa et al., 2014). Return on Assets (ROA) was calculated using 
excel spreadsheet using the following formula: Earnings before interest, taxes, 
amortization, and depreciation divided by the book value of total assets. Return on 
Capital Employed (ROCE) was also calculated by excel spreadsheet using the 
following formula: 
Earnings before interest, taxes, amortization, and depreciation divided by 
book value of capital employed.  
Capital employed is computed as approximately as follows: 
Book value of shareholders’ funds or Net Assets + Long-term debt. 
The average score for each research dependent variable was the average of 
the scores for the 5 years (i.e., the total scores for 2011 to 2015 were added 
together and divided by 5 to get the average score). 
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Appendix C: List of Sampled Companies 
 
Company name   Ticker Symbol  Subsector 
 
A. G. Leventis Nigeria PLC  AGLEVENT   Conglomerates 
Airline Services & Logistics PLC AIRSERVE   Services 
B.O.C. Gases PLC   BOCGAS   Natural Resources 
Berger Paints PLC   BERGER   Industrial Goods 
C&I Leasing PLC   CILEASING   Services 
Cadbury Nigeria PLC   CADBURY   Consumer Goods 
CAP PLC    CAP    Industrial Goods 
Capital Hotel PLC   CAPHOTEL   Services 
Dangote Refinery PLC  DANGSUGAR  Consumer Goods 
DN Meyer PLC   DNMEYER   Industrial Goods 
E-Tranzact Internal PLC  ETRANZACT  ICT 
Eterna PLC    ETERNA   Oil and Gas 
Fidson Healthcare PLC  FIDSON   Healthcare 
First Aluminium Nigeria PLC FIRSTALUM   Industrial Goods 
Flour Mills Nigeria PLC  FLOURMILL   Consumer Goods 
Glaxo Smithkline Consumer PLC GLAXOSMITH  Healthcare 
Greif Nigeria PLC   VANLEER   Industrial Goods 
Guinness Nigeria PLC  GUINESS   Consumer Goods 
Honeywell Flour Mills PLC  HONYFLOUR  Consumer Goods 
Julius Berger Nigeria PLC  JBERGR   Construction/Real 
      Estate 
Livestock Feeds PLC   LIVESTOCK   Agriculture 
May & Baker Nigeria PLC  MAYBAKER   Healthcare 
MRS Oil Nigeria PLC  MRS    Oil & Gas 
Nascon Allied Industries PLC NASCON   Consumer Goods 
Nestle Nigeria PLC   NESTLE   Consumer Goods 
Nigerian Aviation Handling 
Company PLC   NAHCO   Services 
Nigerian Breweries PLC  NB    Consumer Goods 
Nigerian Enamelware PLC  ENAMELWA   Consumer Goods 
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PZ Cussons Nigeria PLC  PZ    Consumer Goods 
Presco PLC    PRESCO   Agriculture 
Red Star Express PLC  REDSTAREX   Services 
Studio Press Nigeria PLC  STUDPRESS   Services 
Total Nigeria PLC   TOTAL   Oil and Gas 
Trans-nationwide Express PLC TRANSEXPR   Services 
Transnational Corporation of 
Nigeria PLC    TRANSCORP   Conglomerates 
UACN PLC    UACN    Conglomerates 
UACN Property Development  
Company PLC   UNC-PROP   Construction/Real    
                                                                                                             Estate 
Unilever Nigeria PLC   UNILEVER   Consumer Goods 
Vitafoam Nigeria PLC  VITAFOAM   Consumer Goods  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
